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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the 1980s, democracy has expanded noticeably both internationally and in Latin 
America.1 From 1990 to 2012, the number of democratic regimes in the world increased from 69 
to 117. Of no less significance, in Latin America, by 2008, freely elected governments existed 
everywhere except in Cuba, and polls consistently showed strong support throughout the region 
for democratic governments. Although substantial progress has been made, serious problems do 
remain. 
Three interrelated objectives guide my comparative study of Colombia and Venezuela. 
My first objective is to identify the myriad of obstacles and setbacks that Colombia and 
Venezuela faced throughout their histories, and explain how those factors affected each nation’s 
processes of state and regime creation. To complete such task, I conduct two separate but 
interrelated analyses of each country’s political history. I begin with an examination of each 
nation’s relevant topographical attributes and pre-Columbian societies. I complete this part of the 
analysis at present day. After documenting the political trajectory of each nation from the 
moment the Spaniards arrive until the present, I explain the way colonialism; the development of 
distinct competing regions with correspondingly disparate regional identities; the presence or 
absence of natural resources; adverse political subcultures; clientelism; and international factors 
hindered the capacity of each nation to create stable democratic regimes.  
My second interrelated objective is to evaluate the explanatory value of existing theories 
of state creation and democratization, and to propose alternative arguments. The Colombian case 
is unique in that the nation possesses a long history of regularly held and successful electoral 
contests that should have led to the creation of a stable democratic regime. And yet, democracy 
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in Colombia is severely undermined by a relatively weak state unable to enforce the rule of law 
and to protect essential freedoms, and by the prolonged presence of internal armed conflict. In 
regards to the Venezuelan case, I attribute the regime’s recent reversion to authoritarianism to 
the fact that throughout much of its contemporary history, the nation retained an overbearing and 
highly centralized state that facilitated the creation of a paternalistic political culture. As a result, 
in times of economic or political crisis, the desire for security and stability has led to the 
condemnation and collapse of the whole regime, rather than to widespread social and political 
reconciliation. In the absence of institutional mechanisms that seek to resolve differences and 
accommodate the interests of all factions in society, democracy will falter. 
My last objective is to briefly assess the current state of democracy in Latin America. 
Although most countries in the region have successfully traveled from dictatorship to electoral 
democracy, save for Cuba and for the most part, Venezuela, the consolidation of democracy has 
yet to be achieved. The comparative analysis of the aforementioned nations serves to provide 
important insights into the nature of democracy, as well as about the factors that continue to 
inhibit its establishment in the region. The conclusions reached by this study could help lay the 
foundation for the analysis of other Latin American cases, as well as contribute to the existing 
literature that seeks to explain the process of democratization throughout Latin America. 
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Literature Review 
Democracy is not inevitable and it is revocable -- it is a choice, not a necessity.2 A 
substantial amount of conceptual and theoretical work on the processes of state creation and 
democratization exists in the realm of political science. Scholars have relied on much of this 
work to try to explain the ways democracies have been constructed throughout the various Latin 
America states. Democracy has generally been defined as a political system of that meets three 
conditions: 1) competition among individuals and organized groups for all positions of 
government, determined at regular intervals and without the use of force; 2) a highly inclusive 
level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies through regular and fair 
elections; 3) and a level of civil and political liberties sufficient enough to guarantee the integrity 
of political competition and participation.3 Additionally, in order for a democracy to be stable it 
must possess political legitimacy. Political legitimacy is attained only when all significant 
political actors (elites and organizations) along with the public, “…believe that the democratic 
regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic 
alternative they can imagine.”4 However, the process of regime legitimization can only occur 
within the boundaries of a well-structured state. As a result, although the processes of state 
creation and democratization may differ, they are inextricably bound to one another in myriad 
ways.  
As a result, there exists a wide array of theories that tend to explain why democracies 
emerge, mature, consolidate, break down, and reemerge, as well as why some countries have 
enjoyed greater success in the construction of stable democratic regimes than others. In order to 
provide a comprehensive review of the existing literature that analyzes the processes of state-
building and democratization, I have separated this chapter into two parts. In the first section, I 
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begin by discussing general theories surrounding the processes of state creation and 
democratization. I then focus on the literature that directly pertain to Latin America, and pay 
particular attention to the factors that have generally affected the consolidation of democracy in 
the region.  
All relevant theories of state creation and democratization retain an analytical framework 
that is based upon a few fundamental principles. First, it is essential to note that a stable 
democracy will not emerge in a state that has failed to consolidate its power. Moreover, the 
processes of state consolidation and legitimization are never fully complete. These processes are 
constantly changing in tandem with socioeconomic, cultural and political shifts experienced 
within the confines of a specific territory. Additionally, external conditions dictated by the 
international environment have a profound impact on the processes of state creation and 
democratization. As a result, changes in both the climate of the international arena as well as the 
existing social, economic and political conditions of a given territory have the ability to either 
hinder or facilitate the process of democratization.  
Lastly, it is important to emphasize that most Latin American nations emerged from their 
respective wars of independence retaining different political, economic and social institutions. 
Due to the lack of administrative uniformity exerted by the Spanish empire upon its colonies, the 
strength, efficacy and legitimacy of these institutions varied drastically. After achieving 
independence in the 1820s (with the exception of Cuba who gained independence from Spain in 
1898), these newly formed nations were challenged by a host of internal disputes and domestic 
troubles ranging from: lengthy periods of civil war and instability that destroyed the wealth and 
infrastructure of the colonial period, mounting public debt, economic hardship as trade had come 
to a complete standstill, and the subsequent rise of ‘strong-men’, or caudillos to political 
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prominence among other setbacks.5 In the cases of Colombia and Venezuela these internal 
complications would subsequently serve as preliminary obstacles to the consolidation of 
democracy; they would also make both nations particularly susceptible to disruptive economic, 
military and political pressures emanating from the international arena.  
    
The Contemporary State and Theories of State Creation 
The state of the past few centuries differs tremendously from the modern state. Samuel E. 
Finer proposes that the contemporary state has acquired five salient characteristics over the 
duration of several centuries.  First, each state encompasses a particular territory that is inhabited 
by a population that acknowledges the legitimacy of a central organ of government. Second, the 
organ of government consists of a civil service that carries out decisions, and a military service 
that backs the decisions by force when necessary and protects the association from other 
similarly constituted associations. Third, each state recognizes the sovereignty of other similarly 
constituted states. Fourth, each state strives to create a sense of community based on a common 
nationality. And fifth, members of the internal community mutually distribute and share duties 
and benefits.6 
Most importantly, Finer posits that the contemporary state can be differentiated from the 
state of the Middle Ages along two major variables: territoriality and function. During the 
medieval period, a vassal may have had to make up his own mind as to where his allegiances lay 
in times of conflict since political allegiance was a, “man-to-man relationship, and obedience 
might be due, in different circumstances, to several overlords.”7 By contrast, in modern times, 
political obedience is a function of territorial location, whereby allegiance is owed to a single 
authority of a specified territory – usually a government, dictator, prince and so forth. The 
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second distinction between the medieval and modern state that Finer emphasizes is functionality. 
As Gaetano Mosca puts it, “by ‘feudal state’ we mean that type of political organization in which 
all the executive functions of society – the economic, the judicial, the administrative, the military 
– are exercised simultaneously by the same individuals…”8 Finer contends that within the 
contemporary state the aforementioned functions are not consolidated in one office or individual, 
but are differentiated among various state apparatuses. Thus, Finer comes to conclude that the, 
“…twin process – from consolidated service to differentiated service and from differentiated 
territory to consolidated territory – is what constitutes the development of the modern state.”9  
 Finer’s distinction between medieval and contemporary state serves as a foundational 
definition that Charles Tilly builds upon via his assertion that a territory is a state in so far as it is 
differentiated from other organizations operating in the same territory; it is autonomous; it is 
centralized; and its divisions are formally coordinated with one another.10 Tilly posits seven 
distinct conditions that contributed to Europe’s success in satisfying the aforementioned 
requirements. According to Tilly, the probability that a European territory would be able to 
engage in the state creation process relied upon its:  
(1) Access to extractable resources; 
(2) A relatively protected position from military conquest for substantial periods of time; 
(3) A continuous supply of capable political leaders; 
(4) A powerful military and success in war; 
(5) A homogenous population; 
(6) Strong coalitions of the central power with a unified landed elite; and 
(7) An advantageous position within the international system11 
10 
 
Among these seven conditions, a few are of particular relevance to the processes of state 
building and regime creation in Latin America. They are: the abundance of fertile land, mineral 
wealth and in some cases oil (condition one); the ascension and subsequent proliferation of local 
strongmen or caudillos to head of government (condition three); varying degrees of 
heterogeneity in ethnicity, class, and religious beliefs (condition 5); and the ability of economic 
and political elites to unify and subject themselves to the authority of a centralized organization 
(condition 6). While the remaining conditions are also significant, those just mentioned have had 
the greatest effect on shaping the political landscape of the region. 
Similar to Tilly, Stein Rokkan constructs a state-building paradigm with the goal of 
performing two tasks. The model must focus upon crucial dimensions of variation across 
political systems and discuss alternative time sequences in the interaction of such dimensions; 
and must serve as a conceptual mapping of variations within and between regions. Rokkan adds 
that the initial state-building process can be divided into four phases.  
The first phase relates back to Tilly’s sixth condition, which is the period of political, 
economic, and cultural unification at the elite level.  During that time the elites strike a series of 
bargains and establish a variety of cultural bonds across networks of local power-holders. They 
also build institutions for the purpose of extracting the resources necessary to create a common 
defense, to maintain internal order and adjudicate disputes, to protect established rights and 
privileges, and to protect and advance the economy and the polity.”12 The second phase entails 
the creation of channels of direct contact between the central elite and peripheral populations as a 
means of establishing widespread feelings of identity with the political system. In the third 
phase, the new channels of contact engender the active participation of the masses via political 
parties, opposition groups and additional organs of representation. In the fourth phase, the 
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growth of agencies of redistribution allows for the building of public welfare services and the 
equalization of economic conditions among other administrative services.13 
Jorge Dominguez’s conception of state creation is similar to both Tilly’s and Rokkan’s. 
Dominguez asserts that a state is a set of institutions that retains a legitimate monopoly of force 
over a given territory, and has the authority to exercise said force.14 Therefore, a state must have 
the capacity to both exert its authority over a given population, as well as be clearly 
distinguishable from other organizations present within the same territory. While both Tilly and 
Rokkan would agree that these conditions are essential, Dominguez goes further and emphasizes 
that state control over a population is a “function of the state’s claim to the monopoly of force.”15 
This assertion relates to the idea of the territorial consolidation posited by Finer, which remains 
an integral distinction between medieval and contemporary states.   
 Before I move on to discuss theories of democracy, there are two other theories that are 
pertinent to the present analysis. The dependency theory is of particular relevance to Venezuela 
as well as Colombia. The theory is constructed on the premise that the sovereign states of the 
Southern hemisphere have long been dependent for advanced technology, financing, markets, 
and basic imports on an international economic system dominated by northern capitalist powers. 
As a result, less developed countries cannot exist as independent nations for they are 
economically and politically constrained by their dependence. Furthermore, the structure of the 
international system ostensibly confines the economies of countries such Colombia and 
Venezuela to either agricultural or extractive industries – industries that inherently provide for 
less dynamic forms of growth.16 This asymmetrical relationship undermines the authority and 
legitimacy of the weaker state, because it impairs its ability to generate sufficient funds. As a 
result, external forces are increasingly able to dictate and influence the development of state 
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institutions. In the words of Andre Gunder Frank, “under-development was and still is generated 
by the very same historical process which also generated economic development: the 
development of capitalism itself.”17 The second relevant theory is the resource curse, or paradox 
of plenty theory. According to this theory, states rich in minerals and petroleum are predisposed 
to generate high levels of corruption, ineffective governance and violence. This theory is 
particularly useful when analyzing the impact petroleum has had on the Venezuelan state.18  
 
Theories of Democratization 
Robert Dahl, Wolfgang Merkel, Juan Linz, and Alfred Stephan have advanced the most 
comprehensive and salient scholarship on the process of democratization in Europe and Latin 
America. In his work Regimes and Opposition, Dahl asserts that democratic governments are 
fundamentally characterized by their ability to respond to citizens’ preferences without 
establishing differences between them. In order for this to transpire, all citizens must have an 
equal opportunity to formulate their preferences; publicly manifest their preferences among their 
fellow partisans and before the government, both individually and collectively; and be treated 
equally by the government. For those three basic conditions to be met, they must be 
accompanied by eight essential guarantees: 
 
1. Freedom of association; 
2. Freedom of expression; 
3. The right to vote; 
4. Eligibility for public office; 
5. The right of political leaders to compete for votes; 
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6. Diverse sources of information; 
7. Free and fair elections; 
8. Government policies that depend on the vote and other forms of preference expression.19 
 
For Dahl, the extent to which any number of those guarantees is present in a contemporary 
political regime can be represented along two dimensions: public contestation and participation. 
Four types of regimes are derived from those dimensions: polyarchy, competitive oligarchy, 
inclusive hegemony, and closed hegemony. The regime classifications are absolutes – the 
extremes of both dimensions. Thus, it is possible and probable that a majority of political 
regimes fall somewhere in between these classifications. Dahl’s theoretical framework can be 
clearly illustrated by the diagram below: 
 
Competitive  
Oligarchy 
 
Polyarchy 
 
Closed 
Hegemony 
 
Inclusive 
Hegemony 
   
 
In the upper right corner of the diagram are polyarchies. These regimes are considered by Dahl 
to be the most democratic since they impose the fewest restrictions on essential freedoms. 
Moreover, polyarchies provide various ways for political parties, opposition groups and other 
organizations to participate through representative government. Diagonally across from 
polyarchy on the diagram are closed hegemonic regimes. In this type of regime all forms of 
expression and organization are banned; dissent and opposition are prohibited. Although public 
Participation 
C
o
m
p
et
it
io
n
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contestation is nonexistent in both closed and inclusive hegemonic regimes, in the latter, 
participation is unconstrained. In Inclusive hegemonies, although there exist hardly any 
institutional barriers to participation, the participants lack access to organizations with the 
authority to voice their dissent and oppose the government. Finally, located in the upper left 
corner of the diagram are competitive oligarchies. Those regimes possess high levels of public 
contestation, but restrict participation.20  
           The scholarship of Wolfgang Merkel differs from Dahl’s. Merkel proposes that a liberal 
democracy must consist of five partial regimes. It must have an electoral regime that permits 
free, fair, and regular elections; a second one that protects freedoms of speech and association; a 
third one that guards civil rights and liberties; a fourth one that ensures the separation of powers 
between executive, legislative and judicial branches; and a fifth one that shields elected officials 
from attempts by nonelected groups to overrule or overthrow them. Merkel also contends that for 
a political regime to be considered democratic, the aforementioned requirements must be 
mutually embedded. Simply put, partial conditions are contingently interconnected.21 
In turn, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan assert that in addition to a well-functioning state, 
five other interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions must be present, or be crafted, in 
order for a democracy to be consolidated. The prerequisites are the existence of a free and lively 
civil society; of a relatively autonomous political society; of an established rule of law that 
protects individual freedoms and associational life; of an effective state bureaucracy; and of an 
institutionalized economic society.22 Linz and Stepan go a step further and identify two major 
obstacles to democratic consolidation. They are the dangers posed by ethnic conflict in 
multinational states, and by disappointed popular hopes for economic improvement in states 
undergoing simultaneous political and economic reform. Although Linz and Stepan label those 
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photos as “surmountable obstacles”, they are nevertheless, potentially inhibiting factors to the 
consolidation of democracy.   
Lastly, it is imperative to draw a clear boundary between democratic and non- democratic 
regimes. It is counterproductive to claim that some democracies are more or less democratic than 
others, for democracy is directly related to the presence of all of the aforementioned conditions. 
For instance, it is false to consider a regime that prohibits competitive elections to be democratic 
even if it satisfies other conditions of democracy. Thus, terms such as “illiberal democracy” or 
“partial democracy” are useless as they are counterintuitive.23 
 
Latin American Theories of State Creation and Democratization 
To present a comprehensive review of the variety of theories related to state creation and 
democratization in Latin America, I will separate this section into two, with one focusing on 
factors that have affected the process of state creation, and the second one on the elements that 
have impacted the process of democratization.  
In addition to the state-creation theories posited by Tilly and Rokkan, there are several 
salient theories of state-creation specific to Latin America. Frank Safford and Fernando Lopez-
Alvez have posited two of the most comprehensive arguments. According to Frank Safford, an 
assemblage of seven factors has either enabled or inhibited state development in nineteenth-
century Latin America. They are:  
 
1. Economic geography, including topography, resources, and relative economic 
integration; 
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2. Political geography, including geographic and transportation conditions 
affecting political integration;  
3. Relative economic and fiscal strength;  
4. Public acceptance of the political systems, whether framed in constitutions or 
not;  
5. The degree to which the military was under the control of civil authorities; 
6. The role of the Catholic Church; and  
7. The nation’s vulnerability to external attack or pressure.  
 
Safford emphasizes that the relative importance and effects of each variable differs from 
case to case.24 For example, whereas the Catholic Church was not a significant source of division 
in Venezuela, it was a major source of conflict and armed struggle in Colombia. Control over the 
military was also a very important factor that if achieved, enhanced the ability of a state to 
consolidate its power. Lastly, Safford concludes that vulnerability to external pressure appears to 
have been a relatively unimportant variable in the grand scheme of state creation.  
Lopez-Alvez posits an argument that diverges from the one advanced by Safford. Lopez-
Alvez asserts that feudal characteristics of rural life in several Latin American countries are not 
accurate predictors of state-creation. Rather, more relevant to the process, are conflict and 
concomitant collective action. For Lopez-Alvez, those two factors together have determined 
access to the means of production, altered property relations, created new classes, and displaced 
old land and trade monopolies in Latin American states. In relation to conflict, those who strive 
to consolidate the power of the state relied principally on the support of members of the nobility 
during wars. The degree to which they were successful, in turn, affected the timing and character 
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of class alliances and the development of state bureaucracies. Lastly, Lopez-Alvez postulates that 
the state creation process was less cumbersome when the members of the rebellious upper class 
were unable to unite against the elites at the center; when the landed gentry were defeated in 
their own domains; and when battles took place in distant regions not controlled by the 
government.25  
 
Conditions of Democratic Consolidation 
There are a number of conditions that have affected the consolidation, or lack thereof, of 
democracy throughout Latin America. For Jeff Haynes they are the political culture and 
legitimacy of the post-authoritarian regime; the nature of political participation and institutions; 
and the economic and international conditions under which the drive to consolidate the 
democratic regime ensued. Haynes also asserts that the development of a strong civic culture 
imbued with high levels of mutual trust, tolerance of diversity and a propensity to compromise, 
is essential to the stability of a democratic regime. Larry Diamond builds upon this idea with his 
contention that, “these elements [moderation, cooperation, bargaining, and accommodation] of 
political culture were necessary…to cope with one of the central dilemmas of democracy: to 
balance cleavage and conflict with the need for consensus.”26 The way in which such a culture is 
created and maintained is through the healthy functioning of democratic institutions and 
structures over a long duration of time. Due to the cyclical resurgence of authoritarian rule 
generally experienced throughout Latin America however, these institutions remain relatively 
weak. As a result, a strong civic culture imbued with the aforementioned qualities remains 
particularly elusive in most nations throughout Latin America.  
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Moreover, Hayes argues that political leaders in developing states are rarely willing to 
relinquish their power. This obstacle to democratic consolidation is quite common amongst most 
Latin American countries, not only because public participation is routinely sidestepped, but also 
because military intervention is frequently relied upon to either retain power or to topple those in 
power.27 Regarding Haynes’ second condition, John Peeler asserts that from 1900-1975 liberal 
democracies were able to persist when regimes proved able to absorb and co-opt substantial 
forms of political participation without altering the balance of political power. As such, the 
successful establishment of liberal democracy in Latin America was contingent upon the 
regime’s ability to include major interests in the decision-making process, as to avoid rebellion. 
In his study of five early democratic regimes (Chile, Uruguay, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Venezuela) Peeler concluded that all of the regimes remained politically stable for decades 
because each was structured to maintain social and economic stability. Simply put, while most 
Latin American countries dealt with expanding political participation either through populist 
authoritarianism and electoral manipulation, repression, or revolution, the five aforementioned 
regimes were able to remain democratic due to a highly institutionalized political system as well 
as by political pacts formed at the elite levels.28  
Lastly, Haynes, relies on the works of Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio 
Chibub, and Fernando Limongi, to contend that for democracy to survive, a country must already 
have a democracy in place, must be affluent, must generate economic growth, allow moderate 
inflation and reduce income inequality, must have parliamentary institutions and be positioned in 
an amicable international environment.29 By looking at the relationship between economic 
performance and democratic stability, Przeworski and his three co-authors conclude that while 
there is a strong correlation between economic performance and the consolidation and 
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persistence of democratic regimes in Latin America, a country’s level of economic development 
alone could not predict whether a regime will become democratic.30 Many of Haynes’ arguments 
are expanded in Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset’s, 
Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America.31   
 With this brief discussion of a number of theories of state creation and democratization 
and their applications to Latin America, I have established a base upon which I will conduct my 
analysis. In the following chapters, I discuss the processes of state-building and regime 
formation that transpired in Colombia and Venezuela, and posit a theoretical argument for each 
as to why both nations have problems creating solid democratic regimes.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Colombia: An Unconsolidated Democracy 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Today state authority in Colombia is formally exercised in accordance with the 1991 
constitution, which defines Colombia as a “decentralized, unitary Republic, with autonomous 
territorial entities, democratic, participatory, and pluralist”. Although the ‘state-of-siege’ powers 
that Colombian presidents have repeatedly relied on to exercise legislative as well as judicial 
power have been significantly curtailed, the executive continues to be the key political office in 
Colombia. Moreover, in 2015 a series of constitutional amendments known as the Balance of 
Power reform eliminated immediate presidential reelection to further deter executive 
concentration of power. Elections have been relatively peaceful, although the 2014 legislative 
elections were marred by accusations of fraud, vote buying, and connections with criminals. This 
latest incident of perceived electoral tampering has engendered a flurry of debate primarily 
amongst intellectuals and government officials surrounding the strengthening of financing and 
political contribution laws, as well as the implementation of more efficient vote-counting 
mechanisms.  
Ever since the constitutional reform of 1991, the traditional Liberal-Conservative partisan 
duopoly in Congress has been on the decline. The new system is comprised of the traditional 
parties as well as regional movements, ideological groups (both from the right and left), and 
technocratic or issue-oriented parties. Corruption still occurs at multiple levels of public 
administration, albeit to a lesser degree than in previous years. Civil liberties, associational and 
organizational rights, and rule of law all remain weakly enforced by the state. The inability of the 
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state to protect civil liberties and ensure the rule of law greatly inhibits liberal democratic 
governance in Colombia.  
In this chapter I justify the aforementioned contentions. To do so, I divide Colombia’s 
history into distinct periods. Following the section that focuses on the era of independence, I 
identify and analyze the political, economic, social, cultural and geographical factors that 
affected the state creation process. At the end of this historical overview, I briefly discuss the 
current state of democracy in Colombia. 
 
 
Pre-Colonial and Colonial Times 
Ever since pre-colonial times, the twin aspects of geography and climate have had a 
decisive impact on the social, political and economic development of Colombia. In order to 
comprehend the processes of state-creation and democratization that have transpired in 
Colombia, it is essential to develop a better understanding of the natural and human 
environments that existed within the region.   
Located in the northwest corner of South America, Colombia shares its borders with 
Venezuela and Brazil to the east, Ecuador to the south, while the Panamanian isthmus provides a 
land route into Central America. On either side of the isthmus there is a coastline – a Caribbean 
Sea coastline and a Pacific Ocean one. Primarily dominated by three Andean mountain ranges 
separated by two broad river valleys (that of the Magdalena and Cauca rivers), Colombia’s 
topographical attributes also include the tropical rain forest of the Amazon jungle, the grasslands 
of the Orinoco River, and other tropical rain forests located on both the Caribbean and Pacific 
coasts.  
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The fourth largest country in Latin America covering approximately 440,829 square 
miles in area, Colombia can be separated into three distinct regions: 1) the mountainous region of 
the west, where three principal ranges of the Andes (the Western, Eastern and Central 
Cordilleras) cut the country and provide for its climatic variations; 2) the eastern region, which 
consists of low-lying flat lands to the north composed of extensive plains (llanos) and the 
Amazonian Jungle to the south; and 3) the area shaped by the Pacific and Caribbean coasts.32 
The Andean region covers around 30 percent of the country’s surface area but retains upwards of 
75 percent of the population. The eastern region constitutes approximately 58 percent of the 
territory, but only 5.5 percent of the population lives there. The Caribbean coast, which 
encompasses around 12 percent of the territory, holds close to 20 percent of the population.33 
Colombia is imbued with a climate that is tropical not only in the relative constancy of 
local temperatures, but also in the abundance of rainfall experienced throughout most of the 
national territory.34 The combination of constant temperature and ample rain allows for the 
vigorous growth of a wide variety of vegetation both in the hot lowland areas and in the Andes. 
The Andes, which range from 500 meters at their lowest point to more than 5700 meters at their 
highest, make the existence of three main climatic regions possible. Since temperature changes at 
varying altitudes, these regions can be separated into: the cold highlands, the temperate slopes, 
and the hot valleys. Historically, the most inhabited regions have been the highlands, for the 
moderate climate provides an escape from the heat and the tropical diseases associated with the 
lower territories. Additionally, fertile intermountain valleys offer favorable conditions for 
agriculture.35 The valleys, troughs, and basins among the ranges, at altitudes varying between 
2,500 and 4,000 meters, have presented and continue to present living conditions favorable 
enough to attract and support large populations.36 It is within these intermountain valleys where 
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the most complex Amerindian societies developed. Settlement on the warmer slopes and hot 
plains occurred solely because of the pressures generated by land concentration and population 
growth in the 19th century.  
 
Pre-Columbian Societies 
Pre-Columbian peoples of many different tongues and cultural attributes were dispersed 
throughout Colombia. The three most dominant linguistic families were: the Chibcha, the Carib, 
and the Arawak.37 These dialects were mutually unintelligible, which resulted in political 
fragmentation as well as the presence of cultural dissimilarities that served to further isolate them 
from one another. Moreover, the complexity of sociopolitical organization, levels of economic 
development, and settlement patterns of these indigenous populations varied substantially.  The 
largest and most developed indigenous groups were the Muisca, the Tairona, and the Cenu.38 The 
Muisca, or Chibcha, lived in the Cordillera Oriental east of the upper Magdalena River in east-
central Colombia. The Tairona were located in what now is part of northern Colombia – between 
the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and the coast, and the Cenu occupied an area to the south-west 
of the Tairona.39 
Upon their arrival, the Spanish encountered both large, socially stratified, indigenous 
kingdoms such as the Muisca, the Tairona and the Cenu, as well as a variety of smaller, less 
hierarchical chiefdoms. The larger more complex societies generally relied upon a firm 
economic base in intensive, and often irrigated, agriculture, supplemented by hunting and 
fishing. Commerce between chiefdoms flourished, although fierce antagonisms and chronic 
conflict between some groups persisted due to cultural and linguistic differences. The 
establishment of trading centers within the more economically advanced chiefdoms facilitated 
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the frequent exchange of goods such as: gold, sea salt, fish, cotton textiles, peccaries and slaves, 
over longer distances primarily along the Magdalena river as well as other river routes. The 
construction of elaborate agricultural works, temples, roads, stairways, plazas and bridges found 
in the settlements of the Tairona and the Cenu, implied the development of elaborately 
hierarchical societies. As for sociopolitical organization, most of the developed chiefdoms of the 
West (specifically in the Cauca region), as well as in the lowlands of northern Colombia, were 
divided into territorial or state-like political organizations each under the jurisdiction of a local 
chief, albeit federated under a paramount chieftain. The aristocratic class within these states 
included warrior leaders, chiefs and other prominent members of society who received tribute 
from commoners, enjoyed the privilege of polygyny, wore golden plates and other ornaments of 
gold, and were given special burial at death.40  
Political fragmentation and chronic warfare within chiefdoms as well as between rivaling 
indigenous groups enabled the Spaniards to conquer with little difficulty even the largest of the 
indigenous chiefdoms. Once the Spaniards had achieved their intended objective, they essentially 
imposed their own sociopolitical hierarchies atop those already in existence. In areas where there 
was a more permanently and densely settled indigenous population, such as in the Eastern 
highlands, the Spaniards began to extract wealth through a system of indirect rule in which 
native leaders were charged with collecting tribute in gold from their vassals.41 Alternatively, 
indigenous groups such as the Tairona, who were able to escape from the European onslaught by 
retreating into swamps, mountains or other nearby undesirable regions, deprived the Spaniards of 
an easily subdued native labor force. The presence of a dense and docile indigenous labor force 
in some regions and the absence of one in others resulted in salient demographic distinctions that 
would subsequently affect the economic, social and political development of each region 
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throughout the colonial period. In the decades directly following the arrival of the Spaniards, the 
indigenous population of the Colombian territory declined rapidly under the pressure of warfare, 
disease, miscegenation, and abortion.42 Between 1537, when the Spaniards first passed through 
the greater part of the Cauca Valley, and the 1570s, the indigenous populations along the Cauca 
River diminished in many places between 80 and 95 percent.43  
 
Spanish Conquest and the Colonial Period 
The Spaniards created their largest posts in areas that had a dense and subdued 
indigenous population, whom they exploited to supply food, cheap and reliable labor force, and 
revenue. The absence of a large docile indigenous population, as was the case in the Eastern 
Cordillera, would have generally precluded the successful establishment of early Spanish 
settlements.  However, the presence of precious minerals – such as gold, and occasionally silver 
– and the temptation striking it rich swiftly, compelled many Spaniards to settle. As gold 
deposits became scarce and the indigenous labor supply died out, mining towns disappeared.  
The first Europeans arrived in present day Colombia at the 15th century and soon began to 
establish trade relations with local indigenous groups. In 1508 the Crown authorized two projects 
for permanent settlement. One of the projects entailed the establishment of permanent 
settlements along the mainland shores of New Andalucía – a domain originally stretching from 
the Gulf of Uraba east to Cabo de la Vela on the Guajira Peninsula. Two years later, the assigned 
leader started the first colony in Colombian territory at San Sebastian de Uraba.44 After fighting 
and enslaving several members of the native population, the colonizers were forced to abandon 
the settlement due to increasing indigenous hostilities. Subsequently, the Spaniards established a 
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new base at Santa Maria de la Antigua.  Lacking the support of the indigenous peoples, who had 
been decimated by disease, the Spaniards abandoned Santa Maria de la Antigua in 1524.45  
As they moved westward, the colonizers settled near the Gulf of Urabá, in the Darien 
region. The settlement became the foundation of the Spanish colony of Castilla del Oro on the 
Isthmus of Panama. Providing a base from which the Spanish would extend their influence and 
establish more permanent control over the Gulf of Urabá, the colony also became a jumping-off 
point for Francisco Pizarro’s expedition into Peru. In 1526, another important settlement was 
constructed at the eastern end of the Caribbean coast – Santa Marta. The territorial limits 
associated with this settlement came to be Cabo de la Vela to the east and the Magdalena River 
to the west. Soon thereafter, Coro, located east of Santa Marta on the coast of Venezuela, was 
founded, providing for another strategic base of operations. In 1533, the founding of the town of 
Cartagena de Indias supplied the Spaniards with yet another permanent foothold on the 
Caribbean coast. The settlement attracted hundreds of adventurers and covered a large swath of 
land located between the Gulf of Uraba and the Magdalena River. Gold discovered in the tombs 
of the Cenu further attracted the Spanish to plunder the area at the expense of indigenous 
populations. In both Santa Marta and Cartagena de Indias, the governing practices of the Spanish 
resulted in the drastic depopulation of these areas as well as the exploitation of indigenous 
communities. Natives were often looted for gold, provisions, and were enslaved; if the Spaniards 
encountered any form of indigenous resistance, they set fire to their homes and fields. 
Eventually, Spanish looting engendered a more systematic exploitation of the land and its 
peoples. In the 1540s those indigenous peoples who had survived the initial plundering of the 
Spanish in Cartagena, were gathered into encomiendas to provide the tribute required to sustain 
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the Spanish settlement. Santa Marta and Cartagena both served as permanent bases from which 
the Spanish conquered and colonized the Colombian interior.46   
 By 1535, native tombs not far inland revealed gold almost on the scale found in Peru or 
Mexico. This discovery provided the impetus for the organization of numerous expeditions into 
the surrounding area. By 1538, three separate expeditionary forces had emerged onto the 
mountain plains inhabited by the Muisca. Within a year, using the well-tried combination of 
intimidation, warfare, and politics, most of the Muisca territory had been conquered.47 Given the 
ambitions of the conquistadores to accumulate wealth and consolidate their power, the three 
leaders of each exposition agreed to an arrangement that gave the authorities in Spain the power 
to decide to whom the newly founded territory should belong. Ultimately, the conquistadores 
bestowed the title of “el Nuevo Reino de Granada” (the New Kingdom of Granada) on the new 
territory and founded the present capital of Colombia, Santafe de Bogotá.48  
 With the establishment of Santafe de Bogota, the Spanish were able to easily consolidate 
their control over the eastern highlands as well as to use the settlement as a base for further 
conquest and colonization. Fanning out into neighboring territories, the Spanish ventured to the 
north, extending to Velez, Tunja, and Pamplona; and to the west, crossing the Magdalena River 
and founding towns at Ibague, Mariquita, and Honda. They also spread eastward, moving down 
the slopes of the Andes to the edge of the llanos, establishing bases at Medina de las Torres, 
Santiago de las Atalyas, and San Juan de los Llanos. Finally, to the South, they traversed the 
Quindio Mountains, opening up contact with the fledgling settlements of the Cauca region; 
which had already established communication with the conquered zones in Quito.49  
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By the end of the 16th century it had become evident that these nascent cities from which 
the Spanish sought to dominate the surrounding countryside did not immediately constitute a 
coherent colonial dominion.50 The two chief regional centers of Spanish control in the interior 
were the eastern highlands and the upper Cauca region. These two regions were physically 
separated from each other by the Central Cordillera, which was often impassable by mule, as 
well as particularly vulnerable to sporadic attacks orchestrated by the native peoples living in the 
mountains. The physical separation created a considerable barrier to transportation as well as to 
communication, which in turn resulted in the relative isolation of these regions from one another. 
Not only were these two regions physically disconnected from one another, but they were also 
separated administratively. This divide was primarily due to the patterns of conquest carried out 
by different conquistadores. As a result, Popayan and much of the rest of the Cauca region 
remained under the authority of Quito until 1549 when Santafe de Bogota became the seat of an 
audiencia. However, much of the western region was then returned to the jurisdiction of Quito 
when it became an audiencia in 1563. Physically and administratively separated, these two 
regions had become economically self-sufficient by the start of the 17th century.51 
In the eastern highlands, the production of grains and the weaving of textiles became the 
principal economic activities, while in the west the extraction of gold became the motor of the 
economy. By the 1580s, gold dust from the West was paying for the textiles woven by Indians in 
the Eastern Cordillera, while grains, textiles, and easily preserved foods (hardtack, cheese, and 
hams) from the Eastern region were being sent to some mining centers on the western side of the 
Magdalena River. However, due to high transportation costs, the volume of this trade between 
the two regions was not substantial.52 The third major region of Spanish settlement, the 
Caribbean coast and the lower Magdalena River Valley, retained its own special functions. It 
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nearly developed a monopoly on all external commerce – namely the legal imports of European 
luxury products and African slaves. Being situated on the Caribbean, Cartagena became the New 
Kingdom of Granada’s leading port, for it allowed the Spanish to easily deliver goods to and 
extract gold from the interior. Cartagena also had a complementary relationship with the two 
major interior regions. It sent most of its imported luxury goods to Santafe de Bogota – the chief 
consumption and distribution center in the eastern highlands, and imported slaves to the mining 
towns of the west. In return, the Caribbean coastal region received agricultural and manufactured 
consumer goods from the East, and gold from the West.  
 During the early colonial period, the amount of gold produced by the Kingdom of New 
Granada far surpassed that of the other colonial regions of the Spanish empire, and continued to 
do so into the 16th century and beyond.53 Production began at Popayan (located in the southern 
area of the Western Cordillera) before 1540, and at Antioquia (located in the northern area of the 
Western Cordillera) in 1546. Though by the 17th century gold production in the existing mining 
towns had diminished measurably, it regained momentum in the next century as new deposits 
were discovered. The discovery of the new gold deposits resulted in the founding of new mining 
frontiers in two regions – the Pacific lowlands of Western Colombia, specifically in the Choco, 
and in the province of Antioquia located in the highlands of the Central Cordillera.54  
The Spaniards placed great value on gold for it was Colombia’s only significant export as 
well as their principal means for the payment of imported European luxuries.55 Although the 
Kingdom of New Granada (becoming New Granada in 1717) assumed the role as the single 
largest producer of gold in colonial Spanish America, the wealth generated by this industry paled 
in comparison to the wealth generated by the silver mining industries in Mexico and Peru: 
“Between 1735 and 1800, the gold registered in New Granada’s western mining regions 
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represented less than one-thirteenth of the value of Mexican bullion mined in the same years.”56 
The lure of gold may first have drawn Spain and the conquistadores to America, however it was 
the presence of silver that prolonged their stay. 
Because the extraction of silver took precedence over the extraction of gold, the large 
fixed investments, and complex or expensive technology that was present in the silver mining 
colonies of Mexico and Peru was absent in New Granada. This difference had an important 
impact on the development of New Granada’s elite. Since the wealth produced in New Granada 
was less substantial relative to the other colonies, it did not develop an elite as wealthy as the 
elites of either Mexico or Peru. Nevertheless, by the end of the colonial period, the gold mine 
boom in both Popayan and Antioquia had helped generate a large commercial bourgeoisie.57  
The regions in Colombia also developed distinct ethnic features. In the agrarian eastern 
highlands, the dense indigenous population did not die as fast as it did in the mining regions. 
Thus, by the eighteenth century, miscegenation in the eastern highlands between Spaniards and 
the indigenous peoples had become a common occurrence, imbuing the region with a largely 
mestizo population. In the West and on the Caribbean coast, however, the natives died at a much 
higher rate, facilitating the introduction of African slaves as a method to replenish a declining 
indigenous labor force. Soon thereafter, African slaves came to provide much of the 
demographic base in these two regions.  
Differing population profiles compounded by distinctive regional economic roles led to 
the development of a variety of institutions designed to enforce colonial socio-economic 
hierarchies and to organize indigenous labor according to specific regional attributes. In the 
eastern highlands, the exploitation and Christianization of the large indigenous population was a 
central theme. Questions of how and how much the natives should work for the Spaniards 
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became the focus of imperial governance in the sixteenth century. Faced with a rapidly shrinking 
indigenous population, the Spaniards were also preoccupied with the ethical dilemmas generated 
by their imposition of forced labor on those who survived and the obligation dictated by the 
Catholic Church to convert them, civilize them, and treat them well.58 The encomienda was 
created to resolve the dilemma. The system’s rules dictated that the native peoples would provide 
the encomenderos goods and labor, and in return, would receive spiritual guidance, protection 
and stability. The outcome proved to be very different. As the steadily accumulated great wealth 
and frequently contested the authority of the crown, the encomenderos exploited the natives, and 
neglected to ‘enlighten’ and fully convert them.59  
The continuous decline of the native population made the encomienda system obsolete. 
Religious acculturation and political control of the native population presented additional 
concerns. Since encomiendas constituted large expanses of land, in the later part of the sixteenth 
century, native peasants lived relatively dispersed on individual plots or in small communities. 
This arrangement, in turn, enabled them to preserve many of their own cultural and religious 
practices despite their formal conversion to Christianity.60 Convinced that the natural dispersion 
of the indigenous population inhibited indigenous religious acculturation, and thus Spanish 
political control, between 1590 and 1620 Spanish administrators implemented a policy that 
facilitated the concentration of indigenous peoples into large towns.  
The creation of collective communities, called resguardos, effectively removed the 
indigenous peoples from the plots of land that they had previously occupied. The transferal of 
native peasants to smaller plots of land generated a large supply of indigenous labor for the 
Spanish haciendas. Moreover, the larger indigenous labor force also served to increase the 
ability of the Spaniards to engage members of the native population in a wider variety of labor 
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obligations, such as providing designated terms of service to residents in cities, to mines, and to 
Spanish farmers.61 Finally, the forced consolidation of the native population into resguardos 
opened up large areas of fertile land for acquisition by Spaniards, who in turn used their 
landholdings to grow European crops and to raise livestock for sale in city markets and mining 
zones. Soon thereafter, landholdings of this kind began to replace the encomienda as a major 
source of wealth.62 Similarly to what had occurred in the East Cordillera, in the West, wherever 
there was a large indigenous population – such as in the Cauca region – the Spaniards initially 
relied upon the encomienda to generate a labor force. As the indigenous population declined, 
however, the Spaniards began to establish large landholdings where they raised cattle and grew 
food crops.  
Nevertheless, as mentioned before, the production of gold remained the dominant 
economic activity of the Colombian region. In the sixteenth century, the labor force of most 
gold-mining towns was composed of black slaves and free prospectors, known as mazamorreros. 
In the Pacific lowland mining zones, slavery was the dominant form of labor, and mine 
ownership was concentrated amongst few individuals. Conversely, in Antioquia, ownership was 
less concentrated, and although slaves constituted a large portion of the labor force, the free labor 
provided by these mazamorreros played an essential role in gold production.63 One of the 
reasons the mazamorreros played a central role was because it costs more to transport legally 
African slaves than it did to rely on the indigenous peoples of the region. However, as the native 
population declined, African slaves began to constitute most of the labor force in the mines. The 
Caribbean region followed a similar path.  However, instead of using African slaves to work on 
the gold mines, they were used primarily to cultivate beans, cassava, and plantains on plots near 
Cartagena, and maize in the Cenu region.64 
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Spanish colonial society after conquest was highly complex and extremely stratified. On 
top of the social hierarchy were the original conquistadores, who for the most part were members 
of Spain’s manual trades or lower professions. Some were hidalgos with noble backgrounds, but 
they typically came from Spain’s lowest social strata. By taking part in major conquests, 
however, these men constructed a socio-economic hierarchy in which they assumed the 
dominant position. Their elevated social status was closely intertwined with their ability to 
extract and amass large quantities of wealth at the expense of the existing indigenous population. 
Post-conquest settlers – the primeros pobladores – also enjoyed a high socio-economic status, as 
many of them became encomenderos. In general, encomenderos tended to surround themselves 
with the material comforts associated with Spanish nobility - large houses set on broad estates, 
and a retinue of relatives and vassals. Occupying the lower rungs of Spanish colonial society in 
descending socio-economic order were mestizos – the progeny of Spanish and native 
miscegenation among other racial intermixtures including mulattoes, zambos etc., the indigenous 
population, and lastly black slaves. Although these populations were primarily relegated to the 
lower social and economic positions in society, fluidity, rather than rigidity within certain limits, 
was the essence of being mestizo in colonial Spanish America.65  
By the 18th century, with its population growing and changing, New Granada had become 
a largely mestizo society. This process had started in the late 16th century, with the 
implementation of the resguardos. Despite strict legal proscriptions against intrusion into the 
resguardos by non-Indians, demand for land generated by a growing colonial population, 
combined with the natives’ need to obtain money as to meet their tributary obligations, resulted 
in the illegal leasing of resguardo lands to small numbers of white and mestizo farmers. By 
1778, invasion of indigenous lands and racial mixing was so advanced that the government’s 
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“Protector of Indians” no longer found it feasible to distinguish between the native and mestizo 
elements of the rural population.66 According to the 1778-1780 censuses, the population was 
divided into the four basic racial categories: whites, blacks, Indians, and “free people of all 
colors”.  
The census showed that people of mixed race made up 46 percent of New Granada’s 
population, whites constituted 26 percent, Indians 20 percent, and black slaves 8 percent.67 As 
exemplified by the census, the native population had drastically declined, being displaced by 
mestizos and whites. The process of miscegenation, or mestizaje, that drew natives into mestizo 
society, was the driving force behind the growth of the population. Either through marriage or 
cohabitation with mestizos, members of the indigenous populations became part of the mestizo 
population and thus reduced the reproductive base of their original communities. The growth in 
the white population on the other hand, stemmed from a natural increase amongst American-born 
Spaniards who constituted an emerging social class: the creoles. Although the creole class 
enjoyed a higher socio-economic status, the Spaniards - especially those among the higher social 
classes – stood above them. However, among the majority of whites who were not included 
within the ranks of the elites, marriage or cohabitation with members of other racial groups 
resulted in an increase in the population of those who may have passed as white.  
The white ruling class viewed the substantial increase in the size of the mestizo 
population with fear. They perceived the rapid expansion of this demographic to be a potential 
threat to their socio-economic dominance. As a result, claims to ‘limpieza de sangre’ (pure 
Spanish decent) were fiercely contested during the eighteenth century, as whites fought to 
distinguish themselves from the expanding mestizo and mulatto groups in order to reinforce the 
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existing colonial socio-economic hierarchies. Notwithstanding these developments, as the 
number of mestizos increased they assumed a wider array of roles in colonial society.68 
Despite the socially divisive measures implemented by members of the white class, 
colonial society in New Granada became less rigid than those where native cultures had 
remained strong, and indigenous populations remained segregated from the white populations - 
such as was the case in the southern Andean regions of Peru, or southern Mexico.69 Simply put, 
since colonial society in New Granada was more of an ethnic hybrid, racial divisions tended to 
be less important in social and political life. Moreover, without alternative native languages and 
cultures, lower social classes were more thoroughly hispanicized.70 That being said, it would be a 
mistake to infer that society in New Granada had achieved greater integration than other colonial 
regions of the Spanish empire, or that the colonial elites had attained greater control. Rather, 
without a strong sense of ethnic separateness, the mestizo and poor white populations tended to 
identify with their localities. Thus, as white and mestizo villages grew, they generally cultivated 
local rights and privileges and sought official recognition as autonomous municipalities able to 
manage their own affairs.   
As the highly specialized development of regional economies engendered substantial 
differences between the racial compositions of regional populations as well as regional social 
structures, the fragmentation of political authority within the territory did much to exacerbate an 
incipient sense of regional autonomy. Initially, under the jurisdiction of the Audiencia of Santafe 
de Bogota from 1546-1717, the centralized authority over New Granada was fragmented and 
generally weak. Moreover, throughout much of the 16th and 17th centuries, the Audiencia lacked 
formal authority over much of what is now western Colombia, which was governed by the 
Audiencia of Quito after its inception in 1563. Due to Colombia’s divisive topological features, 
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transportation and communication difficulties also restricted the ability of the Audiencia of 
Santafe to assert control over its designated territory. As a result, provincial governors remained 
independent of the authority of the Audiencia, while internecine conflict between the Church 
authorities and the Audiencia further inhibited the governing capacity of the colonial state.71 
At the beginning of the 18th century, the Spanish Monarchs acknowledged that its 
colonies were being governed inefficiently and that they lacked formal authoritative powers. 
Moved partly by the exigencies of war (due to multiple military engagements with England and 
France over the duration of the 18th century), Spain’s rulers understood that greater military 
power required increased governmental revenues, which depended on their capacity to increase 
administrative efficiency and economic production. This realization facilitated the promulgation 
of various reforms designed to augment military strength, collect more revenues, achieve greater 
administrative effectiveness, as well as solidify Spanish authority within its colonies. Under the 
stewardship of the Bourbons, Spain created the Viceroyalty of New Granada in 1717 and 
designated Santafe de Bogota as its capital. The new viceroyalty consisted of present-day 
Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, and much of Venezuela. Due to the lack of sufficient revenues to 
sustain an efficient bureaucracy, the viceroyalty was disbanded in 1723. The renewed threat of 
war with England in 1738 compelled Spain to reinstitute the viceroyalty to protect the port of 
Cartagena from mounting English hostilities within the region. This time, the viceroyalty 
encompassed a larger swath of colonial territory, including what is now Colombia, Ecuador, 
Panama, most of Venezuela, and the islands of Trinidad and Margarita. From its reinstatement 
all the way through the second half of the 18th century, the Viceroyalty of New Granada 
underwent a wide array of administrative, economic and social reforms. Ironically, these reforms 
set the stages for rebellion rather than for the further consolidation of Spanish colonial rule.  
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In the vice-royal government, the Spaniards dominated the highest administrative 
positions in society, primarily due to the Spanish Monarchs’ beliefs that men governing outside 
of their homelands would be more loyal to the Crown and less entangled in local interests. 
Additionally, Spanish royal administrators, both in Spain and the Viceroyalty, were naturally 
more inclined to trust men born in Spain than those born in the colonial territory. Generally 
denied the highest political positions, creoles of higher socio-economic status were primarily 
relegated to the middle or lower levels of the colonial administration. Frequently serving as 
provincial administrators (corregidores), lieutenant governors, or lawyers practicing before the 
Audiencia, the creole elite were often highly educated aspirants for government office. By the 
end of the 18th century, the rapidly emerging cadre of creole lawyers began to voice openly their 
resentment, which led to a series of tense and hostile confrontations between the two 
administrative groups preceding independence.  
Of the plethora of concerns that preoccupied those who governed the viceroyalty of New 
Granada, the need to produce more gold and deliver it back to Spain, along with maintaining the 
defenses of Cartagena - the port through which all commerce flowed back to the mother country 
– were of utmost importance. In a drive to combat contraband and thus increase the amount of 
gold that would reach Spain, the Bourbons established more avenues of legal trade and attempted 
to diversify colonial exports. In New Granada, however, illicit commerce continued despite the 
creation of the new trading avenues. Moreover, the diversification of colonial exports generally 
conflicted with the production of bullion. Continued defense of bullion shipments also entailed 
massive investment in the fortification of the Caribbean coast, particularly the port of Cartagena. 
As a result the Spanish crown was unable to finance basic development projects, as well as 
improve overland transportation. While legal trade routes were generally infringed upon due to 
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Spain’s armed engagement with England for most of the eighteenth century, most cities in New 
Granada – primarily the coastal cities of Santa Marta and Riohacha - had no alternative but to 
engage in illegal trading to export their crops and animal products. Moreover, Spanish authorities 
tended to extend the benefits of neutral trade as well as eliminate export taxes to Cuba and 
Venezuela, while denying these same advantages to New Granada. These seemingly unfair 
conditions of trade became a significant source of irritation to creole elites determined to expand 
their exports. From around 1790 onward, educated creoles began to point out the ineptitudes of 
the Spanish regime. They primarily focused their criticisms on the lack of efficient means of 
internal communication and the obstruction of unrestricted external trade.72   
Although tackling the dilemma of smuggling and fostering economic development were 
two primary objectives of the Bourbon reforms, the crown’s chief preoccupation was to increase 
revenue. As already noted, additional revenues were needed to cover the costs associated with 
war, pay for the elaborate administrative establishment of a vice-regal government, and help to 
finance and sustain frontier missions.73 Therefore, in the 1750s, vice-regal administrators began 
to advocate for more efficacious revenue collection methods, which included the monopolization 
of tobacco and cane liquor, a rise in the prices of goods, and an increase in sales tax. While these 
innovations increased revenues, and enabled the viceroyalty to become less dependent upon the 
wealthier viceroyalties for military expenditures, in general, it was unable to entirely support the 
costs of its own administration and defense.74 
By the late 18th century, patterns of war-induced tax exactions, accompanied by riots and 
protests, had become a common occurrence. This cycle was exacerbated by the diffusion of the 
North American and French revolutionary ideals amongst the creole elite.75 According to 
Michael Taussig, the appearance of slave rebellions and flights in the late eighteenth century 
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represented, “a major social factor alongside the growing restlessness of free blacks and a 
general wave of discontent in the colony as a whole.”76 The most striking manifestation of this 
discontent in New Granada was the Comunero movement of 1780-1781, in which the imposition 
of a new tax on tobacco and cane liquor provoked the eruption of riots in the province of 
Soccoro. Initially, a protest generated by the masses rather than orchestrated by the local elites, 
the Comuneros demanded that in all future administrative appointments, creoles, not Spaniards, 
should be extended preferential treatment. As the movement subsided, it was later revealed that 
most of the creole elite were frightened by the mass rioting of the Comunero rebellion, and either 
acquiesced or supported its repression.77 While many scholars who have studied the Comunero 
rebellion have disagreed upon its significance, it is most prudent to consider the movement as a 
foreshadowing event to independence. The public display of anger toward Spanish 
administrators as well as the overwhelming desire for local governance on the part of the masses 
indicated a growing resentment towards the continuation of foreign colonial domination. 
Although the drive for independence had yet to gain extensive backing, the events that transpired 
in 1781 represented a step toward the formation of a nationalist sentiment. 
In summary, the patterns of conquest that originally divided the territory into three 
relatively disconnected regions, communication and transportation problems caused by harsh 
topographical attributes, as well as the initial fragmentation of authority within the region, 
gradually resulted in a pervasive sense of regional autonomy that would have significant 
implications upon the subsequent development of Kingdom of New Granada. Additionally, 
while a large, compliant indigenous population located primarily in the eastern highlands 
allowed for the rapid transformation of numerous Spanish settlements into commercial hubs, 
much of the western region, imbued with gold deposits, generally lacked a consistent and readily 
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accessible labor force. However, the importation and transportation of African slaves to the 
mining towns in the West gradually yielded an increase in regional population that in turn 
generated an overall surge in gold productivity. As a Spanish colonial possession, New 
Granada’s economic significance was primarily as a producer of gold, and quickly assumed the 
role as the principal source of gold in the Spanish Empire.78 
As already noted, although the Comunero rebellion was not orchestrated by the creole 
elite, many of its members became incredibly critical of the Spanish regime, especially regarding 
the ability of Spanish administrators to govern effectively. This nascent skepticism surrounding 
the efficacy of Spanish colonial administration was influenced by the French Revolution of 1789, 
and by Haiti’s independence from France in 1804. However, creole discontent in New Granada 
tended to remain hidden, because many creoles enjoyed the socio-economic advantages 
associated with being members of the dominant class. Generally, creoles did not agree with the 
notions of inherent human freedom and equality, nor did they accept that government should be 
representative of the popular will.  
 
Independence and its Aftermath 
In 1808, the Spanish monarchs were forced to abdicate the throne to Napoleon, thrusting 
Spain as well as its colonies into political disarray. Those loyal to the Crown quickly established 
a Central Junta tasked with the unification of the provinces (and the colonies) under a central 
authority. Over time it became clear that the Junta was unable to organize resistance efforts 
against the French and maintain the unity of provincial Juntas under its authority. As the 
legitimacy of the Junta waned, uncertainty and insecurity regarding the future administration of 
the colonies pervaded the colonial elite. Creole notables became increasingly concerned with, 
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and even skeptical of how colonial society would be changed if the last surviving Spanish Junta 
were to be eliminated. They were especially preoccupied with whether their colonial governors 
would recognize the French regime, just as they had recognized the Spanish Junta, so that they 
could protect their superior vice-regal and administrative positions.  
As Spain staggered through successive crises, the accumulated resentments and 
developing aspirations of New Granada’s educated elites were rapidly transmuted into 
antagonism toward the vice-regal government and demands for political autonomy.79 Moreover, 
as Spanish control over Spain diminished, the importance of Spanish America within the empire 
increased significantly. Cognizant of their growing importance, the creole class further 
embedded themselves within the colonial administration and in other significant positions, thus 
augmenting their own influence within the colonial structure.   
The disappearance of legitimate authority in Spain, the uncertainty about the political 
future of Spain, and the insecurity of colonial officials, led to the growth of a mutual distrust 
between Spaniards and the creole elite. As tensions intensified between Spanish governors and 
resident Spaniards, on the one hand, and creole notables on the other, major conflict between the 
two factions gripped Quito in 1809. In August, the creole elite of Quito deposed the president of 
the Quito Audiencia and established an autonomous Junta that declared loyalty to Ferdinand VII. 
The new Junta also denounced peninsular officials as the creatures of a corrupt, pro-French 
regime, and urged other cities within the viceroyalty to follow Quito’s example. Viceroy Amar y 
Borbon, upon receiving word of the coup, assembled a cohort of government officials, the 
Bogota Cabildo, members from the upper echelons of the clergy and military, as well as leading 
citizens, to counter the apparent threat to his authority and the existing political order. Because 
the action did not lead to a formal resolution, the Viceroy sent a diplomat to negotiate with the 
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Quito Junta, and dispatched troops to restore royal authority should conciliation fail. Far from 
drawing the elites together, the meetings simply exacerbated the mistrust that existed between 
Spanish governors and creole notables.  
The clear political division that had been established within the first decade of the 19th 
century between creoles and peninsulares in Spanish America was further intensified by the 
collapse of the last remnants of monarchical authority in Spain. In February 1810, a newly 
formed Council of Regency, which governed little more than the port of Cadiz, issued a 
proclamation designed both to stabilize the Spanish empire and to sway the creole elite to not to 
break away from Spain. The new edict stated:  
 
From this moment, American Spaniards, you see yourselves elevated to the dignity  
of free men; you are no longer the same men bent under a yoke made…heavier by 
being…distant from the center of power; looked upon with indifference, harassed by 
greed, and destroyed by ignorance…[Y]our destinies now depend neither upon  
ministers nor viceroys, nor governors; they are in your hands.80 
 
Instead of bolstering the Regency’s authority in Spanish America by conceding political rights to 
colonial subjects, the explicit repudiation of the old regime, with the overt recognition of colonial 
claims to self-government, gave the viceroy’s opponents the opportunity to mobilize against the 
colonial government.  
Beginning on June 14, 1810, local notables began to exercise their newly ratified right to 
political autonomy by ejecting royal governors throughout New Granada.  Creole notables in 
Cartagena mobilized to displace the Spanish governor, which occurred shortly after their 
counterparts in Caracas blocked the captain-general of Venezuela from entering the city council, 
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established a Junta, and proclaimed it to be the political authority within the region.81 The coup 
in Cartagena unfolded in a similar fashion, with creoles removing their local governor, and then 
establishing a self-governing Junta. Playing a decisive role in the coup in Cartagena were creole 
military officers who commanded largely American-born units, as well as a group of common 
folk from the relatively poor barrio of Getsemani. In November 1811, Cartagena established a 
Supreme Junta, and declared its complete independence from Spain.82 
 As news regarding the establishment of autonomous juntas in both Caracas and 
Cartagena spread from region to region, creoles in other towns within New Granada began to 
take similar steps. As a result, the deposition of the governor of Cartagena in mid-June was 
followed by Cabildo-led revolts against local officials in Cali, Pamplona, and Socorro. In most 
cases, the creole elite influenced the masses to revolt against the viceregal government in order 
to establish an autonomous junta free of peninsular influence. Once the new governing apparatus 
was erected, the creole elite pledged their allegiance to the Ferdinand VII. This step was taken to 
avoid the internal conflict that would most likely ensue if they were to completely break with 
Spanish authority. The creole elite relied on the support of the masses to overthrow the viceregal 
government in Santafe de Bogota on July 20, 1810. However, as was to occur in Cartagena, a 
faction of creole agitators rallied the masses in Santafe de Bogotá to insist on a more definitive 
break with the past. Under the pressure of popular will, the Bogotá Junta disavowed the authority 
of the Spanish Regency, and broke with the colonial government entirely. 
 Unlike the Comunero rebellion of 1781, the movement towards rebellion in New 
Granada did not originate from popular discontent among the masses; instead it was engineered 
by a faction of the creole elite upon seeing the dissipation of the royal authority within the 
surrounding provinces. The willingness of crowds composed of urban lower classes to support 
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the revolt, as well as the creoles’ success in neutralizing military forces in the capital, also 
contributed to the successful transition of power from colonial officials to creole elite.   
 At its first session on July 21, the newly established Junta in Bogota declared itself to be 
the provisional supreme government of New Granada, calling upon Cabildos throughout the 
territory to send delegates to the capital to form a federal government, “on the bases of the 
freedom and respective independence” of the provinces.83 Many provincial capitals were 
reluctant to cooperate with the Bogota Junta. Wherever a Junta in a provincial capital thrust aside 
colonial authorities, it proclaimed its province to be a sovereign state and its unwillingness to 
forfeit its absolute sovereignty. Cartagena espoused the most vehement opposition to Bogota’s 
scheme to organize a new central government in the viceregal capital. The provinces of Tunja, 
Socorro, Pamplona, and Antioquia also expressed their determination to retain their sovereignty.  
In addition to the construction of autonomous governing bodies in provincial capitals, 
further fragmentation occurred as secondary towns sought to split away from provincial capitals 
and to establish themselves as the head of new provinces. In most instances, enduring regional 
and local rivalries deeply rooted in the colonial period fueled the desire to secede and assert a 
‘natural right’ to sovereignty. Creole ambitions to imbue their towns with power and prestige 
became additional objectives behind the attempted separations. In short, once New Granada was 
released from the yoke of Spanish colonial rule, the regional economic differences as well as 
highly localized factional politics that had been suppressed within the framework of the colonial 
apparatus surfaced, splintered the country into autonomous units.84 
 As the territory succumbed to regional and local fragmentation, it became apparent 
almost immediately that there was no central entity powerful enough to unify the existing 
factions and that there was a profound division amongst regional elites as to the type of system 
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of governance they should adopt. Of no less significance, the provinces, preoccupied with local 
and regional affairs, neglected to organize to defend themselves against royalist forces. Those 
who chose to remain loyal to the Crown still controlled substantial parts of the country and posed 
a significant threat to the nascent independent regions. The years between 1810-1816 in 
Colombia, which is generally referred to as the Patria Boba (Foolish Fatherland) period, was 
accentuated primarily by conflicting regional political aspirations.  
During this period, two dominant regional confederations emerged, each attempting to 
consolidate its own authority and subjugate the other. Struggling against one another were 
Cundinamarca (previously Santafe de Bogota), which encompassed present-day Colombia east 
of the Magdalena River, and the provincial coalition of Cartagena, Antioquia, Tunja, Pamplona, 
and Neiva, later represented by the Congress of New Granada. By 1811, Bogotá had formed the 
new state of Cundinamarca, and sought to reassert the city’s authority over much of the former 
viceroyalty. Convinced that a federal system would be too weak, Antonio Nariño, the first leader 
of Cundinamarca, began to consolidate his power in order to establish a centralist government.85  
As royalist forces began to threaten the nascent confederations, the government of 
Cundinamarca declared absolute independence from Ferdinand VII in July 1813. Antioquia took 
the same steps in August, but Popayan, Panama, and Santa Marta did not. Napoleon’s abdication 
in April 1814 strengthened the likelihood that Ferdinand VII would return to power and that 
Spain would deploy its forces to suppress the creole governments. Apprehensive of this 
impending threat, the Congress of New Granada, which had been formerly committed to a weak 
federalist structure, gradually began to exert more centralized authority, particularly over its 
finances and military operations.  
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The Congress of Granada also sought to incorporate Cundinamarca into a more united 
system as to engender a cohesive military front to royalist forces. However, the governor of 
Cundinamarca refused to cooperate. In December 1814, the forces of the Congress of Granada, 
under the command of Simon Bolivar, forced Bogotá to accept a general union. However, soon 
after Bolivar’s victory, Spanish forces arrived in Santa Marta from Venezuela, and by July 1815, 
Cartagena was under siege. After Cartagena had succumbed to Spain’s army, the conquest of the 
remaining sovereign territories in New Granada was achieved quite rapidly. Due to profound 
regional fragmentation, lack of a unified military front, and the presence of a pervasive weariness 
at both the elite and popular levels, Spain re-conquered New Granada in 1816. Spain’s re-
conquest, however, was short-lived.  
From 1816-1819, Spanish military officers and royalist collaborators almost completely 
controlled New Granada as well as Venezuela and Ecuador, while rebel forces offered sporadic 
resistance from the lowland plains of Casanare.86 Over the following three years, the harshness 
of Spanish colonial rule in the wake of the initial movements for independence rekindled popular 
opposition and once again augmented creole resentment toward the imperial order.87 The thrust 
of the rebellion gained momentum in the last quarter of the 19th century. In August 1819, Bolivar 
and his forces crossed the Andes and defeated the Spanish handily at the battle of Boyacá.  
Bolivar’s victory changed the course of the independence struggle in New Granada, as well as in 
Venezuela and Ecuador.  
Prior to the battle of Boyacá, Spanish authorities had commanded the more populated 
regions within Venezuela and New Granada, and remained unchallenged in Ecuador. After their 
defeat at Boyacá, Spanish authorities panicked and fled from the vice-regal capital. Their action 
enabled Bolivar and his forces to assume control over a large expanse of the territory that 
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included the eastern highlands from Bogotá to Pamplona, the gold-mining regions of Antioquia 
and the Choco, and the Upper Magdalena Valley. Using New Granada as his base of operations, 
Bolivar proceeded to defeat royalist forces in Venezuela, Ecuador and ultimately Peru and 
Bolivia. However, significant contingencies of royalist forces remained on the Caribbean coast 
through 1821, and in southwestern Colombia until 1825. Nevertheless, between 1819 and 1822, 
the creole elite who had constituted the leadership of the rebel forces began the task of 
constructing an independent republic.88  
The Confederation of Gran Colombia was formally proclaimed in 1821.  It consisted of 
the territories of Venezuela, and New Granada. Ecuador was incorporated after it was liberated 
from Spanish control in 1822. In May 1821, delegates from Venezuela and New Granada 
convened in the border town of Rosario de Cucuta to determine the form of government the 
fledgling republic would adopt. The constituent assembly, known as the Congress of Cucuta, 
promulgated a constitution that closely resembled that of the U.S. model. The document 
provided for the strict separation of powers in which a president and vice president would both 
serve four-year terms. It also stipulated that legislative authority would be held by a bicameral 
congress and that a judiciary, whose members were to be determined jointly by the executive and 
the legislature, was charged with enforcing the law. However, the Colombian constitution’s 
emphasis on centralized authority differed tremendously from the federalist nature of the U.S 
constitution. The Colombian president was granted the power to appoint intendants, who retained 
legal jurisdiction over expansive regions as well as their subordinate provincial governors. The 
U.S. president was never extended such power.  
Participation in the political process was essentially relegated to the educated elite. The 
Congress instituted a plethora of voting restrictions as well as requirements to hold office 
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specifically designed to disenfranchise the masses. As a result, political participation was limited 
to males who were either twenty-one years of age or married, owned property worth a hundred 
pesos or independently exercised a craft or profession, and who were literate. The impediments 
limited political participation to ten percent of free adult males.89 Notwithstanding the political 
restrictions, the Congress adopted several broad-minded measures. It enforced a nationwide free-
birth principle designed to gradually abolish slavery and it passed a provision that relieved the 
remaining indigenous population of any obligation to pay tribute or provide involuntary labor. 
The objective of these laws was to end the colonial period’s legal distinctions among racial 
castas through the gradual incorporation of historically marginalized factions of society into the 
general body of citizens. And yet, despite the adopted measures, the dominant class remained 
unwilling to consider blacks and natives as their equals.90  
Amongst some of the first acts of legislature produced by the Congress of Cucuta were 
mandates designed to bolster economic growth and development. Mostly, the laws entailed the 
removal of institutional obstacles to private initiatives, promoted foreign trade, and encouraged 
the construction of free land and labor markets. Many of New Granada’s elite adhered to the 
belief that direct access to foreign markets and capital, state involvement in the economy, and 
participation by local entrepreneurs in external commerce, would help generate economic growth 
and lay the foundation for future prosperity.91 The Congress of Cucuta made Bogota the capital 
of the republic, partly because of the centrality of its location, as well as due to its previous role 
as the vice-regal capital. The Congress elected Bolivar as president, and General Francisco de 
Paula Santander, a Venezuelan soldier, as vice-president. An issue that Congress purposefully 
avoided was whether or not it would tolerate religious diversity.  
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Since the constitution proposed by the Congress of Cucuta increased greater civilian role 
in governance, political leaders coming from relatively high-status families and having attained 
university educations, began to contest the authority that the military held in government. To the 
emerging civilian elite, it was important to bring the military under the rule of law since 
Bolivar’s army constituted a centralizing force that conflicted with their respective localized and 
regional ambitions.92 The military on the other hand, asserted it had claims to authority by virtue 
of having liberated the country. In February 1826, Vice President Francisco de Paula Santander, 
who often allied himself with liberal lawyers, summed up the situation as follows: 
 
The discontent of the military is spreading because everywhere they are treated with 
distrust, and even with scorn, the effect on the one hand of the bad conduct and worse 
manners of some of our officers, and on the other of the fact that the ambitious lawyers 
want to destroy anyone that can oppose them.93   
 
The tension between the civilians and the military in New Granada was exacerbated by 
two developments. It started when the Congress decided to place the national capital in Bogota 
rather than in Caracas. To Caracas’s elites and military officers, the establishment of the national 
capital in Bogota reaffirmed their belief that Venezuelans would be relegated to a subservient 
role as a provincial dependent under the ultimate jurisdiction of Bogota, and that New Granadans 
intended to monopolize government positions in Bogota, making Venezuelans semi-colonists.  
Enraged by their apparent loss of sovereignty, the Caracas elite questioned the legitimacy of the 
1821 constitution on the grounds that Caracas had not been adequately represented at the 
Congressional convocation, and thus that the constitution had not been properly ratified. The fact 
that many of the military officers were Venezuelans, while the lawyers who dominated the 
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judiciary, legislative, and central executive positions were natives of New Granada served to 
increase their mutual distrust.  
Relations between New Granadan civilian elite and Venezuelan military officers 
worsened in 1826, when the Congress in New Granada accused General Jose Antonio Paez - a 
llanero chieftain from Venezuela who had played a leading role in the military liberation of 
Venezuela - of abuse of power. Determined to demonstrate civilian authority over the military, 
and despite Santander’s pleas not to act, the Congress pressed ahead. As a result of the 
congressional accusation, Paez called for Venezuela’s independence from Colombia. 
Encouraged by both civilian and military dissidents in Venezuela, Paez led a separatist 
movement that began in Valencia at the end of April 1826, and quickly spread throughout 
Caracas and other cities in central Venezuela.94 
Upon learning about Paez’s separatist movement, Bolivar responded by encouraging 
military pronouncements that favored martial law with himself in power. The pronouncements 
were to be followed by the implementation of a newly drafted constitution. The document was 
dubbed the Bolivarian constitution. With the new constitution, Bolivar believed he had found the 
ideal remedy for the prevailing political ills of Spanish America. The perceived ills included but 
were not limited to insufficient government revenues, an excess amount of government 
employees, a complex administration of justice, and the existence of too many laws few of which 
were understood by the public.95 The general persistence of the problems left many dissatisfied 
within the fledgling republic and often led to the rise of independence movements – as evidenced 
by Paez’s rebellion. Concerned about the growing divisiveness, Bolivar sought to achieve a 
balance by strengthening the authority of the executive, and providing greater representation to 
local interests. He believed that greater executive power to a president serving for life would help 
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engender stability and security to the nascent republic, and that the creation of legislative bodies 
that consisted of local representatives hailing from various states would help quell the internal 
movements of independence.  
Santander, however, disliked several aspects of Bolivar’s suggested solution. The vice 
president asserted that there was no legal avenue for constitutional reform until ten years after 
the ratification of the constitution, as stipulated by the document itself. Furthermore, the vice 
president condemned the military-organized pronouncements as unconstitutional. Lastly, New 
Granadan liberals, along with Santander, objected to the Bolivarian constitution for it would 
effectively violate the fundamental republican principle of alternation in power.96 Nevertheless, 
Bolivar, rather than bringing Paez and Venezuela under the control of constitutional processes 
and the authority of the national government as Santander believed he would do, granted Paez 
complete amnesty and confirmed him as the ruling chief in Venezuela. It was this action taken 
by Bolivar that ruptured his relations with Santander. As a result, two rivaling camps emerged 
within the political sphere, providing an additional confrontational nuance to the existing 
political order - on one side stood Santander and his supporters and on the other stood Bolivar 
and his followers.   
By 1827 the tensions between Venezuelans and New Granadans, the military and civilian 
elites, and the Santanderistas and Bolivarians had pushed Gran Colombia to its breaking point.  
Of no lesser consequence was the external debt crisis. The collapse of the British bond market 
imposed on the federation an external debt that raised it to approximately five times its annual 
revenues. Prior to the crisis, Gran Colombia’s debt had been caused primarily by its intensive 
borrowing to finance the prolonged wars of independence, the bankrolling of large governmental 
and military apparatuses, and by its nearly moribund foreign trade. As a result of the financial 
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crisis of 1825-1826, Gran Colombia’s fiscal problems intensified, subsequently resulting in a 
crisis of authority.  
In an attempt to preserve the fragile union and consolidate his authority, Bolivar used the 
military in 1828 to impose an authoritarian constitution, with himself at the helm. However, 
shortly after his death two years later, the authoritarian regime was dismantled and the power of 
the military, the apparatus that had been most loyal to Bolivar, was drastically reduced. By 1831, 
the liberals (Santanderistas) had eclipsed the power of the Bolivarians, and two rival parties 
began to form. 
Venezuela and Ecuador broke away from Gran Colombia and established their own 
sovereign states, while Santander gave the new Republic of New Granada a new constitution. 
Santander’s 1832-1837 tenure as president was defined by conflict between two liberal factions 
that had opposed Bolivar’s authoritarian rule. Liberal exaltados (“extremists” or “purists”) opted 
for the permanent exclusion of Bolivarians from political office, whereas moderate liberals 
advocated their reincorporation into the political arena to curtail political tension. Although 
conflict between the two nascent political factions intensified as time went by, ideologically they 
differed little. Moderates, however, considered the approach generally utilized by the exaltados 
imprudent and counterproductive. An issue that divided the two groups substantially was the role 
the Catholic Church should play in society. Exaltados were determined to break the political 
power held by the Catholic Church; moderates on the other hand did not want to address the 
issue because they believed that the Church could help maintain social order.  
These differences were magnified and accentuated by personal rivalries and hostilities 
amongst the leaders of the two groups as they competed for public office. The extent personal 
rivalries that pervaded the political system and polarized Colombian society was exemplified by 
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the election of 1836, in which Jose Ignacio de Marquez captured the majority vote and assumed 
the presidency. Although there was little that differentiated Marquez’s administration from 
Santander’s in terms of policy, the ideological difference about the proper role of the Catholic 
Church in society once again became the focal point. Whereas both liberal factions viewed 
religious orders as outdated, unproductive, and a waste of land, the Santanderistas accused 
Marquez and his supporters of attempting to enhance the authority of the Catholic Church in 
society. This accusation was intended to incite political as well as popular disapproval against 
the Marquez regime. As a result, tensions between the exaltados, represented by Santander, and 
moderates who were more closely aligned with Marquez, erupted into a civil war.97 Lasting from 
1840 until 1842, the war involved the more populated areas of the country, and brought about 
economic devastation and substantial losses of life. The political loyalties and animosities 
cemented during this civil war came to define the relationship between the exaltados (Liberals) 
and the moderates (Conservatives) for a long time to come. 98 
The Conservatives, as the advocates of administrative centralization, Church privileges, 
religious intolerance, and limited suffrage, dominated the political arena until 1849. Thereafter, 
until around 1880, the Liberals, as the promoters of federalism, the separation of Church and 
state, secularization, religious tolerance, and universal suffrage, ostensibly controlled the 
political system. They were out of power during two brief periods - the first one in 1854 when 
the military took over, and the second one between 1855-1861 when the Conservatives regained 
control of the government.99 During the Liberals’ political dominance, they took certain powers 
away from the central government and passed them on to the provincial governments. Moreover, 
they continued to reduce the power of the military as well as the Catholic Church, and authorized 
the people of the various regions to elect their own governors.100 This process of decentralization 
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was bolstered by the promulgation of the constitutional reform of 1853, which extended suffrage 
to all adult males without any property or literacy restriction. Additional constitutional reforms 
instituted in 1858 and 1863, which focused on resolving the question of state sovereignty, 
imbued New Granada as one of the most federalist systems in the world.  
The 1863 constitution, often referred to as the Rionegro Constitution, ambiguously 
stipulated that the duty of the national executive was to ‘watch over, ‘guard’, ‘or protect’ the 
general order of the sovereign federated states.101 However, the constitution did not specify 
conditions under which the national government may have the right to intervene in the affairs of 
the states. Moreover, the nearly absolute sovereignty extended to the states by the newly ratified 
constitution did not impose any limits upon individual liberties, and granted states the authority 
to establish regional armies. Such measures spawned an era defined by rampant civil wars and 
violence. Between 1863 and 1885, the country was afflicted by more than fifty insurrections, as 
well as forty-two constitutions in the nine states.102 Federalism and free trade also helped bring 
the country to the brink of economic ruin, destroying its incipient industrial base, and impeding 
national integration.103 National economic stability and integration were partly achieved in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries solely due to a coffee boom.       
During the Liberal era, from 1845 to 1880, economic policies designed to enhance free 
trade were implemented based on the assumption that an increase in foreign trade as well as 
greater external economic integration would yield substantial growth. New Granada’s elites 
understood that their state was composed of a relatively impoverished cluster of unevenly 
developed regions loosely connected by a primitive network of transport by river and mountain 
trains. As such, they began to experiment with a few export commodities in the hopes of 
generating profit.  
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The first commodity they focused on was tobacco, which had experienced an externally 
motivated boom in the 1850s and 1860s, but then took a sharp decline. Next was Chinchona 
bark, also a significant export from the 1850s until its bust in the 1880s.104 It was not until 1870 
when coffee became one of Colombia’s primary export commodities that elites began to generate 
substantial profits. As noted by Dugas, “coffee accounted for less than 2 percent of export 
earnings during the early 1840s but grew to nearly 50 percent of export earnings by 1898.”105 
Those earnings enhanced the ability of the state to consolidate its power and allowed the 
government to meet its debt obligations, maintain a large standing army, and claim credit for the 
economic revival.106  
Extreme federalism was abandoned in 1885 after Conservative forces, in one of the many 
regional conflict-turned civil wars that came to characterize 19th century Colombia, had defeated 
Liberal radicals. In the wake of the war, Conservatives and independent Liberals formed a 
coalition to support President Rafael Nuñez Moledo, who promoted the creation of a new 
constitution. The coalition, known as La Regeneracion, led to the formation of a new political 
organization called the National Party. The promulgation of the Constitution of 1886 marked the 
end of a quarter century of Liberal party leadership and set the stage for an era of Conservative 
rule lasting until 1930.  
The new constitution gave way to a centralized structure in which the president appointed 
the governors of the departments and elected legislative assemblies replaced sovereign states. 
Additionally, the president and senators were elected indirectly for six-year terms, 
representatives for four-year terms, and civil rights were subject to restriction. Suffrage for 
elections of national scope was limited to all literate men over the age of 21. Under the new 
charter, the government possessed the sole right to import, manufacture, and obtain arms and 
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munitions of war. Finally, the constitution branded Catholicism as Colombia’s official religion 
and empowered civil authorities to enforce respect for the Catholic Church.107 A concordat with 
the Vatican in 1887 further consolidated the role of the Church. In short, the 1886 alliance 
between Rafael Nuñez, the Independents and the Conservative resulted in the promulgation of a 
constitution that symbolized the triumph of a clear set of principles – centralism, strong 
institutional authority, and close church-state cooperation.108  The new constitution would remain 
in place until 1991. 
 
Initial Considerations of Colombia’s State Creation Process 
The period extending from post-independence until the end of the nineteenth century was 
characterized by regional fragmentation, political instability, pervasive violence, economic 
stagnation, intense partisan socialization of the masses and institutionalized decentralization. By 
1849, the Liberal and Conservative parties had become organized and advanced different 
programs. The Liberals were federalists, who advocated free trade, universal suffrage and 
religious toleration. The Conservatives on the other hand, favored a unitary government, 
protectionist policies, religious intolerance and limited suffrage. While party officials on both 
sides could generally tolerate various aspects of opposition party’s platform, the two factions 
vehemently disagreed about the proper role in society of the Catholic Church. Conservatives 
sought to preserve the social order engendered by the Catholic Church, and often used their pro-
clerical position to mobilize the masses. Conversely, the Liberals opposed clerical activism 
outside of the religious sphere.109 Plagued by a multitude of violent civil wars and inter-regional 
conflicts throughout most of the 19th century, the ratification of the 1886 Constitution effectively 
enabled the Colombian state to consolidate its power and provide relative peace and stability for 
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a significant period. Nevertheless, civil conflict would continue into the early 20th century, 
resulting in enormous loss of life as well as the loss of Panama in 1903. 
By the turn of the century, Colombia had already chartered a path that differed from that 
followed by most other Latin American nations. Generally, the experience of most other Latin 
American countries throughout the 19th century showed that armies and police forces led by 
regional caudillos tended to usurp civilian power to gain control over a politically and 
economically important region or entity. 110 Nineteenth century Colombia was also marked by 
several hard-fought, and particularly violent civil wars led by elites as well as the existence of 
fierce regional antagonisms. However, the ability of civilian-led political parties to retain 
substantial autonomy over the authority of the state; mobilize and polarize the Colombian polity 
to the extent that internal conflict was primarily a function of party identification; and hinder the 
development of strong centralized military imbued Colombia with a powerful and domineering 
party system not seen in most other Latin American states during this time. The establishment of 
such a polarizing and sectarian system came to constitute a major barrier towards the 
establishment of a legitimate state as well as a stable democratic regime.  
 
The Twentieth Century until the Present 
Following the War of the Thousand Days and the loss of Panama, a spirit of interparty 
collaboration came to characterize political life. Under the purview of the Conservative 
administration of Rafael Reyes (1904-1909), Liberals were permitted some representation in 
government at the national level. Moreover, a new system of voting for Congress was introduced, 
in which two-thirds of the seats within an electoral district would be allotted to the party receiving 
the most votes, while the other third of the seats would go to the losing party. With these electoral 
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reforms, Reyes hoped to reduce the intensity of the liberal opposition and bring about peace.111 
Liberals, for the most part, also rejected violence as a means of promoting their aims or of seeking 
political office. As a result, consociational practices were employed in an attempt to prevent 
renewed violence. Although Reyes was forced from power in 1909, coalition governments 
steeped in bipartisan consensus and political demobilization began to characterize the political 
landscape. In addition to a profound transition towards bipartisanism, the ability for minority 
parties to participate in the national government was confirmed by a constituent assembly 
immediately following Reyes’ removal from office in 1909. Moreover, this assembly decreed 
direct presidential elections for a four-year term with no immediate reelection.112 
From 1910 until around 1949, Colombia had, as Alexander Wilde has argued, an 
oligarchical democracy “of notable stability, openness, and competitiveness.”113 This political 
stability was in part derived from several factors, the most influential being a sustained coffee 
boom beginning in 1870 and lasting until the mid-twentieth century. Despite the loss of Panama 
at the turn of the century, the expansion of the coffee export sector gave life to Colombia’s 
struggling economy. From 1910 – 1940, the volume of exports increased by an average of 7.4 
percent per year. By the mid-1920s, earnings from coffee exports facilitated economic 
modernization in Colombia, as the nation became the second-largest producer in the world and 
the leading producer of mild coffees.114 In addition to the coffee bonanza, the sustained rise of 
banana exports, the promising takeoff of oil, along with a payment of 25 million U.S. dollars by 
the United States as an indemnity for the seizure of Panama, attracted the interest of lenders in 
New York.115 By 1929, U.S. investments in Colombia had tripled, reaching six percent of its 
Latin American total. The wave of foreign investment that occurred in the late 1920s has been 
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referred to as the ‘dance of millions’, due to the fact that millions of dollars in U.S. loans had 
been injected into the nation at all levels of government. 
Although foreign investment and the U.S. indemnity contributed to Colombia’s economic 
growth in the 1920s, the income generated by coffee exports was three times higher than the 
amount of the indemnity and the loans put together.116 As a result, the larger producers and those 
who processed as well as exported the coffee came to constitute the most dynamic and powerful 
economic group in Colombia. This group consisted of factions of both Liberals and Conservatives 
who were significantly involved the export trade. Throughout this period, coffee production in the 
latifundia of primarily Liberal landowners came into competition with the small, predominantly 
Conservative family-owned farms established in the western highlands.117 Although these two 
factions competed with one another, no major conflicts between the two sectors emerged. 
Ultimately, both groups owned land and controlled the means of production, placing them within 
an oligarchical elite that became focused on the consolidation of political power as a means of 
preserving their own economic dominance. The most notable of these groups is the Federation of 
Coffee Growers. Founded in 1927, the group consisted primarily of small, politically 
Conservative coffee growers in western Colombia, who had practically monopolized control over 
the entire stock of Colombian coffee. By 1940 they had become the sole administers of 
international coffee pacts with large multinational firms.118 By assuming a central role in the 
state’s most important export commodity, this group tended to have a substantial influence over 
politics in Colombia. This oligarchy actively inhibited the development of nationalist radical 
political movements who opposed the increase in international economic integration.119  
The coffee boom, along with the large-scale infusion of foreign capital, helped the 
emerging elites to solo the Colombian state.120 Managing to utilize the export income generated 
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from coffee and greatly aided by foreign loans, the Colombian government rapidly developed its 
transportation industry, established a market for the trade of other consumer goods, and founded a 
national bank - the Banco de la Republica in 1923. Improvements in road and rail transport to 
facilitate coffee exports were crucial developments leading to enhanced international integration 
as well as the creation of a national market. By 1950, 13,125 miles of highway integrated the 
country in a way that would have been unimaginable at the end of the nineteenth century.121 
Moreover, as total income derived from coffee exports improved, wages, profits and rents also 
increased, leading to a corresponding rise in disposable income. With a general increase in 
disposable income, consumption naturally followed, generating a market for other goods and 
services. As a result, industrial production took off and a wide range of basic consumer goods 
began to be produced, albeit on a small scale. In Medellin, Barranquilla and Bogota, some 
tobacco, beer, soft drinks and textile firms employed as many as 250 workers.122 Finally, the 
creation of the Banco de la Republica facilitated the organization of Colombia’s monetary system 
through the creation of a single monetary unit and credit regulation. 
With an expanding economy, the legitimization of federal financial institutions to regulate 
credit, greater regional integration with advancements in transportation, and a seemingly endless 
influx of dollars, by the second half of the 20th century Colombia had achieved greater levels of 
industrialization and diversification of its economic output. As a result, industries associated with 
the production of nontraditional exports and the mining and production of coal, nickel and oil 
expanded exponentially.123 Nevertheless, while the state had been strengthened during this period 
of economic change, it remained fragile and under-resourced. From very early on, the coffee 
bourgeoisie controlled its own affairs, remaining autonomous from the state apparatus and more 
invested in regional or local development. Adhering to the doctrine of economic liberalism 
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enforced by prominent capitalist economies (primarily the United States, to which Colombia was 
significantly indebted), the bourgeoisie utilized the two-party system to protect their power in 
their respective regions and keep the Colombian state weak.124 
The Great Depression slowed down the period of rapid industrialization and urbanization 
and forced Colombians to question the free market policies and political liberalism of the early 
decades. The election of moderate Liberal Enrique Olaya Herrera to the presidency in 1930 
marked the definitive end to almost 45 years of Conservative hegemony. His election also 
engendered the emergence of a ‘Liberal Republic’ that would last until 1946. All four Liberal 
administrations active during the 1930-1946 period tended to enforce policies that heavily favored 
unionization, systems of financial controls, deficit spending and greater executive power within 
the government. The peaceful constitutional transfer of power between political parties was 
unprecedented in the history of the nation. It was made possible by several conditions. First, the 
political faction called Concentracion Nacional, spearheaded by Olaya Herrera included 
moderates from both parties. Second, internal divisions within the Conservative sphere allowed 
for a degree of bipartisan support for a moderate president. The Conservatives who dominated the 
Congress, the courts, the departmental legislatures, and city councils, believed Olaya Herrera 
would maintain the political order of the last few decades long enough for them to reconcile their 
differences within the Conservative Party and return to the presidency in four years. Third, the 
Catholic Church also accepted the election result. Lastly, the military, despite its Conservative 
roots, had acted as the country’s electoral police since 1910, and for the previous two decades it 
had become committed to ending the election-prompted civil wars of the nineteenth century.125 
With the Liberals now at the head of the government, significant change regarding the 
relations between the state and workers became a primary political objective. Aiming to capture 
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the support of a growing urban working class, the Olaya government formulated legislation that 
guaranteed the basic rights of workers.  The new legislation recognized labor unions and their 
right to unionize, established the eight-hour day and the forty-eight-hour working week, and 
clearly outlined the legal responsibilities of employers. Those measures helped Liberals capture 
popular support. The labor reforms enacted under the Olaya government were made effective by 
the incoming administration headed by Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo, whose presidency is commonly 
referred to as the “Revolution on the March”. During his tenure in office, the state was given a 
constitutionally guaranteed role in economic development and diversification of exports.126 Legal 
measures were enacted to protect domestic industry, strengthen credit institutions and levy a 
graduated income tax as well as taxes on excess profits and patrimony. Tax reforms enabled the 
state to break from its exclusive dependence on external trade as the primary source of income, 
although the powerful coffee bourgeoisie limited the scope of governmental intervention in 
economic and social life. In this way, the state did not actively promote industrialization, but 
provided conditions under which entrepreneurs could take initiatives.127 
Between 1933 and 1938, industry grew at an average annual rate of 10.8 percent. As 
industrialization occurred, urbanization gave rise to a cheap and cooperative labor force. The 
Lopez administration was limited in its ability to be involved in the affairs of the industrialized 
sectors of society, however, it viewed labor as “social obligation” and sought protect it. During 
this time, the number of unions, union members, and labor demands increased. Suffrage was 
extended to all adult males aged 21 or over by eliminating the literacy requirement established by 
the 1886 constitution. In 1936, the left (Liberals, Socialists, and Communists) came to dominate 
an important segment of the unions through the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Colombia 
(CTC). As such, the CTC ostensibly came under the purview of the Liberal Party, with its main 
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base of support being workers who depended directly or indirectly on the state.128As a result, 
union organization, labor rights, and Liberal electoral support were all intertwined.  
Ironically, Lopez’s labor program had a devastating impact on the workers’ movement. 
Rather than augmenting the strength and autonomy of the unions, workers increasingly relied on 
state intervention to resolve their disputes. This arrangement resulted in the virtual subservience 
of the unions to the state.129 In addition, issues regarding the peasantry and their access to land 
also formed part of the Liberal-left platform. Culturally diverse, geographically dispersed, and 
working within various agrarian labor systems, the peasantry, although discontented, was unable 
to successfully mobilize. Moreover, agrarian reforms that guaranteed the provision of public land 
to individuals working on it went largely unenforced. Eventually, these reforms were altered in a 
way that strengthened the juridical position of large landowners at the expense of the peasantry. 
By 1937, the Lopez Revolution on the March had aggravated factional divisions within the 
president’s party. As such, by the 1937 congressional elections, the Liberal party was irreparably 
split. Following the elections, Lopez threatened to resign under intense opposition from 
landowners, merchants, industrialists, the Catholic Church, and leaders from both parties. 
Although a moderate liberal captured the presidency in 1938, Lopez would return to the executive 
position in 1942 to resume his March. However, by this time powerful private associations of 
landowners and businessmen called, gremios, had begun to insert themselves into the political 
sphere. The gremios - the most influential being the National Federation of Coffee Growers - 
served to augment the private sector’s ability to monitor and direct state intervention within 
acceptable limits. The proliferation of the associations effectively restricted the autonomy of the 
state and ensured its commitment to economic liberalism. Opposing Lopez and his March, the 
factions along with an uncompromising congress worked to block his liberal agenda. In 1944, 
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Lopez was seized by a military garrison in Pasto as part of an attempted coup. The insurrection 
was carried out by an isolated group of officers without the support of the military establishment. 
After its failure, Lopez resigned from the presidency in 1945, convinced that a bipartisan 
government would unify the nation. Alberto Lleras Camargo acted as the interim-President until 
new elections were held in 1946.  
The 1946 elections represented the second transfer of power between the two parties in the 
20th century. Due to the profound split within the Liberal party, two candidates, Gabriel Turbay, a 
moderate, and Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, a populist, competed against one another for party control. 
Ultimately, the last-minute candidacy of conservative Mariano Ospina Perez led to his election, 
although he did not receive a majority of the popular vote.130 Politicization, polarization and 
violence accelerated after the elections, with Liberals fearing a resurgent Conservative party and 
Conservatives apprehensive of Liberal domination. Moreover, the social and economic changes of 
the previous two decades had facilitated the emergence of more economically integrated and 
politically mobilized groups. As a result, party control over the state became critical, not only for 
patronage and regional favoritism, but also for economic and political security for favorable 
administrative and judicial decisions.131 Local violence erupted in the elections leading to the 
death of some 14,000 people in 1947 alone.132  
From 1946 until 1948, Gaitan headed a popular movement that focused on urban growth 
and inflation. He condemned the Liberal Republic and the oligarchy for ‘betraying’ the nation. 
Based on his claim that the oligarchy had monopolized the wealth and political power under the 
guise of advancements in social justice and economic equality, Gaitan called for their demise and 
the empowerment of historically marginalized groups. His message resonated with a substantial 
portion of the Colombian electorate and with elements of the middle classes. On April 9, 1948, 
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Gaitan was assassinated in the streets of Bogota, leading to a massive urban insurrection dubbed 
the Bogotazo in which, “mobs burned commercial buildings, destroyed churches, and attacked 
government buildings in the capital city; riots spread to other cities”.133  
By 1949, the Conservative Ospina regime was on the verge of collapse, as both Liberal 
and Conservative leaders refused to negotiate in good faith. Following the failure to reach a 
bipartisan accord, the Liberals decided to withdraw entirely from the upcoming presidential 
election, which had been moved up as a means of restoring political order, and began 
impeachment proceedings against Ospina. The result was regime breakdown. Responding to the 
Liberals, Ospina declared a state of siege, closed Congress, banned public meetings and censored 
the press. Running unopposed, Laureano Gomez – a radical conservative obsessed with erecting a 
corporatist state in Colombia along the lines of Franco’s Spain – was elected to the presidency in 
1949.  
The period encompassing Gomez’s tenure in office is referred to as La Violencia. 
Primarily a rural phenomenon, La Violencia was an amalgamation of social, economic, and 
political factors, reinforced by partisan conflict. According to the Colombian social scientist, F. 
Leal Buitrago, “the strength of the parties was such that they were essentially acting as a channel 
for a culmination of small social and economic processes originating in the provinces; the parties 
managed to convert isolated problems into a great political aggregation of national character, 
which came, at a given moment to endanger the very stability of the regime.”134 La Violencia, 
which lasted from 1949 until 1953, was characterized first by terror and then by resistance. Under 
the Gomez regime, the government adopted a widespread policy of overt terrorism, primarily 
organized by local political bosses and landowners. Those groups supported the government and 
its crusade against communism and liberalism in the wake of the destruction caused by the 
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Bogotazo.135 In addition, the regime tightened censorship, increased repression against labor, and 
intensified violence against Liberals and Protestants – sometimes with the cooperation of the local 
clergy. Though Gomez’s repressive policies claimed the lives of an estimated 145,000 people, the 
country also experienced healthy economic growth as export crops reached the ports and urban 
industrial areas were relatively unaffected.136 
As the reign of terror against the liberal peasantry progressed, many guerrilla groups 
formed to resist the state-sponsored persecution. Openly confronting government forces, the 
guerrilla groups were primarily composed of a militarized peasant class and Communists. Clashes 
between the guerrillas and the military significantly augmented the level of violence occurring in 
the countryside. By 1953, virtually all factions of both parties supported the removal of Gomez 
from power. Opting to find a way to facilitate an end to the violence, leaders from both parties 
supported a military coup d’état, and installed the commander in chief of the army, General 
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla to the presidency. The military takeover was expected to be solely a 
transitional phase until rule of law could be restored. Although the Rojas government took 
immediate steps to bring an end to La Violencia, it became clear that Rojas intended to prolong 
his stay at the helm of the government. By 1957, Rojas had begun to construct his own popularly 
based political movement to permanently supplant the traditional parties by taking away their 
mass support.137 Cognizant of Rojas’s play for power, many prominent Liberal and Conservative 
leaders came together and negotiated the basis of a pact between the two traditional parties. The 
pact called for the establishment of a consociational arrangement in which the two traditional 
parties would alternate in power every four years for a minimum period of 16 years.138 A ‘civic 
front’ was also formed to oppose Rojas and his administration. The front included the Church, 
trade associations, labor unions, banks and other institutions that actively pressured Rojas to 
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resign in favor of a military junta. Finally, in 1958, the junta held a plebiscite that resulted in the 
ratification of the party pact and the establishment of the National Front. 
 Founded on the tenets of parity of power and presidential alternation, the National Front 
attempted to synthesize the Liberal Republic and the neoconservative regime in order to bring 
about an end to party-based violence. The National Front was a political arrangement steeped in 
the concept of consociationalism, in which national power was to be divided equally between the 
two parties in order to provide for a period of political stability.139 Over the duration of 16 years, 
the National Front brought about a substantial increase in presidential authority, specifically the 
use of state-of-siege powers with the constitutional reform of 1968. Because they feared that 
leftist would jeopardize the alternation of political power from Liberals to Conservatives, 
members of both parties agreed to exclude third parties from direct participation in the political 
system. The pact allowed for the entrenchment of clientelism as the primary method of interaction 
between elected officials and civilians, and led to elections that had no real effect on the 
composition of elected bodies since parity within the government had already been 
predetermined.140 Furthermore, the arrangement made it easier for private sector interests to 
influence disproportionately political decisions. As a result, state intervention in various sectors of 
the economy as a means of reducing inequality or providing sufficient benefits and wages to the 
poor was kept to a minimum. This development ultimately enabled the private sector to block 
reforms that may have given the state the ability to provide for broader social welfare.141   
 From the 1960s until the 1980s, Colombia underwent massive economic, social, and 
demographic changes. Between 1960 and 1980, the total population increased by approximately 
13.5 million, and became concentrated in several cities – mostly the regional capitals of Bogota, 
Medellin, Cali, and Barranquilla.142 Between 1973 and 1985, younger workers, who increasingly 
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had access to educational facilities, previously only accessible by workers in the formal sector of 
the economy, entered the labor market. By 1988, 72 out of every 100 people looking for work in 
the four main cities (Bogota, Medellin, Cali and Barranquilla) were under thirty. Of that group, 70 
percent had at least some secondary education. Unable to find employment in the formal economy 
due to privatization and state retrenchment programs that were being uniformly adopted in most 
Latin American countries during that period, the informal sector of the Colombian economy, 
which covered a wide range of both legal and illegal activities, experienced rapid and unregulated 
growth.143 The growth in the informal sector often occurred within or on the periphery of cities, 
leading to record levels of rural migration to urban centers. By 1980, 64 percent of the total 
population was urban, whereas in 1960 only 48 percent of the population lived in cities. Due to 
this drastic population shift towards urban centers, Colombia rapidly became ‘a nation of cities’, 
and agriculture ceased to be the principal source of economic growth.  
As the urban labor force expanded, the demand for food to sustain the growing urban 
population as well as the need to generate export earnings for industrial expansion, facilitated the 
proliferation of large-scale commercial farms. As a result, during the 1960s and 1970s, the 
traditional latifundia were transformed into highly mechanized modern enterprises. This 
transformation significantly disadvantaged the rural peasantry. Pushed off the land to 
accommodate the commercial farms, widespread unrest amongst the rural peasantry incited 
extensive debates regarding agrarian reform and rural modernization. In an attempt to address the 
unrest, the first two National Front administrations enacted agrarian reforms. Led by the 
Colombian Agrarian Reform Institute (INCORA), the reforms were designed to eliminate and 
prevent the inequitable concentration of land, give small tenants and share-croppers greater 
guarantees of security of tenure and ownership, and elevate the level of living of the rural 
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population amongst other guarantees. This program was eventually supported, and in part 
financed, by the United States with its Alliance for Progress.144 
The reforms largely failed to achieve the aforementioned objectives, resulting in high 
levels of popular discontent, and a narrowly averted national strike in 1965.145 Liberal president 
Carlos Lleras Restrepo once again considered agrarian reforms in 1966. This time, his 
government made an attempt to accelerate the pace of land distribution by eliminating the legal 
and financial restrictions that had slowed or prevented the application of provisions of the 
previous administrations. In addition, Lleras established a mass movement, the Asociacion 
Nacional de Usurarios Campesinos (ANUC), to apply pressure from below. However, the 
renewed effort did not have its desired redistributive effects. It failed primarily because of the 
presence of internal divisions within the ANUC, as because of poorly designed land tenure 
policies. The failure of the land reforms led thousands of peasants to mobilize in order to halt the 
expansion of cattle ranchers and commercial farmers during this period.146 
In addition to the growing pains associated with industrialization, coffee exports stagnated 
from around 1940 to 1975, and economic growth that was largely dependent on coffee earnings 
slowed down tremendously. This slowdown was caused by the fluctuation of world prices in a 
period of free or only partly regulated markets (1948-1963), by competition from emerging 
producers in Africa, by restrictions imposed by international coffee accords, and by the 
deterioration and destruction of coffee farms during La Violencia in key production areas.147 The 
reduction in coffee exports led to a fall in real wages, which generated a wave of labor agitation 
between 1957 and 1966. Attempting to address the drop in real wages as well as the labor 
movement, the government enacted Decree-Law 444 in 1967, which marked the commencement 
of a growth strategy based on dependent development with an emphasis on export diversification. 
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Simply put, diversified exports, rather than either coffee exports or import-substitution 
industrialization, which had reached its limits in Colombia due to the stagnation of intermediary 
goods and capital-goods sectors, were targeted to become the ‘motor’ for development.148 Minor 
exports, such as bananas, cotton, sugar, tobacco, gold, paper and cardboard, meat, wood, shoes, 
seafood, glass, oilseed cakes, chemicals, furs, cement, hides, precious stones, tires, books, fresh-
cut flowers, and dog toys grew rapidly, and by 1974, these goods had become more important 
than coffee. The new set of exports, along with coffee earnings, brought about higher levels of 
foreign exchange and allowed for the purchase of consumer, capital and intermediate goods.149 
Moreover, Decree-Law 444 established a “crawling peg” exchange rate that sharply reduced 
political conflicts over devaluation and provided the means for a partial reorientation of the 
economy from an import-substitution model to one of export promotion.150 
 Although the new reforms helped the overall state of Colombia’s economy, they did not 
do much to rectify real wages or decrease economic inequality. Moreover, during this period, the 
physical expansion of cities, the proliferation of regionally-based labor actions, a growing 
division between elite interests and popular interests, and self-censorship within the media, 
reduced the exposure and interest of the urban population to the conflicts emerging in the rural 
areas. As the government increasingly ignored the demands of the various labor movements as 
well as the leaders of the two established labor federations - the CTC and the Union de 
Trabajadores Colombianos – the UTC - regionally based independent confederations controlled 
by the left began to emerge. By the end of the 1960s, General Rojas, Colombia’s one-time 20th 
century dictator, had created a populist movement – Accion Nacional Popular (ANAPO) that 
nearly won the 1970 elections. Rojas ran on a platform of “socialism on Christian bases in the 
Colombian manner.” It called for free education, free medical and dental service for the poor, 
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bank credit for small entrepreneurs, the unification of the labor federations, a new plan for 
housing for the poor, and an exchange rate regime that pegged the peso to the dollar. Supported 
by urban and rural workers as well as politicians who had become disenfranchised with the 
National Front, ANAPO’s rapid growth signified the erosion of the consociational coalition’s 
popular support. Over time, many of the popular opposition groups would provide the foundations 
for revolutionary guerilla movements, drawing their support from the ranks of discontented 
laborers and union members situated in the rural regions of the country.151 
 In short, the National Front was a political and economic system designed to protect the 
interests of the elites at the expense of the rest of the country. By limiting political participation, 
bolstering the powers of the executive in the context of weak judicial and legislative bodies, 
allowing for unfair and predetermined elections, and advancing economic inequality, the National 
Front substantially inhibited the development of a democratic regime. According to Harvey F. 
Kline, by 1974, 16 years of coalition government produced: 1) a lack of political space for 
individuals unaffiliated with either the Liberal nor the Conservative parties; 2) a failure to resolve 
many economic problems associated with underdevelopment; 3) continued violence in the 
countryside, although no longer in the name of traditional parties; 4) a lack of sufficient resources 
to allow for the poor to earn a decent wage; 5) a relatively small group of political and economic 
leaders living lavishly in the cities; 6) a government even less able to enforce its laws than before; 
and 7) a weak and politically divided labor movement in which a majority of the urban and rural 
poor were not well organized.152  
In this context, voter participation in national elections decreased sharply, popular 
confidence in the ability of the government to provide for the Colombian people waned, and the 
centrality of the parties in the country’s political life declined. Nevertheless, towards the end of 
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the National Front era, a new generation of provincial politicians emerged, providing electoral 
legitimacy to the state without having to adhere to social pressures or confront the mounting 
internal conflict within the nation.153 The result was the proliferation of non-electoral opposition – 
namely labor confederations independent of the two parties and civic protest movements.  
The end of the National Front era in 1974 had initially been characterized by optimism as 
a progressive administration dedicated to “Closing the Gap” (alluding to an agenda that 
prioritized addressing poverty and attacking inequality) was elected into office. However, an 
unanticipated influx of foreign currencies generated by a boom in coffee prices as well as the 
rapid expansion of illegal drug exports subjected the economy to intense inflationary pressure and 
made monetary control the primary concern of economic policy. Thus, plans to “close the gap” 
had to be delayed or cancelled.154 
In addition to record levels of inflation – the annual rate of price increases was 33.1 
percent by 1977, the prevalence of leftist guerilla revolutionary movements such as the FARC 
(the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the ELN (the National Liberation Army) 
within Colombia dramatically increased.155 Having roots in the labor movements of the 1950s, 
1960s and early 1970s, the guerilla movements drew on the support of an increasingly disgruntled 
peasantry, marginalized lower classes, and disenchanted middle income groups, who perceived 
the politically elite to be corrupt and unfit to govern. In the late 1970s, the government adopted a 
hardline approach against the violent non-state actors. Embarking on a campaign to eliminate 
them groups, President Julio Cesar Turbay (1978-1982), greatly expanded the power and 
authority of the military. In the following years, accusations of humans rights violations by the 
armed forces proliferated, right-wing death squads, many with military ties, appeared, and in 
some rural areas large landowners resorted to violence in order to acquire land from the 
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peasantry.156 After decades of fighting, a lack of oversight, and enduring weak state institutions, 
the military gradually disassociated itself from the two parties and became a more coherent 
institutional force.157 Additionally, by the late 1970s and early 1980s, the expanding influence of 
drug cartels became yet another obstacle that challenged the regime both directly via violent 
confrontation as well as though bribery and corruption. Both cartels and the military have been 
charged with colluding with right-wing paramilitary groups, who have primarily targeted the 
leftist guerilla organizations.  
The 1980s brought about a comprehensive restructuring of the economy built on policies 
introduced by orthodoxy economists originating primarily from Western neo-classical theory. The 
policies aimed to reduce government inefficiency, bolster production and economic growth, 
augment the competitiveness of domestic industries, and reduce poverty and inequality, through 
the establishment of free markets.158 The way in which those objectives were to be achieved was 
through a process of financial liberalization, deregulation of state-protected industries, and 
cutbacks in government expenditures.  
The 1980s, a period popularly referred to as the “lost decade”, was also a time in which 
much of the global south – especially Latin America - suffered extensive debt crises that led to a 
global recession. President Belisario Betancur, who ruled between 1982 and 1986 sought to 
eliminate the government deficit via the drastic reductions in public expenditures and the gradual 
devaluation of its then-overvalued peso. The end result was that the poor disproportionately bore 
the burden of stabilization, as state employees were let go, and state funding for social programs 
was significantly curtailed. 
In addition, the Betancur administration changed its anti-guerrilla tactics. Rather than 
supporting a campaign of unconditional extermination, the government sought political re-
74 
 
accommodation and a negotiated peace with the country’s major guerilla groups. Although the 
peace process achieved some early successes with the passing of an amnesty law in 1982, as well 
as negotiated peace agreements with the FARC, M-19, and the EPL, by the end of the Betancur 
administration in 1986, the M-19 had briefly taken over the country’s Palace of Justice. 
Additionally, most of these guerilla organizations were once again engaged in open conflict with 
the state.159 Although his administration did not accomplish much in regards to political reform, 
Betancur amended the constitution to establish mayoral elections by popular vote beginning in 
1988. This reform was supplemented by various fiscal measures aimed at increasing the flow of 
resources to the departmental and municipal levels. As such, a decade after the end of the 
National Front, politics were now partially open to the public.  
The late 1980s and early 1990s were characterized by efforts to end the tradition of 
coalition government and by effect, establish a single-party government with the presence of 
opposition parties. This government-opposition scheme, however, proved to be a tedious 
endeavor since a legitimate opposition party simply did not exist. Aside from the Liberal and 
Conservative parties, which after decades of coalition rule were ideologically and politically 
similar and sought power by means of broker clientelism, the Union Patriotica (UP) was the only 
other legitimate opposition party. The UP, composed of former members of the FARC, the 
Communist Party and other leftist activists, advocated social change through participation in the 
political process. However, many critics perceived the UP to be a political extension of the FARC 
and as such, between 1985 and 1991, more than 1,000 of its members were assassinated.160 Thus, 
the political system remained devoid of a legitimate opposition party. Moreover, factionalization 
and personalistic tensions left both traditional parties disorganized and in political disarray. The 
absence of more disciplined, and organized political parties with distinct programs, as well as the 
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lack of protection for opposition politicians, greatly undermined the legitimacy of the political 
system. Moreover, the proposition to establish government-opposition regime was ultimately 
rejected by Congress. 
In 1989, the expansion of drug trafficking and the rapid growth of drug cartels resulted in 
a drastic increase in violence throughout the nation. Several prominent Colombian political 
figures, most notably, Luis Carlos Galan – a popular Liberal senator and the clear favorite to win 
the presidency in 1990 – were assassinated, prompting a massive state crackdown of the cartels. 
The Medellin cartel, under the leadership of Pablo Escobar, issued its own declaration of war and 
initiated a campaign of terror designed to destabilize the Colombian state and intimidate its 
society.161 Intense internal conflict combined with the profound reluctance of both political parties 
to transform the political regime, gave rise to a broad-based student movement, which demanded 
constitutional reform by means of a popularly elected National Constituent Assembly outside the 
bounds of Congress.162 The National Constituent Assembly, supported by a plebiscite, took place 
in 1990 as a new administration took office. The composition of this assembly varied, with the 
two traditional parties controlling less than half the seats. Many analysts have attributed the 
surprisingly low voter turnout for this assembly to the fact that most legislators chose not to run 
for a seat in the assembly and thus did not activate their broker clientele networks. Nevertheless, 
with the traditional two parties holding a minority stake in the constituent assembly, the coalition 
that came to dominate within the Assembly was composed of Liberals close to the president, the 
Moviemiento de Salvacion Nacional (MSN), and the representatives of the Alianza Democratic 
M-19 (AD M-19).163 
The Constitution that was created removed all remnants of the coalition governance, and 
instituted electoral, participatory, and institutional reforms. In the electoral sphere, popular 
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elections of departmental governors and the vice-president were implemented, a runoff system for 
presidential elections was established, electoral ballots were distributed officially, non-resident 
voting was barred in municipal elections, the election of alternate delegates to public office was 
negated, and the provision of special seats for the election of indigenous and black representatives 
were instituted. In terms of bolstering participation, the new Constitution called for the 
implementation of a recall vote for governors and mayors, a mechanism for “poplar consultation” 
at all levels of government, referendums to repeal national laws or amend the constitution, and the 
right to organize and participate in political parties and movements. Finally, it reduced 
presidential power, weakened veto power, placed limits on “extraordinary powers” to issue legal 
norms, curtailed state-of-siege emergency powers, significantly transformed the judicial branch to 
counter chronic problems of weakness, corruption and lack of resources, introduced an extensive 
bill of citizen rights, as well as a variety of judicial mechanisms that citizens can employ to 
protect these rights, and strengthened political and legislative powers of Congress.164 
Despite the dramatic changes promised by the 1991 constitution, the reformation of the 
armed forces and the party system was intentionally avoided. The existing military apparatus had 
been responsible for numerous human rights abuses and had become increasingly autonomous 
from the government. The Assembly chose not to enact reforms of the armed services out of fear 
of provoking them. Moreover, the existing electoral procedure in which seats in representative 
bodies were allocated by factional lists rather than by official party lists, had helped to foster the 
extreme factionalism and clientelism characteristic of the political party system. The 
unwillingness to adopt official party lists for the allocation of representatives ostensibly allowed 
for clientelism to continue, and thus to remain a significant method for the acquisition of political 
power.  
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Despite the promulgation of a markedly liberal Constitution, throughout the 1990s the 
state remained unable to end the political violence that ravaged the nation. In addition, criminal 
violence became uncontrollable, and bribery and corruption continued to characterize Colombian 
politics as politicians at all levels were forced to either confront or acquiesce to narco 
traffickers.165 For example, in 1995, the administration of President Andres Samper became mired 
in a serious drug scandal tied to the Cali cartel. This speculative collusion with the Cali cartel 
severely undermined the legitimacy of the regime, which in turn, complicated efforts to 
consolidate the country’s democratic transformation.166 Under mounting pressure from the United 
States to crack down on the drug trade, which by the late 1980s had become a major domestic 
industry, the Samper administration strengthened penalties for drug trafficking and reformed the 
1991 constitution to allow for the extradition of Colombian citizens to stand trial abroad. 
Nevertheless, Samper’s preoccupation with the drug scandal and the accompanying loss of 
credibility inhibited him from addressing the internal armed conflict. By then, both left-wing 
guerrilla movements and right-wing paramilitary organizations had expanded significantly, 
mostly due to their increased financial dependency upon the drug trade.167  
The implementation of Plan Colombia in 2000 signified an attempt by the Colombian and 
United States governments to bilaterally eradicate illicit crops, negotiate settlements with the 
guerilla movements, revive the stagnant Colombian economy, and provide aid for judicial 
institutions, human rights, and alternative development.168 Once adopted however, Plan Colombia 
became mostly a means whereby the United States could supply the Colombian government with 
military and police assistance. Between 2000 and 2010, the United States provided $7.3 billion in 
aid to Colombia, making it the largest recipient of U.S. aid outside the Middle East and 
Afghanistan.169 Under this plan, the Uribe Administration (2002-2010) strengthened the state 
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security forces and deployed them aggressively against the FARC and ELN guerillas. Unwilling 
to negotiate with the various guerrilla organizations, by 2010, Uribe’s aggressive tactics had 
produced significant results. There had been a considerable decline in most indicators of violence, 
including kidnappings, extrajudicial killings, and massacres, along with the extensive 
demobilization of right-wing paramilitary units across the country. In recent years, while there has 
been a surge in the number of paramilitary groups operating within Colombia, lengthy 
negotiations with the FARC beginning in 2012 have resulted in a historic cease-fire agreement 
enacted in 2016. This ceasefire marks the end of 50 years of internal armed conflict between the 
FARC and the Colombian government. However, attempts to establish a post-conflict transitory 
regime have been slightly setback due to the recent failure of a national peace agreement 
referendum. 
 
Exploratory Conclusions: Democracy in Colombia 
Although the Colombian constitution has bolstered political pluralism and inclusion in 
recent years, the establishment of liberal democracy in Colombia remains contingent upon the 
broader capacity of the state to ensure the protection of civil liberties, address corruption, 
engender the complete subservience of the military to civilian rule, and bring about an end to 
internal conflict and the proliferation of autonomous intrastate actors. Moreover, a politically 
insulated elite class that has perpetuated a culture of exclusion and non-representative democracy 
ever since the post-independence era has hindered democratic consolidation. These conclusions 
have been reinforced by recurrently low voter turn-out rates, as well as declining confidence in 
political parties and their ability to affect change. As mentioned before, Colombians 
overwhelming approve of democracy over any other form of government. However, liberal 
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democracy has been unable to flourish in Colombia, and will continue to be elusive so long as 
the aforementioned conditions endure both within the state and the political system. 
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CHAPTER II 
Venezuela: Reversion to Authoritarianism in the Twenty-First Century 
 
Introduction 
 On January 10, 2007, President Hugo Chavez began his inaugural speech by proclaiming: 
“Fatherland, socialism, or death – I swear it”. Promising to accelerate the march toward 
socialism, he announced the imminent nationalization of three foreign controlled economic 
sectors -- telecommunications, electricity, and “heavy oil” petroleum industries located around 
Venezuela’s Orinoco Tar Belt. A day later, Chavez invoked a 1999 constitutional provision that 
allows the executive to assume all legislative powers exercised by the National Assembly (Ley 
Habilante). Determined to enlarge his power further, Chavez used an executive order to push 
through a constitutional amendment that repealed the two-term presidential limit. The new 
amendment authorized the indefinite reelection of the executive. Since then, the Venezuelan 
regime has become markedly more authoritarian in nature, as almost every aspect of political, 
economic, and civil life has come under the jurisdiction of an overbearing, executive-led 
bureaucracy. 
            With decision-making authority concentrated in the executive, the ability of citizens to 
shape government policies and proposals has been significantly curtailed. Economic crisis has 
exacerbated the political situation. Recent decreases in the international price of oil have 
engendered increases in inflation, unemployment, scarcity, and poverty. In response to the 
political and economic instability afflicting the country, the Venezuelan regime under president 
Nicolás Maduro has tightened its control over every aspect of society. Widespread protests have 
resulted, which have been met with state-sponsored violence. In the process, civil and 
associational rights have been repeatedly infringed upon. Through an analysis of the evolution 
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of Venezuela’s political, economic and social systems, beginning with the pre-colonial period, I 
will explain in this chapter how and why Venezuela managed to create a democratic system, and 
how why said system reverted to authoritarian rule 
 
Pre-Colonial and Colonial Times 
Just like the Colombian case, in order to fully understand the processes of state-creation 
and democratization that have transpired in Venezuela, the analysis must begin with an overview 
of the nation’s geography and original human population. With its mountains, valleys, plains, 
deserts, jungle, rivers and coastline, Venezuela is geographically and topographically similar to 
Colombia. Although it is smaller than Colombia (ranking seventh in size among Latin American 
nations), it can also be succinctly divided into various regions based upon distinctive 
physiography, climate, culture, populations, and economic systems.170  
Venezuela’s landscape is dominated by a sweeping chain of Andean mountain ranges in 
the west (bordering Lake Maracaibo to the Northwest), highlands towards the east that give way 
to another mountain range which parallels the coast until it is broken up by the Orinoco Delta in 
the northeast, large expanses of plains (llanos) located east and south of the Andes as well as the 
Central Coastal Range, and the Guayana highlands – an area dominated by low mountains, rich 
grasslands and extensive tropical forests.171 Within this panorama, six major provinces have 
emerged in the context of three geographically distinguishable regions; the northern region, 
separated from the southern region by the Andes as well as the lesser range of mountains that run 
to the northeastern corner of the country. The southern region, consisting of the territory south of 
the Central Coastal Range - the llanos, that extend to both the east towards the Orinoco River 
and the west towards the Colombian border, and the Guayana highlands in the southernmost 
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region of the nation.172 Historically, the different geographical characteristics of these regions 
have facilitated uneven economic development across most provinces, which has in turn proved 
to be a considerable setback in achieving the consolidation of the power of the state.  
 
Pre-Columbian Societies 
The indigenous peoples of Venezuela created political, economic and social systems that 
differed immensely from the empires of the Inca on the continent’s western region, or the Aztecs 
in the central valley of Mexico. Rather than hierarchical and centralized empires, native 
chiefdoms were found in much of Venezuela north of the Orinoco River, although enclaves of 
tropical-forest farmers occupied some of the lowlands adjoining Lake Maracaibo, while nomadic 
hunters and gatherers lived along the Orinoco River on the southern borders of the chiefdoms.173 
In western Venezuela, the chiefdoms primarily produced manioc, maize, and sweet potatoes, 
while in the east, the indigenous groups relied exclusively on bitter manioc. When harvests were 
poor, the native population subsisted on the rich game resources. Trade was considerable 
between the northern Venezuelan peoples with some groups bartering gold for pearls obtained 
from a distant coastal region. Most of the larger chiefdoms retained an elaborate political 
structure with a primary chieftain and lesser chieftains presiding over a class of nobles, 
distinguished warriors, and wealthy men whose status seems to have been hereditary. Occupying 
the lowest socioeconomic status were slaves who consisted of captive children.174 Although there 
were many indigenous groups who lived in Venezuela, almost all of these peoples were 
vanquished by the Spaniards early in the colonial period, and the area was greatly depopulated. 
Those who survived were often enslaved under harsh conditions or “entrusted” by the Crown to 
the missionaries in the interior.175  
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Spanish Conquest and the Colonial Period 
The Spaniards arrived to Venezuela by around 1500, and had first attempted to extract 
wealth from the territory by forcing the natives to dive and retrieve pearls from the waters near 
the Island of Margarita off the northeast coast. Once the pearl beds had been exhausted, the 
absence of large mineral deposits on the scale of those found in Mexico, Peru or even New 
Granada compelled many settlers to move westward. Those who remained began to subjugate 
the native population by the means of the encomienda system; a system of forced labor based 
upon the concept of tribute, that was uniformly implemented in the Spanish colonies of the New 
World. The first area that the Spaniards colonized was Venezuela’s northern region. Discovering 
gold in Yaracuy - located in Venezuela’s northwestern region - the Spaniards attempted to utilize 
the indigenous population as a cheap and easily subdued labor force. However, the native 
population diminished rapidly due to exposure to disease, armed resistance against the Spanish 
interlopers, and horrendous working conditions. As a result, the colonizers sought to import 
African slaves as a way to augment their dwindling labor force. Soon thereafter, slave-trading 
became a major source of revenue.176 
Lacking substantial mineral wealth as well as a large, organized, and easily exploitable 
indigenous population (the importation of slave labor was costly), Venezuela quickly lapsed into 
the periphery of the Spanish Empire.177 Considered to be a quiet and unimportant backwater of 
the empire, in 1528 the Spanish Crown rented Venezuela to the German commercial banking 
firm of Welser, which by 1546, also deemed Venezuela to be unprofitable. As such, the settlers 
primarily embraced agricultural production, which was primitive and largely intended for 
internal consumption. The colonizers cultivated a variety of crops in Venezuela’s northern region 
ranging from tobacco, indigo, cotton, coffee, wheat and sugar cane. In short time, however, 
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cacao became the colony’s most important crop. By the end of the 18th century, cacao production 
dominated the domestic economy as well as accounted for almost all of the colony’s export 
earnings. In addition to these crops, the early economy was based upon the production of cattle 
on the southwestern llanos. Cattle ranchers primarily relied upon the meat from the herds to 
provide for the local market, while they also sold the hides they produced on both domestic and 
international markets.178 Labor for the ranches as well as agricultural activities was supported 
using the encomienda system, and later, by the imported slave population. Since encomiendas 
typically occupied large swaths of land, wealth was highly concentrated in the hands of a few 
encomenderos. This proclivity for wealth consolidation would become a salient aspect of 
Venezuelan society well into the 20th century. 
By 1620 cacao had gradually become Venezuela’s principle export, and would remain so 
for the next two centuries. Its effects on Venezuelan colonial society were substantial. The 
production of cacao generated sizable profits, which attracted for the first time in Venezuela’s 
history significant numbers of Spaniards, including relatively poor Canary Islanders. Moreover, 
seeing that there was little indigenous labor available, the crop’s plantation culture facilitated a 
great demand for African slaves during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. As such, 
those who owned the means of production came to constitute a ruling class, occupying the 
highest strata of colonial society. These elites were subsequently divided into two factions: the 
peninsulares, who were associated with Spanish colonial rule and the mantuanos, who were the 
American-born progeny of the Spanish colonizers. They were followed by white Canary 
Islanders, who typically worked as wage laborers. Next came a large group of racially mixed 
pardos. As white Canary Islanders, African slaves, and the natives worked closely with one 
another either on plantations, or on small landholdings, miscegenation became commonplace. As 
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a result, by the late eighteenth century, pardos constituted more than half of the total population. 
Finally, occupying the lowest position in society were African slaves, who constituted about 20 
percent of the population, and the native population, who constituted less than 10 percent of the 
total population by the time of independence.179 
By the mid-seventeenth century, Venezuela had been incorporated into New Granada. 
However, occupying a relatively marginal position in the empire, it retained considerable 
political autonomy.180 As such, communication and commerce flowed relatively freely between 
the three primary regions. The northern region, with its access to the Caribbean Sea, became an 
important hub of commerce through which most of Venezuela’s imports and exports, such as 
cacao, wheat, and tobacco, passed through. The southern and eastern regions, albeit not as 
important, supplied crucial linkages to New Granada, as well as access to both the Atlantic 
Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. These regions that relied primarily upon the production of cattle 
and related commodities (hides, and other livestock items) generally augmented the flow of 
trade.181 Spanish indifference to Venezuela was such that the colonies provided a larger market 
for Venezuelan cacao than did Spain. Moreover, the profits obtained from the triangular trade of 
African slaves for Venezuelan cacao, which was then shipped across the Caribbean and sold 
primarily in Veracruz (for consumption in New Spain), made the Venezuelan coast a frequent 
port of call for Dutch and British merchants.182 As a result, illegal intercolonial trade flourished, 
while Dutch and British merchants profited. 
By the start of the 18th century, the Spanish crown took an active interest in regulating 
commerce as part of an attempt to stem imperial decline. Attempting to crack down on the level 
of contraband flowing through the Caribbean as well as to enhance profitability, the reformist 
Bourbon dynasty granted the Compania Guipuzcoana, or the Caracas Company, a complete 
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commercial monopoly on cacao in 1728.183 In return for this monopoly, the Caracas Company 
agreed to suppress the contraband trade, defend the Venezuelan coast, stimulate the regional 
production of cacao, and provide slaves to the colony.184 
In addition to the reform that granted the Company monopoly rights on the cacao 
industry, the Spanish Crown had implemented four additional measures designed to augment 
revenues as well as strengthen its control over Venezuela in the late eighteenth century. The first 
of these reforms occurred in 1776 when the Bourbon Monarchs placed the six provinces of 
Venezuela under the fiscal jurisdiction of the Intendencia de Venezuela. A year later, the 
Captaincy General of Venezuela, corresponding roughly to the present national territory, was 
created with Caracas as its capital.185 This institution was established to consolidate the defense 
of the Venezuelan provinces under the jurisdiction of a central office located in Caracas. 
Desiring greater centralization of judicial, political and administrative functions within 
Venezuela, the Crown created the Audiencia de Caracas in 1786 to regulate the activities of 
colonial authorities; these functions had previously been handled by the audiencias of Santo 
Domingo and Santa Fe de Bogota.186 Finally, in 1793, Spain established the Consulado Real de 
Caracas. The Consulado was charged with the adjudication of mercantile cases and the 
promotion of economic growth in Venezuela.187 
Although the reforms were enacted primarily to bolster the administrative, social and 
economic authority of Caracas over the six provinces, Venezuela continued to be a two-tiered 
society divided along the self-reinforcing cleavages of wealth, ethnicity, and locality. At the top 
of the socio-economic hierarchy was a white elite composed of high-ranking Spanish officials, 
mantuano hacendados and rancheros, and a few wealthy merchants as well as professionals, all 
of whom primarily resided in Caracas. On the other hand, pardo agriculturalists, day laborers, 
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artisans, and slaves, who jointly constituted the lower strata of Venezuelan society, lived 
predominantly in the surrounding provinces. They enjoyed relative political autonomy and 
controlled their respective channels of commerce. As such, these regions became increasingly 
reluctant to accept the greater prominence of Caracas and its emergent elite.188 By the end of the 
18th century, regional antagonisms bolstered by sentiments of socio-economic autonomy would 
greatly intensify the chaos and violence experienced during the Wars of Independence, which 
lasted from 1810 to 1821. 
 
Independence and its Aftermath 
Napoleon’s occupation of Spain in 1808 provided the impetus for independence that 
spread throughout Spanish America in the early 19th century. With Charles IV and his son 
Ferdinand VII forced to abdicate the throne in favor of Napoleon, Spanish authority in the 
colonies came under immense scrutiny from a relatively critical creole elite. Refusing to 
recognize the French usurper, the Caracas cabildo (a city council which was primarily composed 
of creole leaders) instead pledged their allegiance to the royal Spanish junta. However, this did 
not deter a faction of creoles from questioning the political legitimacy of the hastily-formulated 
Spanish junta. Moreover, for them, the immediate future of the colonial system was rife with 
insecurity, uncertainty and tension, especially within the upper echelons of society. In April 
1810, the Caracas cabildo, meeting as a cabildo abierto (town meeting), ousted the governor of 
Caracas, the intendant, several Audiencia justices and the military forces. Shortly thereafter, the 
leaders of the rebellion formed a junta that repudiated the authority of the Council of Regency in 
Spain, abeit governed in the name of the deposed Ferdinand VII. The cabildos of three major 
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cities – Coro, Maracaibo, and Guayana – were the only regional elites to not join Caracas; 
instead, they vowed to remain loyal to Spain.189 
On July 5, 1811, a congress convoked by the junta declared Venezuelan independence 
from Spain, despite the lack of a completely unified central authority. Five months later, on 
December 21, 1811, the congress drafted a constitution, marking the official beginning of 
Venezuela’s First Republic. Known by Venezuelan historians as La Patria Boba, or the Silly 
Republic, the First Republic of Venezuela lasted approximately six months. From the outset, it 
was clear that the constitution preserved the privileges of the elite as well as enhanced their 
control over the government and society by limiting suffrage to property owners. Moreover, it 
abolished slave trading and legal ethnic discrimination, but not slavery itself. Finally, the new 
republic suffered from an overwhelming unwillingness on the part of the surrounding localities 
to become subservient to the caraqueno elite, either because they still adhered to the authority of 
the Crown or because they thought themselves fully capable of self-government.190 Ultimately, 
the caraqueno elite desired the political authority wielded by the Spanish Crown, with no change 
to the existing socio-economic order. As such, those who remained loyal to Spain utilized 
widespread social unrest among slaves and pardos to their advantage; these groups were more 
interested in freedom, or land, than in the grand political principles elaborated in proclamations 
and newspapers. Rallying these disenchanted factions of society with the promises of liberation 
and civil equality, Spanish authorities ruthlessly crushed the independence movement.191 
By July 1812, royalist forces defeated the national forces led by Simon Bolivar, captured 
the leader of the new republic, Francisco Miranda, and reinstituted the colonial government. 
However, once in power, the royalist government instituted an oppressive military occupation 
that rekindled creole resentment of the centralized, colonial system of authority.192 As such, the 
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rebels embraced a new strategy of military campaigns from the periphery to regain control over 
Caracas. Capturing Caracas in 1813 with the support of an eastern front as well as a second front 
from New Granada, Bolivar re-entered the city. However, as a member of the Caraqueno creole 
elite, he too desired the preservation of a system whereby blacks remained at the bottom of the 
social hierarchy. Writing in 1813 about the Royalist triumph over the nascent Republic in 1812, 
Bolivar primarily focuses upon blacks and the role they played in the destruction of the First 
Republic: “…a revolution of blacks, free and slave, broke out in the eastern coastal valleys, 
provoked, supplied, and supported by agents of Monteverde. These inhuman and vile people, 
feeding upon the blood and property of the patriots…committed the most horrible assassinations, 
thefts, assaults and devastation.”193 In addition to this proclamation, a year later, Bolivar openly 
supported a policy that ordered the capturing of escaped slaves to safeguard the supply of labor.  
Making his intentions to keep blacks socially subjugated public, Bolivar essentially 
pushed blacks, whether they were freedmen, slaves or fugitive slaves to offer their services to 
royalist forces as to avoid remaining oppressed under a new system. The royalists, with a force 
of 10,000 to 12,000 troops, only 160 of whom were Spaniards, began to terrorize those in the 
llanos and eventually marched into Caracas in July 1814, defeating Bolivar’s forces and 
restoring Venezuela to the Spanish Crown.194 Ousted from Caracas, Bolivar came to realize that 
his intentions of maintaining a system that restricted blacks to the lower strata of society would 
have to change if he was to triumph over the royalist forces and free Venezuela. Moreover, from 
his defeat, it became clear that while control of Venezuela’s political and economic center was 
imperative, dominance over the hinterland was also of vital importance.195 
Acting upon these two lessons, upon his return to Venezuela in 1816, Bolivar secured 
support from the llaneros – namely Jose Antonio Paez, while also promising to abolish slavery if 
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newly freed slaves aided in the effort for independence from Spanish Colonial rule.196 Although 
the Venezuelan army effectively became a conglomeration of regional armies primarily fighting 
for the protection of their respective localities, from 1817 on, the leaders of the various regions 
were united by one common goal: to defeat the Spaniards. By 1819, although Caracas remained 
controlled by royalists, the Venezuelan army was gaining momentum. In the same year, the 
Congress of Angostura (present-day Ciudad Bolivar) established the Third Republic, naming 
Bolivar as its first President. Bolivar and his army then quickly marched across the llanos and 
into the Andes, where he managed a decisive victory in Boyacá. Soon thereafter, he marched 
triumphantly into Bogota – liberating New Granada from the yoke of Spanish imperial rule. 
Nearly two years later, in June 1821, Bolivar’s troops triumphed over royalist forces at 
Carabobo, resulting in the liberation of Caracas from Spanish rule. That August, delegates from 
Venezuela and Colombia met at Cucuta to formally sign the Constitution of the Republic of Gran 
Colombia. Bolivar was named the first provisional president of Gran Colombia, Francsico de 
Paula Santander was named Vice-President, and the capital was placed in Bogota.197 
The Republic of Colombia was formally proclaimed in 1819, consisting of the territories 
of Venezuela, New Granada and Ecuador (when it was eventually liberated from Spanish control 
in 1822). In addition to appointing Bolivar to the Presidency and Santander to the Vice-
presidency, the Congress of Cucuta in 1821, duly reaffirmed the legitimacy of the fledgling 
republic, adopting a highly centralized system of government. The constituent nations were 
divided into provinces and departments whose head administrators were appointed Bogota 
officials. Furthermore, this document provided for strict separation of powers, allowing the 
executive to retain ultimate authority over the other branches of government in cases of 
emergency – adhering to the tendency of emerging Latin American countries to 
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disproportionately concentrate power in the executive. In terms of who would be able to 
participate in the political process, socioeconomic restrictions implemented by this constitution 
limited the right to vote to at most, 10 percent of free adult males - a fairly standard procedure at 
the time.198 Citizens were also guaranteed a list of basic rights, albeit not included in this list was 
freedom of worship – leaving the issue of religious toleration to be decided upon at a later time. 
Surprisingly, the Congress also adopted a nationwide free-birth principle that was designed to 
gradually abolish slavery, as well as a provision that relieved natives of any obligation to pay 
tribute or provide involuntary labor.199 This constitution generally reflected Bolivar’s vision of 
an ideal republic; unified under the auspices of a quasi-monarchical centralized government, and 
headed by a powerful executive. However, almost immediately, the new government was 
hindered by disunity among various existing political factions and economic interests within the 
Republic. Over the duration of ten years, the Republic experienced gradual economic and 
political fragmentation, generating along with it, trans-national as well as internal conflict.  
During the 1820s, Bolivar continued the fight for the liberation of Spanish America, 
leading his forces against the royalist troops that remained in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru. In his 
absence, tensions between various factions of the new Republic began to foster a sense of 
Venezuelan nationalism, as many of the caraqueno elite came to be resentful of the fact that they 
were being governed once again, by a distant power – this time located in Bogota. In addition to 
tensions between Venezuelan and New Granadan elites, confrontations between a predominantly 
Venezuelan military and New Granadan civilian leaders as well as between political factions that 
had consolidated around either Santander or Bolivar came to characterize the existing political 
order of the Republic. In 1826, these tensions culminated in a separatist movement lead by the 
llanero chieftain Antonio Paez, who desired Venezuela’s independence from the Colombian 
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Confederation. Unable to defuse the separatist movement and quell tensions between rivaling 
factions, Gran Colombia disintegrated as regional military chieftains (such as Paez) took 
advantage of discontent to seize power.200 In 1830, Paez officially declared Venezuela’s 
independence from Gran Colombia, and would subsequently dominate politics for the first 
twenty years of the new republic.  
 Beginning with Paez, the dissolution of the Republic engendered the rise of various 
regional leaders called caudillos to political and economic prominence. For the remainder of the 
19th century, these leaders would construct a quasi-federal framework in which regional elites 
would wield substantial autonomy. However, Caracas would ultimately remain the economic and 
political seat of power. Robert Gilmore in his seminal study of caudillismo in Venezuela, defines 
it as, “…the union of personalism and violence for the conquest of power. It is a means for the 
selection and establishment of political leadership in the absence of a social structure and 
political groupings adequate to the functioning of representative government.”201 Simply put, 
these caudillos were local strongmen who relied on the backing of regional militias as well as the 
loyalty of local oligarchs to consolidate their own economic and political power within the 
context of a war-torn nation with a history of weak central institutions. As a result, Venezuela’s 
post-independence era from 1830 to approximately 1920 can best be understood as a competition 
among various social and regional factions over the control of the Caracas-based bureaucracy, to 
consolidate the wealth derived from the coffee trade with North Atlantic and European 
nations.202  
From 1830 – 1845, Paez would preside over an initially prosperous Venezuelan economy 
as coffee became the country’s principal source of revenue. This was primarily due to high 
European demand for coffee, as well as the increased availability of international credit, that 
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spurred further investment into the coffee industry.203 As the demand for Venezuelan coffee 
increased, so did the need for more domestic labor. However, the Wars of Independence which 
had lasted for approximately two decades had substantially decimated Venezuela’s working 
population. To address this lack of labor, coffee planters advocated to delay the liberation of 
slaves as well as forced the enactment of laws designed to reduce the mobility of rural workers 
from coffee plantations to subsistence agriculture.204Additionally, under the leadership of Paez, a 
new constitution was ratified in 1830, which separated the government into three powers 
(judicial, executive, legislative) although the executive became inherently, and unsurprisingly, 
more powerful than the other branches. Eleven provinces also acquired legal status with the 
ability to retain their own governors and local assemblies. However, the provinces remained 
subservient to the central government by use of force as well as through the allocations of money 
derived from the state budget.205  
Although Venezuela experienced rapid economic growth in the early years of post-
independence, three factors limited the possibility of sustained economic development: 
staggering external debt accumulated during the wars of independence, the insecurity of land 
property, and competition from cheap manufactured imports, which debilitated the artisan 
sector.206 While public expenditure grew from 5 million bolivars (Bs.) to Bs. 18 million over 
Paez’s fifteen-year presidential term, inherited debts and lack of an effective tax system served to 
undermine the fiscal viability of the central government. By 1839, the external debt had grown to 
ten times the value of exports and servicing it absorbed 40 percent of public expenditures. 
Moreover, fifty percent of the state budget was used by Paez to keep unruly local caudillos and 
their militias in line at the expense of a strong, central army.  
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The reluctance of Venezuela’s economic elite to break with their coffee monoculture (by 
region) and their dependence upon imports of manufactured European goods made the economy 
highly vulnerable to the volatile commodity markets of the western metropoles. Therefore, when 
European and U.S. demand for Venezuelan goods contracted in the 1840s, peasants and 
landowners were driven further into debt, while merchants and financiers in the cities eagerly 
foreclosed on their properties.207 As a result, a lasting political division amongst two elite 
factions began to form.208 In one camp, controlled by Paez, were the Conservatives, or the godos, 
composed primarily of merchants, creditors and agents of foreign commerce. Opposing the 
godos were the Liberals – a group of largely indebted coffee planters, allies of Bolivar who 
regarded Paez as a traitor to Republican and Pan-American ideals, and rival caudillos who feared 
the economic power of the established commercial and financial elite. The liberals advocated for 
a more decentralized state, the expansion of suffrage, freedom of the press, and checks upon the 
power of the Church among other reforms. This faction coalesced around the leadership of 
Antonio Leocadio Guzman. 
Perceiving Guzman as a threat to his continued Conservative rule, Paez imprisoned him, 
and in 1847 selected fellow godo, Jose Tadeo Monagas, to become Venezuela’s next president. 
However, Jose Monagas began to gravitate towards the liberal party. After passing a series of 
debt-relief laws and granting protection against foreclosures to protect landowners, Paez sought 
to overthrow Monagas. By then, however, Paez had lost much of his political power and was 
soon exiled to the Caribbean and then the United States in 1849. After Monagas had exiled Paez, 
he and his brother Jose Gregorio initiated close to a century of dictatorial rule which centered 
around land and labor reforms. Unable to unify the country with these policies, a global 
economic crisis in 1857-1858 led to the ultimate demise of the Monagas dynasty. As the prices 
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of leather fell by 30 percent, coffee 20 percent, and cacao 50 percent, both Conservative and 
Liberal caudillos took advantage of growing discontent in the countryside to drive the ruling 
Monagas family from power. However, no new government emerged to fill the void.209 
The period between 1858-1863 is commonly referred to as the Federal Wars. The result 
of intense ideological conflict amongst Venezuela’s elites, this five-year military campaign 
claimed the lives of approximately 5 percent of the population.210 These wars were primarily 
fought as a means of determining whether Venezuela should adopt a federalist or unitary system 
of governance. Coming to an end in 1863 when General Juan C. Falcon and his adviser, Antonio 
Guzman Blanco achieved control over Caracas, the Federal Wars had profoundly impacted 
Venezuelan society, while solving few of its problems.211 Falcon would eventually be replaced 
by Guzman in 1868, who would thus assume the singular role as Venezuela’s provisional leader. 
Initiating approximately eighteen years of formal and informal dictatorial rule from 1870 to 
1887, Guzman substantially altered Venezuela’s state structure.  
Determined to achieve “eternal peace,” strengthen the Venezuelan economy, and provide 
for the construction of essential infrastructural works, Guzman embarked upon an agenda that 
would destroy the Conservative oligarchy and pacify his Liberal allies, revive the coffee trade 
and appease the financial and commercial elites, and induce foreign investment for the 
construction of various public works, transportation projects and national electrification. Guzman 
and his administration seemed to deliver on their promises. They concretely expanded coffee 
production, augmented the availability of foreign loans, established new contracts with foreign 
companies, amassed a Federal army to address potential sources of dissent, arranged for the 
construction of highways and transportation, and even established an educational system.212 
Moreover, Guzman rebuilt the city of Caracas, developed a modern governmental bureaucracy 
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with the capacity for inter-regional communication and transportation (roads, railroads, telegraph 
lines etc.), and pushed for the approval of a constitution that reduced the number of states from 
twenty to nine in 1881.213 This reform diminished the number of caudillos participating in 
government, making it substantially easier to exercise total control over the national territory. 
However, despite eighteen years of expensive, foreign-financed projects, the national income 
derived from export earnings had remained where it had been at the start of his rule.214 Thus, by 
1897-1898, the amount of foreign and domestic debt that Venezuela had accumulated was 
immense, while only 19 percent of the population was literate. As one caudillo took over the 
reins of the central government from the next, it was not until 1899, when a drop in the price of 
coffee again facilitated political and economic upheaval, that Cipriano Castro would assume the 
presidency - paving the way for his protégé Juan Vicente Gomez to facilitate the initial process 
of state creation.  
With General Castro ousted by a coup supported by the United States in 1908, Gomez, 
assumed the presidency. Posthumously known as the “Tyrant of the Andes,” Gomez has been 
remembered for his particularly repressive regime and recognized as the founder of the modern 
Venezuelan state. He organized the first national army, built up a highly-centralized bureaucracy 
and established a government monopoly in the fiscal arena.215 Remaining president for the next 
27 years, he deployed his well-trained and well-armed troops to defeat regional caudillos and 
establish himself as the nation’s single, dominant caudillo.216 More importantly, Gomez was 
fortunate enough to be in office when the petroleum industry came to Venezuela. As early as 
1909, concessions for the right to explore large swaths of territory for oil were granted to foreign 
companies, with a representative of a British company being awarded concessions for twenty-
seven million hectares – a little less than one-third of the national territory.217 
97 
 
Following the end of World War I, U.S. corporations moved to battle for the concessions, 
influenced by a government policy designed to preserve domestic supplies through the 
exploitation of foreign oil. Aware of the potential profits to be made with increased competition, 
in 1918, the Gomez regime drafted an oil law that raised royalties to 15 percent and reduced the 
number of new concessions. Warned by the U.S. companies that they would not invest if the 
terms were to hold, President Gomez acquiesced, cognizant that he could not afford to alienate 
the companies. In 1922, the Venezuelan Congress legally gave the President sole authority to 
extend concessions, set royalties at 10 percent, confer titles for 40 years, and grant customs 
exemptions for industry-related imports.218 Later that year, Shell’s oil drillers struck the first 
enormous gusher and Venezuela was forever changed.219 
The development of the petroleum industry from the 1920s on made for radical 
discontinuities with the past.220 From 1922 to 1945, Venezuela became the world’s first great 
exporter of petroleum and the world’s second producer after the United States.221 Between 1921 
and 1925, petroleum exports rose from Bs. 5.26 million to Bs. 259.15 million, while by 1936, oil 
earnings were Bs. 676.77 million, more than twenty-one times coffee earnings – coffee being 
Venezuela’s primary source of export income before the discovery of oil.222 With these 
petroleum revenues Gomez was able to pay off the national debt by 1930, finance the 
construction of an extensive new highway system and other public works, provide subsidies to 
Venezuela’s constituent states during the economic depression, support the expansion of the 
armed forces, government employees and benefit his political allies. Although the wealth 
generated from this initial petroleum boom facilitated many important structural changes, the 
greatest flow of wealth went to Gomez, his associates, and members of the armed forces.223  
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Oil expansion also engendered a massive rural-urban migration that crippled the 
agricultural sector as both agricultural workers and land-owning elite desired a piece of the 
nascent petroleum industry. While peasants fled brutal conditions and rural indolence for new 
opportunities in oil camps and cities and rural elites sold their land to oil companies to make a 
fortune, the result was the creation of both a new working class, as well as a small mercantile 
bourgeoisie.224 However, with the agricultural-led export sector now destroyed, these new socio-
economic classes became increasingly dependent upon the investment decisions of the foreign 
oil companies for profit. Imports increased, the bolivar appreciated against the dollar resulting in 
an overvalued exchange rate which further promoted importation, inflation increased and real 
wages declined. Moreover, since oil production is a capital-intensive industry and does not 
require a large labor force, the initial expansion of the industry did not necessarily equate to an 
increase in employment; the resultant expansion of the service sector, however, captured some of 
the excess supply of labor. Alberto Adriani, a Venezuelan politician who served on the cabinet of 
Gomez’s successor called the oil industry, “…a foreign, provincial enclave within the national 
economy… [one that] exercises a relatively insignificant influence over the prosperity of our 
people.”225 Ultimately, if the revenue derived from petroleum had been invested in public 
education, health care, domestic industrialization and agricultural diversification, it is possible 
that the absolute dependence upon foreign investment and international oil prices could have 
been mitigated. However, this did not happen, and Venezuela’s oil enclave economy would 
persist well into the 20th century. 
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Initial Considerations of Venezuela’s State Creation Process 
Like any other Latin American country, for Venezuela to become a modern state, its  
divisions had to be formerly coordinated with one another through a centralized administrative 
apparatus; this apparatus had to be autonomous and able to enforce its authority throughout its 
territory; and finally, it must have been able to mobilize and integrate the polity into national 
political life.226 By the beginning of the twentieth century, Venezuela had been able to fulfill the 
first condition and part of the second, while the third remained elusive. As posited by Charles 
Tilly in his state-building paradigm, the probability that a territory would have success in 
satisfying the aforementioned requirements relied upon the presence of seven important factors. 
Of these seven, the most relevant to Venezuela have been related to the nation’s absence of large 
quantities of mineral wealth as well as an extensive and easily subdued indigenous population 
(condition one), the proliferation of inexperienced caudillos to head of government (condition 
three), the varying degree of heterogeneity in ethnicity, religion and class (condition five), and 
the inability of economic and political elites to unify and subject themselves to the authority of a 
centralized entity (condition 6).  
As a result of the oil expansion in the early 19th century, more rapid structural changes 
occurred in Venezuela between 1920 and 1960, than had been seen in the years between 1780 
and 1920.227 Utilizing Venezuela’s newly found oil wealth, Gomez bought weapons, built a 
permanent standing army, and laid the foundation for the first effective central state apparatus in 
Venezuelan history.228Military and administrative power allowed Gomez to decimate his 
enemies and close the books on nineteenth-century political life.229 Moreover, oil revenues 
provided him with the monetary capability to centralize power, embark upon substantial public 
works and transportation projects, eliminate external debt, and retain the allegiance of the 
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military with decent salaries and sizable benefits. At this juncture, the power of the state had 
been fully consolidated, however the legitimacy of the state was yet to be achieved.  
 
The Twentieth Century until the Present 
As mentioned before, changes in the economy and the state had a profound impact upon 
the social structure of Venezuela. The new social groups and forces being created by the rise of 
the petroleum industry had little connection to older elites or to the social and political structures 
of the past. As such, they were effectively marginalized by the oligarchic political system 
perpetuated by Gomez, and could neither find legitimate avenues of organizational expression, 
nor reliable allies within the regime to represent their interests. Since agrarian elites had lost their 
base of support due to extensive rural-urban migration, it was incredibly difficult for them to 
establish powerful political organizations able to dominate the political arena, as was the case in 
neighboring Colombia. On the other hand, the peasantry that had migrated the cities became 
particularly receptive to the calls of politically-charged university students disenchanted with the 
Gomez regime. This was because these groups saw little hope for their own socio-economic 
advancement under the current system.230 After a series of protests in 1928 where university 
students were arrested and exiled, one member this “generation of 1928”, Romulo Betancourt, 
whose name would become synonymous with the struggle for electoral democracy, developed a 
plan to replace Gomez with a government broadly representative of Venezuelan society.231 His 
strategy was eventually incorporated into the doctrine of the Accion Democratica (AD) party – 
as it was called upon its legalization in 1941 – and consisted of: 1) anti-imperialism whereby 
foreign oil companies would be challenged and a “just share” of profits accrued for the nation; 2) 
the utilization of those profits to modernize and diversify the economy as well as to provide 
101 
 
essential state-funded services such as healthcare, public education, subsidized housing etc; and 
3) universal suffrage, and a direct vote for the president as to provide an opportunity for 
democratic governance.232 
With Gomez’s death in 1935, exiles were permitted reentry to Venezuela, and returned 
eager to expand politics and opposition beyond student protests. Gomez was succeeded in office 
by his minister of war General Eleazar Lopez Contreras, who sought to maintain the gomestica 
political structure, but also manage the revolutionary zeal engendered by Gomez’s death and the 
return of the political exiles. After Lopez Contreras enacted a law in 1936 that formally 
sanctioned the right of works to create their own unions, The Movimiento de Organizacion 
Venezolana, formed by Betancourt, organized petroleum workers who then launched a national 
strike with support from the Communist Party, the Partido Democratico Nacional (the precursor 
to AD), and the Caracas middle classes.233 In response to the strike, Lopez Contreras banned 
political parties and incipient trade unions, forcing them underground; he prohibited open mass 
activities, and also retained many gomecista generals in the tops ranks of the military - to the 
consternation of many professionally trained officers.234 Moreover, he curtailed political 
participation by limiting suffrage to adult, literate males and by establishing indirect elections 
whereby the oligarchy continued to dominate local and state politics.235 In 1941, Lopez 
Contreras was succeeded by his minister of war, General Isaias Medina Angarita. Once in office, 
Medina began a process of liberalization. Seeking a base of support independent from Lopez, 
and perhaps influenced by the climate of democratic struggle in World War II, Medina gradually 
re-authorized the creation of political organizations and unions.236 In addition to legalizing AD in 
1941, he forced the foreign oil companies to revise their contracts and to accept the right of the 
government to raise their taxes. Venezuela’s share of oil profits increased from about one eighth 
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to over one half. Medina also pushed through an agrarian reform law designed to address 
economic and social discontent in Venezuela’s rural areas.237 
During the Medina period, the AD created a vigorous, effective, and close-knit political 
organization. Party organizers mobilized and established industrial as well as peasant unions – by 
1945, the AD had out-expanded its political competitors (namely the Communist party) and 
generally had the upper hand in popular organization.238 Although the party had grown 
exponentially, power continued firmly in the hands of the gomecista military and state elites. 
Mass organization yielded no real power, elections remained indirect, and suffrage limited. At 
the end of his term in 1945, Medina reached an agreement with AD for a gradual transition to 
full democracy. However, the transitional, compromise candidate suffered a nervous breakdown. 
Under pressure to name a successor, Medina chose a civilian, which effectively ended decades of 
gomecista military rule; however, it did not guarantee a clear promise of free elections.239 
Unknown to Medina during the time of his negotiations with AD, a group of young 
military officers - including future president Marcos Perez Jimenez – had approached AD party 
officials with a proposal for a coup. During the early years of the 20th century, the Gomez 
administration, like the Lopez Contreras and Medina administrations after him, maintained a 
large, highly-trained, standing army to neutralize the power wielded by the regional caudillos 
and various dissenting groups. As such, to augment the military’s power as well as retain its 
allegiance to civilian authority based in Caracas, the Venezuelan state allocated a significant 
portion of its oil revenues to the military as to improve the standard of living of its officers, to 
purchase new and more sophisticated weapons, and to allow many young officers to gain 
technical skills and advanced training by studying abroad.240  
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Influenced by the professionalism and modernization of their Latin American 
counterparts, many of Venezuela’s young officers were eager to cleanse the institution of the old, 
unprofessional Gomez hierarchy represented by both General Lopez and General Medina. 
Moreover, they believed that the military was the only domestic organization with the integrity 
and capability to protect the national interest – a common sentiment found among many military 
forces operating in Latin America at this time.241 As a result, these officers formed the Union 
Patriotic Militar (UPM) and entered into an agreement with the AD. If successful, they would 
turn control over the government to AD, with the understanding that free elections would be 
held, control of the military would be depoliticized, and professional criteria would be used in 
promotions, assignments and other military affairs.242 After Medina named his successor, the 
adecos (AD members) accepted. On October 18th, 1945, the military conspirators ousted Medina 
and transferred power to a provisional junta headed by four members from AD, two officers, and 
one independent civilian. The three years that followed, known in Venezuela as the trienio, 
marked the definitive introduction of mass politics into national life.243  
Almost immediately, the provisional government passed laws that lowered barriers to 
participation, and guaranteed universal suffrage to all citizens over eighteen. Moreover, the 
government began to aggressively pursue the implementation of education reform, limited land 
reform, peasant and labor organizing, housing construction and public investment.244 In 
December 1947, AD won control of the new Congress and elected novelist Romulo Gallegos to 
the presidency with 70 percent of the vote. Whereas only 5 percent of the population voted 
before 1945, the electorate expanded to 36 percent immediately thereafter. Free, direct elections 
prevailed at all levels, from municipal councils and state legislatures to the national congress and 
the president. Although AD captured most governmental positions, new parties were formed, the 
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most significant being COPEI (a Christian Democratic group), and Union Republicana 
Democratica (URD), which was a non-Communist leftist faction that had supported Medina. 
Continuing the policies set forth by the provisional junta, AD leaders utilized the profits accrued 
by the oil bonanza to provide services such as education, health, water and communication to 
poor and peripheral groups and regions. Moreover, they sought to bring about a rapid democratic 
revolution, including: the full establishment of a liberal democracy; a significant increase in the 
state’s royalties on petroleum products; the promulgation of labor laws favorable to unions, and 
the institution of secular educational reform.245 While the policies advanced by the government 
under the AD garnered massive and long-lasting popular support, they also systematically 
alienated a number of powerful groups. Opposition consolidated on the right, represented by the 
Catholic Church, by new political parties such as COPEI, and by conservative elements in the 
military, in business (foreign and domestic), and in the U.S. embassy.  
Business interests – the oil industry in particular – contested policies favoring labor and 
restricting company profits. Rural elites resisted land reform and vehemently objected measures 
bolstering the participation of peasant unions in the implementation of rural policy. The Catholic 
Church was strongly averse to education reforms that promoted public schools and restricted the 
autonomy of Church-run institutions. Finally, the same military leaders who had orchestrated the 
coup against General Medina resented attempts by the civilian leaders to relegate them to 
subordinate, apolitical roles. Confident in its vast electoral majorities and its perceived alliance 
with the military, the AD largely ignored the opposition coalition that had begun to form. On 
November 24th, 1948, the AD government fell to a military coup. The three-year experiment with 
democracy would subsequently give way to a decade of bloody dictatorship.246  
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After the coup, a junta composed of three colonels – Marcos Perez Jimenez, Carolos 
Delgado Chalbaud (minister of defense during the trienio), and Felipe Llovera Paez – was 
installed as a provisional government. Of the three, Colonel Delgado was chosen president, albeit 
his tenure in that position only lasted until November 23, 1950 when he was assassinated. For 
two years, Perez Jimenez, who had been appointed the minister of defense under Delgado, 
consolidated control over the military. After leading a new military junta, Perez Jimenez 
declared himself provisional president in 1952. On November 30th of that year, Perez Jimenez 
manipulated a National Constituent Assembly to declare himself the constitutionally elected 
president for the period 1953 – 1958.247 Under the leadership of General Marcos Perez Jimenez, 
public policy was rolled back across the board. Educational, labor, and agrarian reforms were 
rescinded, the press was censored, and the labor syndicates and peasant unions that had formed 
the base of AD support were replaced with nonpartisan unions.248 Nuancing this heavy-handed 
authoritarianism with populist policies, Perez Jimenez launched a state initiative that allocated 
large amounts of money for the creation of major urban centers and massive housing projects. 
Money was also allocated for the transformation of transportation and communication 
infrastructure, and the development of basic industries such as iron and steel.249  
By 1957, several factors converged to undermine military rule. First, the Catholic Church 
which had openly endorsed military rule in 1948 as “salvation”, turned against the regime, 
legitimizing opposition to the military. Second, a general economic downturn combined with 
notorious corruption – especially in public works- stimulated public criticism by professional 
societies (engineers, lawyers etc.).250 Moreover, the business community became increasingly 
alienated as the regime reneged its debts and contracts.251 Third, exiled party elites from the 
major parties (AD, COPEI, URD, and the Communists) formed an opposition bloc, the Junta 
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Patriotica, that relied upon the underground activities of, and collaboration between, younger 
party cadres to oust the dictator, and create the conditions for a revolutionary transformation in 
Venezuela.252 Finally, although many military officers benefited from the regime’s lavish 
spending and rampant corruption, others had become concerned with the long-term viability and 
integrity of the institution. As such, on New Year’s Eve 1957, a group of officers staged a coup 
against Perez Jimenez. This attempted insurrection disintegrated the façade of unity that had 
been enforced by the military regime. Although the coup failed, it prompted Perez Jimenez to 
unleash a wave of repression that resulted in the further alienation of the armed forces. 253 
As the weakness of the regime became more apparent, underground political forces, now 
united under the Junta Patriotica, orchestrated massive public demonstrations and street fighting. 
Unable to control the masses, the regime collapsed quickly and Perez Jimenez was forced to flee 
the country on January 23, 1958.254 Following the flight of Perez Jimenez, a junta, composed of 
five men (two military and three civilian) assumed provisionary control over the government. 
The transition of power from the dictator to this provisionary junta did not immediately generate 
an end to public demonstrations and violence. The demonstrations continued until the two 
military officers, who had been closely associated with the dictatorship, were discharged. In 
February, a new junta took firm control; it was composed of Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal, two 
other military officers, and two civilians. However, the political situation remained far from 
stable. Under pressure from more conservative officers as well as political parties, a brief period 
of political negotiation and maneuvering followed. Finally, the junta decided to call for elections 
by the end of the year to stabilize the political arena as well as to address Venezuela’s economic 
woes - the petroleum market was contracting and the construction and financial sectors were in 
crisis. Cognizant of the various challenges facing Venezuela, the leaders of the nation’s three 
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main political parties – AD, URD, and COPEI – signed a series of pacts that culminated with the 
promulgation of the Punto Fijo Pact.255 
With this pact, key party leaders agreed to defend constitutional government against any 
possible coup d’état, to form a coalition government of national unity whereby no one party 
would dominate the president’s cabinet, to establish a minimum common program to be enacted 
regardless of which party won office, to guarantee a financial subsidy and legal autonomy to the 
Church, and to enforce civilian oversight over the military as well as assure that officers would 
not be subject to prosecution for their past actions. Moreover, the signatories agreed to exclude 
the revolutionary left, namely the Communist Party, from participating in government.256 The 
power-sharing agreement was signed in October 1958, just before the December elections. The 
result of the elections propelled Romulo Betancourt, the leader of the AD, to the presidency. 
Moreover, his party won 73 of the 132 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and 32 of the 51 seats 
in the Senate, with voter turnout being above 92 percent.  
The agreement reached by the main political forces and socioeconomic elites ensured that 
the vital interests of all major social interest groups (AD and COPEI, other political parties, 
socioeconomic elites, military officials, ecclesiastical groups, labor and peasant coalitions) were 
represented through the establishment of implicit concurrent majority rule. This “pacted 
democracy” significantly enhanced governability in Venezuela, as well as lowered political 
tensions through the deliberate toning down of partisan discourse. As such, citizens and social 
actors not affiliated with either party recognized the elections as legitimate, and accepted the 
results without conflict.257 
Political change in 1958 was driven by the lessons that relevant social actors had chosen 
to learn from earlier experiences. Key members of the political class perceived the fall of Perez 
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Jimenez to be a second opportunity for democracy; a chance to avoid the political disasters of the 
trienio. These included: polarization, a sense of controlled conflict, and the alienation of 
powerful minorities. Relying upon these experiences, Venezuelan political leaders understood 
that substantive social and economic change could not occur solely through methods of mass 
mobilization. Moreover, they believed that through mass mobilization (as was seen during the 
trienio), either power became too concentrated in the dominant party – which led to a virtual 
dictatorship - or that conflict was so profound as to make governing impossible.258 As a result, 
the political class decided to act with caution in constructing the post-1958 settlement. Five 
points characterized the political system of the fledgling democratic regime over the next decade: 
(1) pacts and coalitions; (2) inter-elite consensus; (3) program limitation; (4) encouragement of 
participation, but controlled and channeled; and (5) exclusion of the revolutionary left.259 After 
1958, barriers to participation dropped and active political involvement was not only encouraged 
but facilitated. Registration was easy and voting was obligatory.260 Moreover, a strong 
associational life bolstered political participation, while the highly-institutionalized party 
structure established by the Punto Fijo pact helped to legitimize electoral competitions and those 
who competed in them.  
According to Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, since parties control access to 
policy-making positions, the way they function and are organized become central components to 
the performance and viability of Latin American democracy.261 As such, Latin American 
countries that retain a highly-institutionalized party system – in that parties become well 
established, competition among them is universally accepted, and confidence that the system is 
legitimate and will prevail into the foreseeable future is unwavering - are often the ones with the 
longest traditions of stable democratic governance. In order to ascertain the degree to which a 
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democratic party system is either institutionalized or inchoate, the authors relied upon four 
essential criterion. The first is regularity of party competition as measured by Mogens N. 
Pedersen’s index of electoral volatility, which gauges the net change in the seat or vote shares of 
all parties from one election to the next. The second criterion of institutionalization stresses that 
parties must develop somewhat stable roots in society. This dimension addresses linkages 
between parties, citizens and organized interests. A third criterion emphasizes, “that citizens and 
organized interests must perceive that parties and elections are the means of determine who 
governs, and that the electoral process and parties are accorded legitimacy.”262 Lacking relevant 
cross-national surveys, the authors offer survey data based upon rough estimates that assess key 
aspects of this criterion. The fourth and final criterion is that party organization in countries with 
institutionalized party systems must be solid. Aggregating these four dimensions to measure 
party system institutionalization in Latin America, Mainwaring and Scully place Venezuela 
among the top four countries in the region, only behind Costa Rica, Chile, and Uruguay.263 They 
go on to mention that:  
 
Parties have been the central actors in Venezuelan democracy since its inception in 1958. 
Parties are institutionalized, disciplined, and centralized. They control the process of 
candidate selection, and they are the key actors in political campaigns. Organized groups 
in society have strong linkages to parties and are often dominated by them. Party voting 
and party identification are strong.264 
 
Although a highly-institutionalized party system reduces the number of problems associated with 
inchoate or disorganized party systems – such as corruption and personalism - Mainwaring and 
Scully assert that a high level of institutionalization does not necessarily mean that stable 
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democratic governance will be achieved. It simply means that where a party system is more 
institutionalized, parties are key actors in structuring the political process. Thus, political actors 
in institutionalized systems usually control candidate selection for the head of government, are 
generally oriented toward winning electoral competitions and coming to power through peaceful 
means, facilitate governability while allowing for groups to express their interests, and attenuate 
conflict in ways that do not overwhelm the political system. Moreover, an institutionalized 
system also enhances electoral accountability and generally reduces the incidence of corruption, 
which makes for more effective government because, “corruption thrives on disorganization, the 
absence of stable relationships among groups and of recognized patterns of authority... 
Corruption is most prevalent in states which lack effective political parties…In a modernizing 
polity the weaker and less accepted the political parties, the greater the likelihood of 
corruption.”265 To summarize, although a high degree of party institutionalization does not 
necessarily lead to democratic governance, stable democracy is more likely to thrive when the 
party system is institutionalized, than when democratic institutions are weak and uncertainty is 
pervasive.266 
 In the post-1958 period, although stability and governability had been achieved through 
the institutionalization of Venezuela’s party system, the consociational or quasi-consociational 
experiment that emerged also imposed considerable constraints on the decision-making process. 
Due to the fact that most important sectors were given a virtual veto power on matters affecting 
their respective fundamental interests, policy making was rather lengthy and generated slow 
advances in terms of redistributive legislation.267 Moreover, until the 1980s, associational life 
was encapsulated and dominated by the major political parties, namely AD and COPEI (URD 
left the coalition in 1960). Therefore, in general, voter choice and participation in elections were 
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constrained by both electoral and legal systems, which also afforded leaders of the dominant 
parties significant influence over all stages of the electoral process.268 Finally, the Betancourt 
administration, as well as the administration of Raul Leoni that succeeded it, worked assiduously 
to isolate and exclude the Communist party and other leftist factions from government. In 
response to their marginalization, and inspired by the recent success of Fidel Castro in Cuba, the 
Communists and the leftist factions of AD and URD moved quickly to armed opposition in 1960. 
However, by the late 1960s, the insurgency had been defeated and many of the former guerillas 
accepted amnesty and integrated themselves into political life as members of peaceful political 
parties of the left – most notably the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) and the Revolutionary 
Left Movement (MIR).269  
  From 1958 to 1973, gradual fragmentation of the party system due to doctrinal disputes, 
generational rivalries, and conflicting personal ambitions led to the steady decline of AD, the 
uninterrupted growth of COPEI – with Rafael Caldera, the first opposition candidate to win an 
election doing so in 1968 – and the rise and fall of various personalist vehicles that sought to 
gain legitimacy.270 During these years, the Venezuelan political system in some regards 
flourished, as elections became more competitive and political parties proliferated. However, this 
competition lacked coherence or enduring structure. It was not until the 1973 elections that 
fragmentation disappeared with the share of presidential votes going to “Other” (not to AD or 
COPEI) dropping from 42.6 percent in 1968 to 14.6 percent in 1973.271 The significance of this 
transformation was the consolidation of the political system into a two-party-arrangement, as AD 
and COPEI successfully pushed their rivals to the margin. Although a growing number and 
variety of groups during this period sought official representation in government – with three 
candidates competing for the presidency in 1958 while twenty-three competed in 1988; and eight 
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parties presenting legislative slates in the first election compared to seventy-eight approximately 
thirty years later – AD and COPEI are the only parties to have enjoyed substantial time in 
power.272  
John D. Martz in his study of the characteristics of party maturation in Venezuela from 
1973 to 1983 posits eight reasons for the unwavering political dominance of these two-parties. 
These are: (1) the costs of campaign competition which hindered the potential success of minor 
or of personalistic challenges; (2) the ability of major parties to control internal conflict without 
leading to outright division due to prior extensive experience doing so; (3) the centrist 
proclivities of public opinion that forced the two dominant parties towards the middle of the 
political spectrum, effectively crowding out all competitors; (4)  the diminished appeal of radical 
parties on either the right or the left due to the catch-all methods of AD and COPEI; (5) the 
solidification of the democratic system that underlined the commitments of the Punto Fijo pact in 
which AD and COPEI were the main beneficiaries; (6) party loyalties that took precedent over 
nonparty personalities; (7) centralized party organizations that functioned in democratic manner; 
and (8) the hegemonic turnover of governments between the two main parties.273 By the early 
1980s, years of shared political dominance between these two parties had allowed them to 
essentially monopolize the political space at local, regional, and national levels. As a result, this 
Partidocracia, or rule by parties, became a major source of frustration in Venezuelan politics as 
well as a primary target of opposition and reform by the late 1980s. Dissatisfaction with the 
political system continued to mount during the 1980s and 1990s as the inability of the political 
parties to guarantee a better standard of living for Venezuela’s growing population became 
increasingly apparent in the context of continued economic downturn.  
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The 1973 Middle East oil embargo and the correspondingly high prices for oil on the 
international markets greatly augmented the revenues of the Venezuelan government; in late 
1973 oil prices quadrupled and by 1974, oil earnings had increased from $2.6 billion in 1973 to 
$8.9 billion.274 This dramatic increase in government income allowed newly-elected President 
Carlos Andres Perez to raise the minimum wage, eliminate unemployment entirely, create vast 
steel and aluminum industries, subsidize industries and agriculture, and expand social benefits. 
Moreover, inflation was controlled at a fixed exchange rate (Bs. 4.3 to the dollar), which made it 
relatively cheaper to obtain dollars as well as imported goods. Although the sustained petroleum 
boom had earned Venezuela over $150 billion - which was augmented by the nationalization of 
the oil industry in 1976 - by 1978, the positive balance of payments generated by the boom had 
been overtaken by the export of capital abroad, by imports for consumption as well as by imports 
for the expansion of basic industries. To continue industrial expansion projects and cover the 
balance of payments deficit, the government contracted several large, short-term loans, which 
came due just as the price for petroleum on international markets experienced a drastic 
decrease.275  
In the early 1980s, general overproduction, reduced demand resulting from a recession 
lasting from 1981-1982 and widespread conservation efforts facilitated serious decreases in 
petroleum prices, which subsequently affected the economies of the oil-exporting nations, 
including Venezuela.276 As prices fell, income from petroleum exports dropped from slightly 
below $20 billion in 1981 to $11 billion in 1983. Since petroleum still accounted for over 90 
percent of export earnings, the government heavily depended upon those revenues to fund social 
programs, public works, construction and subsidize nascent domestic industries.277 Therefore, as 
petroleum prices decreased, wages and salaries stagnated in both public and private sectors, real 
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income decreased and government services experienced a significant decline in quality as well as 
accessibility. As real income from wages and salaries dropped, the proportion of households in 
poverty and extreme poverty grew significantly.278 Moreover, inflation, which had begun to rise 
incrementally during the Perez administration skyrocketed over the course of a few years.   
As Robert Alexander points out, “On the basis of 1970 as 100, the index number for the 
general price level had risen from 119.7 in 1974, the first year of the Perez administration, to 
153.0 in 1978, the last year Carlos Andres Perez was in office. It then rose from 184.2 in Herrera 
Campins’s first year to 303 in 1983, the last full year of the Herrera period.” 279 Unable to 
effectively counter hyperinflationary pressures, on February 28, 1983, a day known to 
Venezuelans as “Black Friday”, the government was forced to devalue the Bolivar from Bs. 4.3 
per U.S dollar to Bs. 8 per U.S dollar. With this devaluation, investment and employment in all 
industries that depended upon foreign exchange slowed or declined. Additionally, domestic 
consumers saw their ability to purchase imported goods cut in half over the course of six 
weeks.280 Unemployment and poverty reached record highs while purchasing power steadily 
plummeted (by the end of 1998, the exchange rate was around Bs.560 per U.S. dollar).281 
Between 1987 and 1989, oil exports earned only $8.5 billion on average, and two additional 
devaluations took place in 1985 and 1987. This was problematic considering that in 1988, 
Venezuela’s income from oil exports accounted for over 80 percent of the total value of the 
country’s sales. Furthermore, the central government obtained around 60 percent of its resources 
from the state operation of the oilfields.282 Overall, between 1981 and 1989, GDP fell by 3.8 
percent – almost 25 percent in per capita terms. In 1989, the GDP contracted by more than 8 
percent, inflation reached 81 percent, unemployment reached 50 percent, and foreign reserves 
had been severely depleted.283 
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Moreover, the massive amounts of revenue that had been acquired by Venezuelan 
government due to the oil bonanza had largely resulted in considerable waste and corruption. 
During both the administrations of Luis Herrera Campins (1978 – 1983) and Jaime Lusenchi 
(1983 – 1988) mismanagement, corruption and politically bloated bureaucracies significantly 
diminished the credibility and transparency of the transactions being made within all levels of 
government. The proliferation of these problems in the political sphere subsequently initiated the 
gradual decay of Punto Fijo system, which had been characterized by disciplined party 
organization and a general responsiveness to the interests of a variety of social groups.284 By the 
late 1980s, corruption was endemic as generals, senators, ministers, and business elites siphoned 
millions of dollars into their pockets and then safely abroad; while petty corruption became a 
way of life at the grassroots level.285 To make matters worse, by the time Hererra Campins left 
office in 1983, the foreign debt owed by the Venezuelan government, banks and other enterprises 
was officially estimated to be $27 billion. By 1985, total foreign debt (private and public) was 
estimated to be about $35 billion.286  
As Venezuela was dealing with one crisis, another one emerged that would further 
debilitate the existing political system. For the first three decades after the 1958 Punto Fijo pact, 
national elections garnered unprecedently high rates of voter turnout. As such, parties and party 
leaders had been able to promote an agenda and implement policies that were reflective of the 
desires of a large majority of the population. However, despite the introduction of electoral 
reforms in 1978 that established separate municipal and state elections to diversify choice and 
spur voter interest, by 1988, voter abstention increased to over 18 percent and to almost 49 
percent in the 1993 presidential elections.287 Furthermore, abstention in regional races was 
measured to be over 25 percent in 1979, increasing to over 50 percent in 1989.288 With voting 
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mandatory and a ballot that discourages ticket-splitting, such behavior on the part of the 
electorate is indicative of overwhelming discontent with the party system.289 Moreover, with less 
of the electorate performing their civic duty, the capacity of parties and leaders to channel 
conflict, control organizations, and mobilize votes suffered tremendously. Ultimately, party 
coherence decayed and new organizations emerged to challenge the dominant parties’, “hitherto 
unquestioned role as the only legitimate vehicle for public voice and representation.”290 These 
organizations – ranging from middle-class neighborhood associations, to nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) – no longer relied upon the parties to gain access to information and 
acquire means of political action. More significantly, they operated via networks of FAX and 
electronic mail and acquired independent access to radio, television, and print media.291  
In 1988, Carlos Andres Perez was re-elected president after campaigning as a populist 
who promised to restore Venezuela to the prosperity of the 1970s. To the surprise of the 
Venezuelan polity, Perez announced the implementation of an austerity program and structural 
adjustment agreement with the International Monetary Fund in exchange for a $4.5 billion 
loan.292 The implementation of neoliberal reforms in Venezuela immediately provoked public 
unrest, especially since the economic crisis in the 1980s, coupled with the end of the Cold War, 
left the government with no other choice but to embrace orthodox macroeconomic policies and 
dismantle the protectionist structures that had previously been in place.293 The confluence of  
both economic and political crises led to a sudden outbreak of violence on February 27th, 1989 
when a rise in gasoline prices was to be absorbed by an increase in bus fares and the cost of basic 
goods.294 Known as the Caracazo, widespread demonstrations, rioting and extensive looting 
gripped Venezuela, and by the end of the day, twenty-two cities had experienced some kind of 
public demonstration. Unable to contain the protests with the traditional mechanisms of social 
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control (such as party or trade-union networks), Perez sent in the military to address the 
demonstrators. Ultimately, the situation took a turn for the worse, and it is estimated that almost 
a thousand Venezuelans – mostly civilians perished.295 Following the Caracazo, public support 
for the government decreased drastically, while demonstrations and protests continued on a daily 
basis.  
In light of the government’s use of the army as an ‘urban shock force’ during the 
uprising, a growing cadre of young military officials attempted to overthrow the Perez regime in 
1992. Upon the failure of the attempted coup, massive demonstrations in support of the military 
insurrection propelled its leaders, Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chavez among them, to national 
fame. In November of the same year, there was another failed coup attempt led by military 
leaders who had formed an alliance with a collection of small leftist groups. The fact that these 
two coups occurred within such a short time of one another sent a clear signal that normalcy had 
not yet returned to Venezuela.296 Additionally, these coups served to undermine the legitimacy of 
the existing democratic regime. In 1993, Congress found Perez guilty of a relatively minor 
misuse of public funds and voted successfully to remove him from the presidency. Moreover, the 
political dominance of AD and COPEI came under considerable attack in the early 90s, as the 
whole democratic regime was portrayed and perceived to be corrupt and fraudulent.297  
The hostility towards the political system – specifically AD and COPEI’s hegemonic 
governance – allowed Rafael Caldera, running as an independent, to claim the presidency in 
1993. Leaving COPEI, which he had founded 50 years earlier, Caldera had formed an alliance 
with several minor leftist parties to establish a movement called the National Convergence. 
Relying upon an anti-neoliberal and anti-party discourse, Caldera promised to return to the days 
of consultative consensus building as well as establish an interventionist state. However, from 
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the outset, his administration faced a financial crisis of enormous proportions. He thus accepted 
support from AD and implemented a second structural adjustment package based upon neoliberal 
policies, effectively reneging on his campaign promises.298 In 1998, a sudden drop in oil prices in 
the international market engendered an economic and fiscal disaster in Venezuela. This 
economic downturn served to augment existing frustrations amongst the masses. In turn, this 
frustration was channeled into a repudiation of the traditional elites, the parties and neoliberal 
doctrine.  
The opportunity to make dramatic changes in what most citizens considered to be an 
unresponsive political regime presented itself with the national elections of 1998. Hugo Chavez, 
who had been pardoned by the Caldera administration in 1994, surged to national prominence 
with an electoral movement called the Movimiento Quinta Republica (MVR). Garnering massive 
support amongst discontented factions of society, Chavez utilized a radical and polarizing anti-
neoliberal discourse that offered to eliminate corruption and incompetence, as well as bring 
about profound social and political change.299 Winning 56 percent of the vote, Chavez assumed 
the presidency in 1999.  
During his first two years in office, Chavez prioritized the dismemberment of the old 
institutions that supported the continued hegemony of the traditional parties. Convoking a 
Constituent assembly legitimized by a national referendum, Chavez and his supporters worked to 
neutralize the most important institutional checks upon the President’s ability to construct a more 
robust ‘democratic regime’. By 1999, a new Constitution had been ratified. It created two new 
branches of government – the Citizen Power and the Electoral Power – in addition to the 
Executive, the Judicial and the Legislative branches. This was done to promote direct and semi-
direct participation by the people, and by doing so, enhance the efficacy of decision making and 
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the management of public policies. The constitutional text also incorporated four types of 
popular referenda and provided for legislative initiatives, assemblies and other participatory 
measures.300 Political parties were not specifically mentioned as vehicles for political 
organization and public financing of parties was prohibited.  
Moreover, the Constitution significantly augmented the power of the Executive, who 
presides over the central government and is eligible for election to a second consecutive six-year 
term. The president also has complete authority over the armed forces, and can appoint and 
remove at any time the 25 ministers that comprise his cabinet, as well as the Vice-President. 
Furthermore, the Constitution substituted a unicameral National Assembly for the bicameral 
Congress mandated by the 1961 Constitution. In addition, the document significantly curtailed 
the autonomy and power of the legislative body, and granted the President the ability to dissolve 
the National Assembly and call for new elections if it proves recalcitrant. Finally, the 
Constitution does much to shield the entire judiciary from the influence of political parties as 
Justices are elected for terms of 12 years without the possibility of reelection and are forbidden 
to engage in partisan political activity during their time in office.301 In 2004, the National 
Assembly expanded the Supreme Court from 20 to 32 members which ostensibly granted greater 
judicial authority to the Assembly and to the National Executive.302  
The Constitution also reaffirmed the centrality of the state, the validity of the universal 
principle of social rights, and the inherent duty of the state to create the conditions to guarantee 
these rights.303 State ownership of oil resources was enforced, which reversed the tendency 
towards privatization that had occurred under the Caldera administration. Chavez’s policies and 
programs were also primarily directed at the marginalized sectors of the population, which came 
to constitute his exclusive base of support.304 As a result, the political changes introduced by the 
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new Constitution along with the redistributive policies enshrined within the Bolivarian 
Revolution generated significant resistance from economic, political, media, religious, and trade 
union interests who were reluctant to lose their privileged positions in society. In prioritizing the 
interests of the poor over those of previously privileged groups, Chavez created a ‘zero-sum’ 
framework for governing, whereby one group’s losses were the other’s gains. Therefore, 
capturing and controlling the state became essential for contending social groups to ensure the 
protection of their interests. This contention between social interests whereby the middle and 
upper classes were pitted against the lower classes, mitigated any possibility of negotiation and 
compromise.305 The result was intense social polarization and political conflict that divided the 
country between supporters and opponents of the democratically elected government.  
Between 2001 and 2003, the opposition attempted to either force the ouster or resignation 
of Chavez. The first of these attempts manifested as a coup in April 2002. This coup occurred 
after hundreds of thousands of disgruntled citizens marched in Caracas. Ending in bloodshed, the 
incident became an excuse for military officers to remove Chavez from office and install Pedro 
Carmona Estanga, the head executive of a prominent business confederation to the Presidency. 
Carmona presided over a short-lived administration in which he abolished the National 
Assembly and attempted to establish a right-wing dictatorship. Shortly thereafter, Diosdado 
Cabello was appointed to the presidency who in turn, reinstituted Chavez. In December of that 
year, a general strike orchestrated by Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) – an organization that 
produced around 80 percent of Venezuela’s export revenues – attempted to force Chavez to 
resign. In response, Chavez fired the workers on strike and replaced them with non-union 
employees loyal to the regime as well as foreign laborers supplied via international cooperation 
from the OPEC countries.306  
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Failing to remove Chavez from office, the influence wielded by these opposition groups 
significantly diminished. Conversely, Chavez consolidated power and attracted significant 
support from the poorer factions of society. A final effort to force Chavez from power occurred 
when the main anti-chavista organization, the Coordinadora Democratic (CD) comprised of both 
traditional parties, many smaller leftist parties of the Punto Fijo era, leaders of the Venezuelan 
Workers Confederation (CTV) and other less-influential middle-class parties and civic 
organizations, called for a recall referendum in 2004.307 Upon their defeat, the CD collapsed and 
Chavez was reelected to his third term in 2006.  
Contributing to Chavez’s re-election was vigorous and sustained economic growth 
beginning in 2004. After almost two decades of economic stagnation, an increase in international 
prices of oil as well as domestic oil reforms greatly augmented the state’s fiscal resources. 
Greater oil rents allowed for increases in public expenditure through social programs which 
contributed to an overall decline in poverty and extreme poverty as well as official 
unemployment.308 At this juncture, the Bolivarian movement led by Chavez had clearly 
consolidated itself as the nation’s most important political force, and was supported by a broad-
based consensus driven by the lower-income and working class cleavages of society.309  
Determined to further consolidate his power, Chavez proposed a Project for 
Constitutional Reform in 2007 that extended the presidential term from six to seven years as well 
as allowed for the indefinite re-election of the president among other reforms. In December 
2007, the proposal was rejected in a national referendum by a slight margin – 50.65 percent of 
the votes being ‘No’ and 49.34 percent being ‘Yes’. The abstention rate was around 44 percent. 
In a referendum held in February, 2009 however, a constitutional amendment was approved that 
removed the legal obstacles to the continuous reelection of the president and all other elected 
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positions. Chavez and his political alliance considered the passing of this amendment to be a 
victory and an indication of public support for the continuation of their socialist project.310 Over 
the years, Chavez and his party utilized their control over the state, including the state media, to 
reward friends, quell dissent, and propagandize in favor of the regime during campaigns.311 
Moreover, many scholars have noted the drastic departure from the participatory model of 
democracy proposed by Chavez upon his election to the presidency in 1998 and the socialist 
model advanced by his regime after the 2006 elections.312 According to Margarita Lopez Maya: 
 
Until 2006 the government was guided – not without contradictions – by ideas of 
participatory democracy, which involved a mixed economic model. It was redistributive 
in the social sphere and combined liberal institutions of representation with mechanisms 
of direct democracy…after 2006 the government initiated a new phase, emphasizing its 
statist tendencies in the economy and maintaining its redistributive orientation. 
Politically, there was a turn toward the construction of a highly centralized state 
apparatus, which concentrated power in the hands of Chavez and was characterized by 
growing authoritarian features.313 
  
The progressive centralization of political and economic power in the executive branch was also 
accompanied by a general weakening of liberal institutions. There ceased to be separation of 
powers, fully competitive elections, and boundaries dividing state, government, party and the 
participatory social organizations that operated from above.314 The various channels of 
participation that characterized the first period were repealed and replaced by communal 
councils, while civil and political rights suffered.  
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The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and its impact on international oil prices 
generated a significant blow to the viability of Chavez’s socialist project. Once again, the 
weakness of the Venezuelan economy was made evident as it suffered from the typical boom and 
bust cycle characteristic of mono-export oil economies.315 As oil rent decreased, the state was 
increasingly unable to redirect the wealth derived from oil towards the poor - amplifying the 
regime’s failure to decrease the nation’s dependence upon oil. The consequence was mounting 
frustration among the masses, reflected in surveys that demonstrated social discontent and 
declining popularity of the president.316 Ultimately, the global crisis revealed the institutional 
weaknesses of Chavez’s political agenda as well as the regime’s redistributive mechanisms.317 
Although ill and with re-election uncertain, Chavez ran again and won his fourth 
consecutive presidential term in 2012. Shortly thereafter, he died from cancer. His successor, 
Nicolas Maduro was elected by a small margin in April, 2013. Again, in 2014, as international 
oil prices declined and Venezuela’s economy suffered, Maduro’s popularity deteriorated rapidly. 
National Assembly elections in early December 2015 saw high voter turnout as well as a change 
in majority rule in the Assembly as the centrist-conservative opposition overtook Maduro’s party 
for the first time in 16 years. In April 2016, the Supreme Court ratified a constitutional 
amendment proposed by Maduro’s opponents designed to reduce the presidential term from six 
to four years. However, the court noted that since the amendment was ratified after Maduro’s 
election, it could not be applied retroactively to his administration. Disregarding this caveat, the 
National Electoral Commission authorized Maduro’s opponents to initiate the paperwork 
required to begin his recall. Soon thereafter, they had collected more than nine times the number 
of signatures they would need to initiate the recall process. 
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In response to these actions, Maduro decreed a state of emergency, claiming that right-
wing elements working jointly with foreign powers were threatening the security of the state. 
The National Assembly however, rejected Maduro’s decree who subsequently declared the 
Assembly illegitimate and disregarded its vote of approval. Ultimately, under Chavez and 
Maduro, authoritarian tendencies have come to characterize the current regime as the executive 
retains extensive control over the other branches of government. As such, democratic institutions 
have deteriorated, freedom of expression has been increasingly suppressed, and political 
polarization has intensified.318 In 2016, Venezuela ranked next-to-last when compared to other 
Spanish American states in regards to the strength of its democracy – Cuba was last.319 
As of 2015, both the World Bank and the CIA cited that oil revenues accounted for 
almost all export earnings and nearly half of the government’s revenue.320 As a result, due to the 
collapse in international oil prices in 2014, Venezuela faces major domestic restrictions, with a 
fiscal deficit estimated at 20 percent of GDP at the end of 2015 and external financing needs 
estimated to be between US$25 billion and US$35 billion.321 Furthermore, a combination of 
price controls, limitations on access to foreign currency, and the collapse of the private sector in 
the provision of basic goods, led to drastic increases in inflation that had skyrocketed to 121.7 
percent by the end of 2015 - one of the highest rates of inflation in the world. This inflationary 
pressure prompted the Venezuelan government to transition from a multiple exchange rate 
system with additional controls, to a dual system whereby the lowest official rate was devalued 
by 37 percent (from 6.3 bolivars per dollar to 10 bolivars per dollar) and the other rate was left 
floating. Due to this devaluation, Venezuela now faces major stagflation and importers are 
increasingly unable to obtain sufficient dollars to purchase goods.322 The overall result of 
Venezuela’s overdependence on the petroleum industry for revenues – complemented by 
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misguided macroeconomic stabilization policies – has been rampant inflation, widespread 
shortages of basic consumer goods, medicine and medical supplies, violent crime, high 
unemployment, and political instability. 
 
Exploratory Conclusions: The ‘Deepening of Democracy’ in Venezuela 
In Venezuela, democracy is treasured but not practiced. This is in part due to the culture 
of corruption that has encumbered the Venezuelan state ever since the discovery of oil in the 
1920s. Becoming particularly apparent in the wake of the oil boom, the economic and political 
dominance of oil corroded the efficacy of the state as well as its political culture. The “get rich 
quick” mentality that came to characterize the Venezuelan political elite following the rapid 
influx of petrodollars normalized and expanded clientelistic behavior as well as augmented the 
levels of governmental corruption. Despite Hugo Chavez’s claim that he would eliminate 
corruption it remains widespread.323 In 2016, Venezuela was ranked as the tenth most corrupt 
state in the world, and the most corrupt nation in Latin American region.324 
The extreme polarization of the electorate also continues to be a salient issue regarding 
the quality of democratic governance in Venezuela. Opposition to the social and political reforms 
entailed by the Bolivarian Revolution has emanated primarily from the middle and upper classes 
of society who vehemently contested the redistribution of their wealth and the undermining of 
their political and social influence. Ever since Chavez’s reelection in 2006, this opposition has 
faced political exclusion and the repression of civil liberties. On the other hand, support for the 
Bolivarian project has continued to be drawn from a large majority of the population in 
predominantly lower-class areas. This demographic has historically been the target of the various 
social and political reforms implemented by the government. Although these two camps 
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constitute a large portion of the population, there also exists a mass in the middle that either 
supports or opposes the government according its perception of its performance. 325 In recent 
years, a growing majority of Venezuelans have come to be increasingly dissatisfied with the 
performance of the government. However, the high intensity to which Venezuelans either 
support the current regime or oppose it, remains a divisive reality whereby a culture of 
accommodation and moderation cannot thrive.  
Finally, the quality of a nation’s democracy is measured in part by the institutionalization 
of a system of checks and balances able to prevent the consolidation of power in a single 
governmental apparatus. In Venezuela, and in Latin America in general, the executive has 
historically wielded significant authority over the powers of the state – either to protect the social 
order or to direct social or economic transformation.326 Upon being elected President, Hugo 
Chavez played into promises of widespread social and political reform to strengthen his authority 
and retain control of the executive branch for a longer period than originally stipulated. While his 
push to further increase presidential longevity in 2007 was blocked by Congress, he was 
ultimately able to amend the constitution a few years later via executive decree. The apparent 
legislative and judicial subordination to presidential authority in the absence of effective 
institutional checks has in turn led to the uneven consolidation of power in the hands of the 
executive.  
Although democratic governance in Venezuela continues to be inhibited by endemic 
corruption and clientelism, the intense polarization of civil society and the increasingly 
authoritarian characteristics of the Bolivarian regime, the democratic aspirations of the 
Venezuelan people remain. Until solutions to these problems are reached however, Venezuela 
will continue to be plagued by acute political and social instability. 
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CHAPTER III 
A Comparative Analysis of Colombia and Venezuela  
 
 
The Process of State Creation 
 
The regimes presently operating in Colombia and Venezuela are far from being stable, 
liberal democracies. However, in both nations, experimentation with consociational regimes, 
pacted democracy, and partyarchy have signaled a desire at the elite level to create stable and 
inclusive governance, while grassroots mobilization, the proliferation of civil organizations, and 
public demonstrations (often in response to elite political arrangements) indicate a substantial 
yearning for democracy on the part of the masses. Both Colombia and Venezuela possess formal 
constitutions that express each nation’s commitment to the establishment of participatory 
democracy, and incorporate extensive bills of citizen rights and judicial, and state mechanisms 
for the protection of those rights. Nevertheless, the absence of a clear connection between 
democratic governance and the democratic ethos of the existing constitutions is also very much 
apparent. Democracy is treasured, yet it remains unconsolidated or marginally practiced. In order 
to discern the reasons why the state-building and democratization experiences in Colombia and 
Venezuela have faltered, I will conduct a comparative analysis of their respective processes of 
state creation and democratization.   
At this stage, it is important to reiterate that the consolidation and legitimization of the 
state is one of the critical requirements for the establishment of a stable democratic regime. 
Regarding the task of state-building in Latin America, David Eugene Blank asserts that in 
becoming a modern state, any Latin America country must deal successfully with the 
establishment of a stable boundary with the external world; and with the construction of an 
effective national administration able to enforce the authority and autonomy of the state 
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throughout its national territory.327 Frank Safford adds seven distinct factors to Blank’s state-
building paradigm. They are: 1) economic geography; 2) political geography, including 
geographic and transportation conditions affecting political integration; 3) relative economic and 
fiscal strength; 4) the degree to which the public accepts the political systems; 5) the 
subservience of the military to civilian rule; 6) the role of the Catholic Church; and 7) protection 
from external attack or pressure.328 The presence or absence of the aforementioned factors and 
their respective influence on state-building varies from case to case. As such, the ability of a 
centralized body to overcome the challenges presented by these conditions constitutes the task of 
state-building, or as Blank notes, “the creation of institutions and differentiated structures with 
sufficient authority to penetrate effectively, and integrate politically, the national territory.”329 
Colombia’s substantial size, accentuated by its multiple topographical attributes and 
regional variances in climate, have consistently obstructed its drive to achieve economic and 
political integration and thus to consolidate and legitimize the power of the state. Upon their 
arrival, the Spaniards discovered a relatively large indigenous population dispersed throughout 
the country. The Spanish conquest of the various indigenous groups changed little from one 
region to the next one. The conquistadores only settled in the places where they could utilize the 
indigenous population as a workforce – or where they could mine gold. The result was the 
existence of a considerable amount of distance between each colonial settlement, which 
generated a collective sense of mutual isolation and autonomy. Moreover, as each region 
developed distinctive economic roles, demographic shifts corresponding to different regional 
specializations engendered noticeable social transformations that also varied from region to 
region. Augmenting this sense of regional economic and social differentiation was the existence 
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of pervasive transportation and communication difficulties due to the rugged terrain of the 
Andes.330  
This sense of isolation and relative independence affected the drive to create the Republic 
of Colombia in 1820.  Though the initial intent of the elites was to unify and strengthen the 
relatively susceptible and disorganized nations of Venezuela, Ecuador and Colombia, the 
political differences and economic interests they inherited from the colonial period hindered their 
ability and willingness to consolidate the power of the state. 
Throughout much of the 16th and 17th centuries, because the Venezuelan economy was 
based on ranching and plantation agriculture, and lacked mineral wealth and a large centrally-
organized (and thus easily exploitable) indigenous population, the Spanish Crown paid limited 
attention to its development. The absence of close supervision enabled the northern, southern, 
and eastern regional elites to engage in unrestricted trade within the Atlantic and the Caribbean, 
as well as with New Spain, and for each to develop a strong sense of regional independence. 
Caracas, however, quickly became the dominant center of commerce. This development became 
increasingly evident to the Bourbon Monarchs, particularly during the cacao boom in the early 
17th century.  
As Spanish colonies, both Venezuelans and Colombians constructed their societies on the 
concept of limpieza de sangre - where white Spaniards and creole elites occupied the upper strata 
of society while pardos, African slaves and native peoples constituted the lower levels. Because 
Venezuela was considered to be an “unimportant backwater of the Spanish empire,” it did not 
attract as many Spaniards as did Nueva Granada. As a result, much of the wealth generated by 
the cacao industry in Venezuela was amassed by creole elites, most of whom resided in Caracas. 
Moreover, by the end of the 18th century, both nations retained a substantial mestizo population 
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due to centuries of miscegenation between different racial groups. Fearful of the potential 
destructiveness that the predominantly mestizo masses could have upon the existing social order 
if mobilized, the Spanish peninsulares, as well as the creole elite, favored the strict enforcement 
of the existing socio-economic hierarchies over the implementation of homogenizing reforms. 
By the time of independence, Venezuelan society remained divided along the lines of class, 
locality and ethnicity, while in Colombia, strong regional identities as well as a general proclivity 
to resist centralization at both the elite and grassroots levels emerged. These distinctions and 
differences would help obstruct the creation of a national identity shaped around collective 
ideals, which in turn, would hinder the consolidation of the power of the state. 
The wars of independence had several relevant effects on the ability of Colombia and 
Venezuela to consolidate the power of the state. First, they spurred the destruction of what 
passed for a local aristocracy. Second, they wrecked the basis of colonial wealth, and third, they 
initiated a series of civil wars and armed conflicts that continued throughout the nineteenth 
century.331 According to John Lombardi: 
 
In the mature colonial society before the war, conflicts of interest at all levels were 
resolved through an elaborate, formal, and bureaucratized system. Disputes over  
land or authority, over precedence and honor, over concessions or profits – whatever  
the problem, a formal procedure existed to resolve it…. For all its failings and  
injustices, it did manage a complex society. With the wars of independence, this  
system disappeared during the clash of bandit armies and the confiscation and 
reallocation of property.332 
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In this context of political, economic and social instability, the creole elites in Venezuela, 
Colombia, and Ecuador sought to construct a regime that would protect their respective interests. 
According to Stein Rokkan and Charles Tilly, who both advance their own state-building 
paradigms, an essential condition to the process of state creation is a period of political, 
economic and cultural collusion amongst elites in which, “…a series of bargains are struck and a 
variety of cultural bonds are established across networks of local power-holders and a number of 
institutions are built for the extraction of resources for common defense, for the maintenance of 
internal order and the adjudication of disputes, for the protection of established rights and 
privileges and for the elementary infrastructure requirements of the economy and the polity.”333 
The failure of the landed elite in the newly formed Confederation of Gran Colombia to establish 
these bonds can be attributed to: 1) the inability of new creole elite to govern effectively, or to 
design a political system capable of coping with regional fragmentation and administrative decay 
associated with gaining independence, and 2) the inability of the creoles to agree upon a stable 
political system that would satisfy their collective economic interests. 
The absence of elite cohesion, mostly due to the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian elite’s 
resentment towards the creole elite in Colombia, led to the subsequent dissolution of the 
Confederation of Gran Colombia, and set the stage for the rise of two dominant political parties 
in Colombia, which consolidated their power at the expense of the state. In Venezuela, for much 
of the 19th century, caudillos such as Paez, the Monagas brothers and Guzman Blanco, seized 
Caracas, enlarged their power, and each established a system whereby as the national caudillo 
each presided at different times over a quasi-federalist state. The success of these national 
caudillos remained contingent upon their personal political skills, their ability to retain a 
powerful militia, and a booming economy.  
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The wars of independence destroyed the cacao plantations of the colonial era. After 
independence, the coffee economy grew rapidly. This was primary because production expanded 
onto the mountain slopes of the relatively untouched Andean region. By controlling the ports of 
Caracas, its caudillos essentially monopolized trade with the North Atlantic and European 
powers, whose demand for Venezuelan coffee enticed regional elites to work with, rather than 
against Caracas. As foreign loans proliferated and credit became easily accessible, the expansion 
of the domestic coffee industry allowed Venezuela to recover part of its wealth that it had lost as 
a result of the wars for independence. However, when the demand for coffee had abated, 
Venezuela’s inability to repay its debts and attract new investment undermined the stability of 
the Paez regime, which became increasingly unable to keep unruly regional caudillos in line. 
Furthermore, tensions between the caraqueno elite and the landowning regional elite due to the 
economic downtown engendered the creation of the nation’s first political parties, although the 
differences between them were marginal. After the deposition of Paez, the Monagas brothers, 
who were equally reluctant to share political power or shy away from export-led growth based 
upon the production of a single commodity, suffered the same fate in 1858. 
In Colombia, the dissolution of the confederation in 1830 was accompanied by a 
substantial reduction in the size of the national armed forces. An emerging liberal elite who 
strongly advocated for the decentralization of state power supported the action. Its immediate 
impact was the proliferation of regional militias. With its power further curtailed after a brief 
military dictatorship in 1854, the Colombian military was unable to function as an independent, 
authoritative political force for the rest of the nineteenth century. The relative weakness of a 
national military or a domineering military force led to a number of violent and highly-polarizing 
133 
 
civil wars.334 Ironically, the absence of an external enemy may have also helped slow down the 
development of a national consciousness and political consensus.335 
The relative historical weakness of the Colombian military, combined with persistent 
regionalism and political instability, allowed for the installment and perpetuation of a violent 
two-party system that would fuel internal armed conflict as well as define the nature of the 
political struggles in the decades to come. As noted by Kline, other “cleavages, (such as social 
class and regionalism) became secondary to the party one. Although the elite of either party was 
often divided in terms of ideology, economic interests, personal loyalties, and even regional 
allegiances, in the face of a challenge from the other party, factional differences were set 
aside.”336 As a result, in the absence of substantive periods of stabilizing military rule, as was 
commonplace in most other nineteenth century Latin American countries – particularly Mexico 
and Peru, the Liberals and Conservatives were able to mobilize all factions of society to engage 
in numerous civil conflicts that only served to further polarize Colombian society along party 
lines.337  
Contributing significantly to polarization throughout the nineteenth century was the status 
and occupation of the Catholic Church in society. Whereas Liberals generally advocated 
ecclesiastical reform as well as the diminished role of the Church in society, Conservatives 
portended that the Church was important for social stability and should hold influence in all 
areas of life. This profound division created by the religious question was apparent even within 
the lowest social classes, serving to intensify the various internal conflicts. According to the 
Colombian sociologist Orlando Fals Borda,  
[The] religious struggle – emotional, bitter, and personal – made the 
consciousness of social class pass to a second level and eliminated the conflicts 
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based on popular self-identification. The Colombian political parties were 
converted to simple agglomerations in which there remained together both 
members of the elite and of the lower classes who had their inclinations…. For 
this reason, far from being an “element of national unity” and of “social order as 
the Constitution says, the Catholic religion has really been a source of conflict and 
a root of the bitter disunity among Colombians. 338  
The role that the Catholic Church should play in society became the most salient 
distinction not only between the traditional parties, but also amongst the masses. By the mid-19th 
century, political participation (which had been extended to all men via the constitution of 1853) 
had become a function of party loyalty in which a majority of voters gave no heed to a specific 
party program, or to the image of their party’s candidate.339 In Venezuela, on the other hand, the 
ecclesiastical structures of the Catholic Church were largely absent. As such, issues regarding the 
role of the Catholic Church in society did not divide the nation to the degree that it did in 
Colombia.340  
The instability generated in Venezuela by the Federal Wars of 1858-1865 did not end 
until Guzman Blanco seized power in 1870. During his tenure in office, his national campaigns 
to ‘modernize’ Venezuela helped strengthen the power of the state. However, by the end of his 
rule in 1888, the Venezuelan population was comparatively worse off. As Judith Ewell writes, 
“the Venezuelan population on the brink of the twentieth century was unhealthy, illiterate, 
unmarried, rural, concentrated on the coastal belt, and numbered just over 2 million.”341 Ewell’s 
overview illuminates the conditions of life in a nation where the ability of the state to provide 
even basic health and public education services had been greatly curtailed. Although a 
centralized and autonomous administrative apparatus had been formed in Venezuela by the turn 
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of the century, the state remained unable to enforce its authority throughout its territory. 
Moreover, as evidenced by the frequent military campaigns throughout the 19th century, the state 
never garnered the capacity to mobilize and integrate the long-divided citizenry into national 
political life. As such, the process of state creation would not fully commence until after the 
discovery of oil in the early years of the 20th century.  
Lastly, as a Spanish colonial possession, Colombia’s economic significance had been 
primarily as a producer of gold. Additionally, the port of Cartagena served as a key base for the 
Spanish navy in the Caribbean as well as a major entry point for both African slaves and 
European imports destined for the interior of the country. However, Colombia’s economic 
development was stagnant throughout the colonial period, and it never developed any significant 
exports outside of gold. In the post-independence era, Colombia’s economy, devastated by the 
war, continued to be reliant upon gold as a primary export although it was seriously constrained 
by high transportation costs. It was not until the mid-1860s, however, when economic elites 
began to experiment with tropical commodities such as tobacco, that gold was surpassed as the 
primary export. Eventually, coffee would become Colombia’s most important export commodity 
during the nineteenth century. From the end of the nineteenth century until the early twentieth 
century, a sustained coffee boom would provide the Colombian government with sufficient funds 
to cover its expenses as well as to begin to consolidate the power of the state.342  
In Venezuela, on the other hand, to control the northern region, primarily Caracas, 
political leaders had to have access to most of the wealth generated within the colony as well as 
control over lucrative commercial ties. As such, throughout the second half of the nineteenth 
century, while regional caudillos made it their objective to capture and control Caracas in order 
to consolidate their power and establish a quasi-federal system, in Colombia, civilian-led 
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political parties relied upon deep-seeded regional antagonisms to consolidate their power at the 
expense of the state. 
It was not until the promulgation of the 1886 Constitution that the consolidation of the 
Colombian state began to occur. The victory by Rafael Nuñez Moledo, the Independents and 
their Conservative allies in 1886, signified the triumph of centralism, strengthened institutional 
authority, and close church-state cooperation. Nuñez and his followers utilized the greatly 
enhanced power of government to thwart opposition, create a strong executive as well as a more 
representative legislature to combat regionalism, and maintain a large standing army. This initial 
move towards consolidation coincided with the rapid expansion of the coffee economy, which 
bolstered customs revenues and allowed the government to meet its fiscal obligations.343 
Nevertheless, although the power of the state had seemingly been consolidated, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, Colombia was thrust into one of the largest and bloodiest civil wars to ever 
occur in its history.  
 
The Process of Democratization  
The state provides the legal framework within which the exercise of citizenship and 
social conflicts are managed. A well-structured and legitimate state ensures the provision of 
basic services; monopolizes the use of legitimate force; defends its citizens from external and 
internal threats; finances public projects by collecting taxes, mobilizing savings and allocating 
resources, and preserves territorial integrity.344 Partially due to the early consolidation and power 
of the two traditional parties, the state in Colombia has been historically weak. During the 20th 
century, the role of the state in society became even more limited as the confluence between an 
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emerging economic elite, due to the coffee boom, and the existing political elite, created an elite 
social class that strived to retain control over the nation and its economy. As explained by Kline:  
The social dimensions of the Colombian state before 1958 were built around two 
principles: (1) political power in the hands of one of the two traditional parties 
each of which, in turn, controlled vast numbers of dependent people, primarily 
through sectarian methods; and (2) a social-class system, with a small elite 
dominating both the economic and political structures.345 
By the 1960s, increased international assistance, especially from the U.S. government, 
substantially augmented the state’s economic and technical capabilities.346 However, the 
orientation of governmental agencies and policies were significantly tailored to serve the 
interests of private international and domestic businesses, the military, and the political parties. 
As a result, the state was charged with providing support for private businesses as well as 
creating a collegial investment climate for international interests. While fiscal conservativism, 
privatization and international investment allowed the Colombian government to mitigate the 
impacts of regional and international economic crises so common in most other Latin American 
nations, those policies also hindered the ability of the state to provide a strong, and 
comprehensive network of social programs (education, healthcare, social security) aimed at 
poverty alleviation, and inequality reduction that were more or less implemented in neighboring 
Latin American countries. The result was the proliferation of organizations on the left that 
demanded greater social equality as well as greater political participation.  
Facing political exclusion and repression due to the restrictive political framework of the 
National Front, a number of groups radicalized and established the foundations of the guerrilla 
movements that have up until recently operated throughout much of the nation. In the 1990s, the 
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adherence to neoliberal doctrine further curtailed the size and power of the state, and its ability to 
address the underlying socio-economic factors contributing to internal conflict. Although poverty 
has declined markedly since the late 1990s -- from 50 percent in 2002 to 28.5 percent in 2014 --
currently, income inequality in Colombia remains amongst the highest in the world.347 The 
persistence of high-income inequality as well as the increased concentration of land in the hands 
of a small minority since the 1980s, have contributed to the longevity and the intensity of 
protracted civil conflict. The conflict itself, in turn, has had a profound impact upon the 
development of Colombian politics, economy, society and culture over the last 50 years. As 
such, although a peace deal has been recently ratified between the FARC and the Colombian 
government, and there now exists many leftist political parties that compete in elections, many 
analysts speculate that the possibility of continued internal conflict persists as long as this high 
degree of inequality remains unaddressed.348  
One way to begin the analysis of the process of democratization in Venezuela is by 
examining the impact that petroleum has had on the formation and development of the state. As 
Terry Karl asserts, “in the Venezuelan case, petroleum is the single most important factor 
explaining the creation of the structural conditions for the breakdown of military 
authoritarianism and the subsequent persistence of a democratic system.”349 Once oil production 
and export got underway after 1920, oil propelled the expansion of the state.350 Revenues 
expanded tremendously under the Gomez regime, who utilized the oil earnings to pay off foreign 
debt, stabilize the currency, strengthen the military, underwrite an extensive bureaucracy and 
public-works program, destroy his regional enemies and provide his cadre of loyal caudillos with 
high salaries and benefits.351 Since oil-mediated integration into the world market allowed for the 
continuous expansion of the nation’s capacity to import, the pressure to industrialize and the 
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tendency towards populism that other Latin American nations were experiencing during the great 
depression in the 1930s was conspicuously absent in Venezuela. Unlike most nations in the 
region - insulated by oil wealth and its strong import capacity - Venezuela did not embark on 
import substitution industrialization, nor did it witness the rise of populist elements in society 
until the end of World War II.  
According to the resource curse theory, the leaders of a state rich in minerals often 
neglect to invest in the necessary infrastructure needed to develop alternative forms of 
production as well as invest in new industries. Rather than diversify, leaders opt to encourage 
isolated investment into and development of a specific resource or technology used to extract or 
process that resource. In the absence of basic industries as well as a more diverse economy, a 
state becomes dependent upon other states for the provision of goods and services. Not only does 
the state become dependent upon other states to supply essential goods, but the growth of its own 
economy increases its dependence on the external market demand for its product. Therefore, 
when the market for the product declines, or the resource is exhausted, the economy suffers.  
More specifically, this problem emerges when a commodity, in this case petroleum, 
facilitates an increase in income and investment within one sector disproportionate to the rest of 
the economy. The increase in one particular sector engenders the distorted growth in services and 
other non-tradables, which cannot be imported, while simultaneously discouraging the 
production of tradables, which are then imported. As the demand for domestic services and 
imports increase, prices rise and the domestic currency appreciates. Thus, consumers find that 
foreign goods are now cheaper than the same domestic goods, and consumption becomes heavily 
reliant upon imported goods. This in turn, creates a cycle of importation and service-based 
growth that discourages the growth of other sectors of the economy as well as a strong domestic 
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consumer market. As a result, those nations that confront this problem are highly susceptible to 
price changes in one particular commodity – oil in the case of Venezuela - and are increasingly 
unable to diversify their economy. 
Although the rapid growth of the oil industry paradoxically deterred domestic 
industrialization until after World War II, the timing of industrialization was of particular 
importance to the establishment of democracy in Venezuela. As already explained, before 1920 
Venezuela’s economy was almost entirely based upon agriculture. However, due to the lucrative 
opportunities that accompanied the advent of the oil industry after 1921, every line of 
agricultural production and export dropped sharply; both agricultural workers and rural elites 
moved into the primarily urbanized sectors of commerce, manufacturing and services. As a 
result, by 1950 the agricultural sector’s share of GDP sank from one-third in the mid-1920s to 
less than one-tenth – the smallest contribution in all of Latin America.352 While urban areas 
experienced profound growth and the proliferation of a younger and more educated electorate, 
the countryside practically emptied. The decline of agriculture in Venezuela had myriad social 
and political implications.  
First, as the attractiveness of rural investment declined, Venezuelan landowners sold their 
property to the oil companies and came to constitute a commercial and financial urban 
bourgeoisie deeply invested in the importation of consumer goods. Bonds between foreign 
capital, domestic capital and the state – frequently enforced by clientelistic relationships – were 
established and strengthened with time. Second, without a rural base, the Venezuelan agricultural 
elite was unable to have a significant impact in the political realm. Although it would support the 
formation of a conservative Christian Democratic Party, this class did not wield nearly as much 
political influence as did the agrarian elites in other Latin American nations – namely Colombia. 
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Similarly, the ability of the Catholic Church to mobilize and politicize rural factions was also 
significantly curtailed by the oil-induced rural-urban migration. As such, Venezuela lacked a 
party organization that could, “…shift the political spectrum to the Right in a future electoral 
arena.”353 
Third, since oil production is a capital-intensive industry, the working class grew slowly 
as the number of jobs generated by the industry was minimal. Although they were militantly 
organized by the Communist party of Venezuela, this industrial working class was small as well 
as isolated in camps located far from urban centers. These factors subsequently hindered the 
ability of the working class to have a powerful political impact to a degree equivalent to that of 
the Socialist and Communist parties in Argentina or Chile.354 Finally, the introduction and 
consolidation of the oil enclave economy engendered the emergence of an urban middle class 
that grew in tandem with the rapid expansion of the service sector and the state bureaucracy. 
During the 1940s and 1950s, direct foreign investment in Venezuela increased from $938 million 
to $3.71 billion – the largest concentration in any Latin American nation. As the manufacturing 
industry grew, so did the number of small artisans and white-collar workers in the service sector. 
As a result, foreign and domestic economic and political forces became increasingly intertwined. 
Due to the weakness and small size of the leftist working class as well as of the traditionally 
conservative rural and ecclesiastical elites, the aspirations and demands of the nascent middle 
class dominated the political arena and led to the trienio period.   
After a brief experiment with democracy that was centered upon “sowing the petroleum”, 
or using petroleum revenues to diversify the economy and provide for basic social services, the 
military resumed control over the state and governed in authoritarian fashion for a period of 10 
years. From then on, Venezuela’s acute dependence on oil revenues to finance the rapidly 
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expanding functionalities of the state continued, contributing to its classification as a petro-state 
– a state built upon a mono-export petroleum economy that uses distributive strategies to sustain 
political order.355 
 
Party Systems and Political Structures: Competition and Participation 
The models of democratization advanced by Dahl as well as by Linz and Stepan, assert 
that the degree to which a ‘free and lively’ civil society as well as a ‘relatively autonomous and 
valued’ political society are allowed to flourish - in that citizens are granted the freedom to form 
and join organizations, to express their views, and are guaranteed access alternative sources of 
information - is crucial for the consolidation of democracy. As most theoreticians of democratic 
consolidation can agree, parties and competition among them are essential to the practice of 
liberal democracy since they present an institutional vehicle through which citizens can exercise 
their rights.356 While strong civil organizations are also essential to democracy in that they allow 
for a non-institutionalized medium of political expression, political parties process and structure 
the options to be made available to the electorate thereby combining a multitude of opinions and 
ideologies into a collective decision about who will govern.357 As such, the study of parties and 
party systems are central to understanding democracy.358  
The two-party system in Colombia has remained its most dominant political feature since 
the late 1840s until the early 2000s. The consolidation of this hegemonic two-party configuration 
allowed the traditional parties to wield substantial influence over both political and civil 
societies. As a result, powerful partisan subcultures created by the traditional parties have 
divided the population, and in many instances, such as the Bogotazo in 1948, fueled violent 
conflict constituting serious threats to continued democratic governance.359 On the other hand, 
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strong party identification has historically facilitated national integration, impeded the 
emergence of a strong military able to contest civilian rule, and led to the expansion of the 
electorate in the 20th century.360 In Venezuela, although petroleum facilitated the socio-economic 
transformations that created the necessary conditions for a democratic regime in the second half 
of the 20th century, these changes by themselves do not explain the successful construction and 
institutionalization of a competitive party regime. Moreover, political parties are relatively new 
organizations compared to those in Colombia. For much of the 19th century and well into the 
early 20th century, Venezuela was primarily controlled by caudillos, or regional military 
strongmen, who sought to consolidate their own power in a dominantly authoritarian manner. As 
a result, it was not until the 1940s that political parties became legitimate vehicles of political 
competition and representation.  
In Colombia, from 1849 until 1886, the political parties consolidated power at the 
expense of the state, preferring to augment regional autonomy rather than to acquiesce to a 
centralized authority. The Conservatives tended to favor strong, central government, protection 
of the Catholic Church and its social and economic prerogatives, and the defense of the interests 
of traditional landowners. Liberals, on the other hand, advocated for federalism, disestablishment 
of the Church, and the defense of commercial interests.361 The Liberals dominated this period, 
however their federalist agenda was fiercely contested by Conservative opposition, which led to 
numerous bouts of internal conflict that obstructed stable governance. It was not until the 
promulgation of the 1886 Constitution, which aimed to consolidate the power of the state, that 
the maintenance of political hegemony became increasingly tethered to the domination of one 
party over the other within government. As Robert Dix has stated, “…[T]he rule of one party has 
frequently meant the almost total exclusion of members of the other from government. The 
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parties have treated government as an objective to be seized and, once won, as a bastion in which 
to entrench themselves like armies of occupation, subsisting on the bureaucratic booty of 
battle.”362 Until 1946, interchange between the two parties based on sectarian politics 
characterized the political system, resulting in the establishment of weak state institutions, and 
intense confrontation in both the electoral arena and within the electorate.   
 During the years of the liberal republic and la violencia, both parties were intensely 
involved in the mobilization of their respective bases. The drive towards mass mobilization 
facilitated the expansion of civil participation, and the incorporation of a nascent urban working 
and middle classes into the traditional party structures. Attempting to fortify their respective 
organizations and provide representation for the new social classes, social conflict and violence 
emerged as competition between parties escalated. At the elite level, conflict was relatively 
contained, resulting in slander as well as the occasional duel; at the grass roots level, however, 
political polarization along the lines of acute ideological differences, especially surrounding the 
role of the Church in society, led to fratricidal violence.363 According to Dix, Colombia was 
among the few ‘continuous’ party systems in the region, ‘that simply have not evolved or 
changed much at all over time, despite…marked increases in social and political mobilization 
and the emergence of new social classes.’364 Rather than presenting a challenge to the traditional 
parties by means of forming opposition groups, the emerging working classes were effectively 
inculcated into the established two-party system, with the only significant opposition to the 
continuous character of the system emanating from Jorge Eliecer Gaitan in 1946.    
Following Gaitan’s assassination in 1948, and the failed attempt to restore order by 
means of a military dictatorship, the consociational elements of the National Front were designed 
by the traditional party elite to both regain control over the country’s political life, as well as to, 
145 
 
“…consolidate their empire and to mold the society which interested them”. 365 Driven by a 
general fear of mass mobilization especially by the left (evidenced by the rise of Gaitan), the 
National Front agreement practically assured governmental immobility, which in turn restricted 
the capacity to bring about political change and social reform.366 By the end of its constitutional 
charter in 1974, the National Front regime had achieved its designed purpose of ensuring 
political and social stability to Colombia. However, it did so at great cost.  
A similar agreement between Venezuela’s two leading parties occurred in 1958 as they 
promulgated a series of pacts that culminated with the Punto Fijo Pact. The political and 
economic elites from both leading parties negotiated fundamental agreements concerning how 
major decisions would be made and who would be involved making them. The agreement led to 
a period of consensual and conciliatory politics in Venezuela.367 Agreeing that democracy was 
the best system of stable governance, the elites created what Terry Karl refers to as a “pacted 
democracy” and what Michael Coppedge calls “partyarchy”.368 
Both Karl and Coppedge assert that while this variation of democracy promotes regime 
stability as well as a certain degree of predictability with regards to future reforms, it does so at 
the expense of the nature and quality of the democracy established. In a pacted democracy, 
collusion at the elite level is predicated upon inclusion as well as exclusion, and is an implicitly 
anti-democratic method of interest representation.369 The decision to exclude various interest 
groups can be exemplified by the fact that although Venezuela’s socialist and communist parties 
supported the overthrow of the Perez Jimenez regime in 1957-58, they were left out of the 
negotiations leading up the Punto Fijo pact as well as barred from the political process. The 
exclusion of these parties and other important societal actors in conjunction with the extension of 
substantial compromises to the military and economic elites, severely limited the scope and 
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possibility of reform. Although pact-making permits socioeconomic structures to change over 
time by providing political stability, it does so by freezing a set of relationships in place. Thus, 
when new politically relevant social actors emerge – products of the varied socioeconomic 
conditions facilitated by the pact – they find themselves unrepresented by the elite agreements of 
the past. In Venezuela, shortly after their isolation from the decision-making process, the 
socialist and communist parties turned to guerrilla warfare and waged a brief insurgency against 
the government in the 1960s. Although their action was most notably an expression of frustration 
with the exclusionary aspects of the new regime, by the 1980s, grassroots challenges to the old 
system began to proliferate as socioeconomic changes outpaced the ossified political institutions. 
As dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of pacted governance became widespread, alternative 
parties, business groups, unions and other organizations emerged to contest both the dominant 
parties and the party system.  
Moreover, Karl notes that once the original negotiators of a pact have departed from the 
political arena, a new generation of leaders must be able to sustain a high degree of 
communication as well as a spirit of accommodation. This task is difficult to carry out since 
different generations may not be operating in the same political, social and economic context as 
their predecessors. In the Venezuelan case, the “spirit of Punto Fijo” and the conciliatory manner 
of politics that had characterized the first three administrations was markedly absent from the 
governments of Carlos Andres Perez (1974-79) and Luis Herrera Campins (1979-84).370 Due to 
the oil booms of the 1970s and 80s and the subsequent influx of petrodollars, the administrations 
during this period assumed that money would no longer be a problem as long as the state kept 
accumulating oil rent. As the political and economic elite adopted a ‘get rich quick’ mentality, 
the spoils system that had been established by the original political and economic elites gradually 
147 
 
gave way to a crisis of clientelism in Venezuela. This shift in political culture had a deeply 
corrosive influence upon the efficacy and productivity of the state, which became visible when 
the oil boom eventually ended.371  
Although the agreement between Liberals and Conservatives in Colombia accommodated 
many important societal actors, including the Catholic Church, which came to view itself as a 
force of conciliation; the military, which was promised autonomy and respect; and producer 
groups, which capitalized on promises of greater access to policy circles, it excluded many 
others, most notably leftist groups. Lacking an institutional channel for participation, the 
disillusioned factions within society radicalized and came to promote guerrilla activity as the 
only means of affecting political change. Gradually, the legitimacy of the political system began 
to suffer as these movements proliferated and came to control substantial portions of the 
Colombian territory. Furthermore, because of state-led industrialization, massive population 
growth, and high rates of rural-urban migration during the late 1980s, less than 50 percent of the 
Colombians under the age of thirty-five expressed identification with either of the traditional 
parties.372 Declining party identification amongst an increasingly younger, less politically 
informed and less economically well-off electorate revealed the institutional weakness of the 
traditional parties, as they were increasingly unable to appeal to the changing demographics. 
Contributing to the decline in party identification was the inability of those who were civically 
engaged to differentiate between the policies and agendas of the two dominant parties. Years of 
sharing power had ostensibly erased ideological distinctions that had previously existed, and led 
to little variation in the parties’ proposed social and economic policies. Moreover, the parties 
came to heavily rely upon patronage-based incentives for voter mobilization, which in turn 
facilitated the entrenchment of clientelism in Colombia. 
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Additionally, the party structure itself proved to be problematic in that it led to political 
fragmentation and factionalization within the regime. The electoral guidelines enforced by the 
National Front agreement stipulated that elites from both parties were charged with negotiating 
an official presidential candidate, whereby candidates for other positions would be linked to the 
list of the agreed-upon presidential candidate. This process greatly divided political elites, and 
subsequently reduced central party control. As such, factionalism and fragmentation came to 
characterize the National Front period, giving way to intense bargaining with regional elites for 
political support, the rise of intraparty competition, and the proliferation of insurgent lists at the 
presidential and congressional levels.373 As Francisco Leal in his Estado y Politica en Colombia 
explains, “with the National Front great traumas were produced at the national level of 
bipartyism, at the same time as the regional level, which is the properly clientelist one, was being 
strengthened and modified. In effect, together with the process of bipartisan depoliticization, the 
role of national leadership as legitimizer of the party collectivities was being weakened.”374 In 
short, the existing regime structure itself engendered internal disorder within the parties, 
government immobility, the growth of clientelism and an increasingly disenchanted electorate.  
Furthermore, according to the concept of democracy advanced by Dahl, a principle tenet 
of democracy is participation, such that no substantial segment of the population is excluded 
from the effective pursuit of political power.375 During the National Front arrangement, many 
movements and organizations on the left were barred from participating in political contests, 
while the power-sharing mechanism ostensibly allowed the two parties to jointly co-opt 
elections. Although there did not exist any barrier to entry for alternative parties, evidenced by 
the participation of Gustavo Rojas’ populist party, ANAPO, it was not until 1974, after the end 
of coalition governance, that these parties were awarded seats proportional to their electoral 
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results.376 This act undermined the second tenet of democracy advanced by Dahl, which 
stipulates that there be free, fair, and regular contests for the support of the population. 
While elections occurred frequently and were relatively free, the institutionalized power-
sharing agreement among the traditional two-party political elites inhibited truly ‘fair’ elections. 
Furthermore, a constitutional amendment introduced in 1968 (Article 120 of the Constitution 
referred to as the “desmonte” of the National Front) extended bureaucratic parity for the 
presidential term of 1974 to 1978, while it also established that a “proper and equitable” share of 
representation in government be awarded to the party with the second-largest number of votes.377 
Essentially, a power-sharing arrangement based upon the machine-oriented clientelism of the 
National Front period had been indefinitely established.378 At this juncture, the final principle of 
democracy, accountability such that political rulers and elected representatives serve as “agents” 
of their constituencies, was (and continues to be) blatantly ignored.  
It is important to recognize that the primary objective of the agreement between the two 
parties was not to establish democratic governance. In fact, it was an arrangement that 
increasingly came to serve the bureaucratic and personal interests of national and regional party 
leaders. As a result, clientelism, secrecy, increased presidential authority, ad hoc decision forums 
and summit negotiations and government-sponsored mass organizations became the informal 
“rules of the game”.379 
As mentioned earlier, Michael Coppedge classifies the system that existed during the 
Punto Fijo period as a partyarchy – or a dictatorship of parties. Relating Robert Dahl’s 
conception of polyarchy to partyarchy, Coppedge asserts that partyarchy is the degree to which 
political parties interfere with the fulfillment of the necessary requirements for polyarchy (these 
being: freedom of association, expression, the right to vote and the right of political leaders to 
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compete for votes, eligibility for public office, free and fair elections, alternative sources of 
information and policies that depend on the vote).380 He also posits that it is possible for a 
partyarchy to be considered fully polyarchic as long as 1) the parties themselves are internally 
democratic and 2) there are meaningful differences in the platforms of the major parties that 
offer voters a diversity of representation. Neither of these conditions were present in 
Venezuela.381 
To facilitate a high degree of control, the political parties permeated all facets of civil 
society, mobilizing and organizing both the peasantry and urban working class into, “officially 
sanctioned, non-competitive, and state-supervised interest associations linked to the traditional 
parties.”382 The role of these associations was primarily to mediate as well as to contain civil 
society interests before the state. At first, party infiltration of these major civil society 
organizations resulted in the expansion of the electorate and massive mobilization of the polity 
whereby between 1958 and 1988, voter registration never dropped below 83% of the voting age 
population and of those registered to vote, 82% on average performed their civic duty.383 
Moreover, party identification was very strong. Contributing to high rates of participation and 
party identification, were various reforms that aimed to lower barriers to participation, simplify 
voter registration, augment party identification through costly organizational campaigns, and 
revamp electoral procedures. While these reforms initially buffered stability, as well as enhanced 
the institutional strength of parties in Venezuela, over time, the closed nature of this 
partyarchical system led to pervasive disillusionment with the regime.     
First, the corporatist structure constructed by the parties allowed them to monopolize 
political space through the domination of civil organizations. This imposed structure made 
joining autonomous groups almost impossible. Additionally, civil participation was hindered 
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under this institutional arrangement as the party leadership had complete control over candidate 
selection; they also fixed the place of each candidate on the party’s slate. Moreover, the 
centralized nature of internal party decision-making made it so that party activism through 
primaries or caucuses was an ineffective avenue of influencing the future election of party 
officials. Since party elites had complete control over the nomination and election of legislators, 
members of Congress had no incentive to serve particular constituencies. Thus, rank-and-file 
party members gradually came to perceive their ability to influence the political sphere to be 
greatly diminished, while the dependence upon party elites for election and re-election rather 
than upon the electorate further entrenched clientelistic practices. A two-part study conducted by 
Enrique A. Baloyra that measured public opinion about military coups and democratic 
consolidation in Venezuela in 1973 and 1983 concluded that Venezuelans were increasingly 
dissatisfied with the performance of government, and desired an expansion of suffrage to correct 
governmental shortcomings in the future. The study also revealed that despite their frustration 
with ineffective governance, Venezuelans remained very supportive of democratic norms.384  
Finally, as catchall parties aiming to benefit every sector of society, there was little 
programmatic divergence between the two dominant organizations. Additionally, partisan 
support depended upon effective economic management.385 In the absence of inherently different 
political, economic and societal agendas, the parties ceased to be vehicles of popular expression 
and became increasingly stratified along an elite-non-elite dimension. As the parties controlled 
both the administrative and judicial apparatuses, a dual system of clientelism and justice emerged 
that furthered the divide between the rich and the poor.  As explained by Phillip:   
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By the 1990s, the Venezuelan administrative system could be characterized by 
operating at two levels. At the lowest level it provided a subsistence minimum of 
income to a significant number of people who owed their position and any 
prospects they might have had to political connections…this can be seen as a 
system of mass clientelism. At the highest level the state was run by an elite of 
several thousand people to whom the law did not really apply: one might call this 
elite clientelism.386 
 
In the judiciary, a similar system materialized where the politically unconnected poor 
were subject to stricter judicial punishment, while the well-connected and wealthy elites were 
essentially immune from law enforcement.387 This division left much of the Venezuelan 
electorate demanding institutions that would represent the populous, not just a few elites. 
Although a 1973 survey showed that 66 percent of those polled agreed with the statement: “It 
matters a lot which party is going to win this presidential election,” after more than a decade of 
economic stress and revelations of corruption the choice between the two parties had become 
less meaningful. This trend was reflected by increasing electoral abstention, with abstention rates 
jumping from 12.4 percent in 1978 to 18.1 percent in 1988, as well as by a dramatic decline in 
party identification. A survey showed that while 18 percent of those polled in 1988 did not 
identify with either party, by 1991 the percentage had increased to 45 percent.388 
Financed by a steady stream of oil rents, the clientelistic political framework in which the 
two dominant parties stifled civic participation, excluded a growing number of influential 
societal actors, and exercised hegemonic control over the entire system started to lose legitimacy 
as the price of oil declined in the mid-1980s. By the 1990s, the failure of the regime to stabilize 
the economy and bring about viable social change led to periodic rioting and public 
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demonstrations. Ultimately, the regime collapsed, opening the door to an alternative experiment 
with direct democracy under the leadership of Hugo Chavez.  
From the standpoint of achieving short-term political stability, partyarchy is an 
efficacious arrangement that could gradually facilitate a transition towards stable democratic 
rule. In the Venezuelan case this transition did not occur, because political and economic elites 
deprived citizens of the ability to influence internal party decisions, while both parties 
subordinated class, sectoral, and regional interests to partisan concerns. Along with pervasive 
corruption and financial mismanagement that intensified in the wake of the oil booms, inherent 
political exclusion, and a government that remained unresponsive to changing socioeconomic 
conditions also contributed to the repudiation of the regime and the political parties in the 1990s. 
As Michael Coppedge notes: 
 
In these crises the only institutions with the power to propose immediate solutions 
were the parties, but because the parties were precisely the instructions whose 
leadership was unwelcome at that moment, the crises were much harder to solve. 
In the long run, therefore, partyarchy can tarnish the quality of democracy to the 
point where the regime’s stability may be threatened.389 
 
Similarly, although the National Front achieved its objective in that it provided political 
stability to a worn-torn nation, the quality of democracy in Colombia suffered – albeit not to the 
extent where there occurred a regime collapse. Numerous challenges to governmental authority 
emerged that undermined the legitimacy of the regime. First, as noted earlier, the institutionally 
restrictive nature of the National Front contributed to the growth of radical guerilla organizations 
that sought to overthrow the traditional political elite. These guerilla groups attracted support 
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from various factions of the Colombian polity that had become increasingly disenchanted with 
the traditional political order. As such, every President from 1982 to the present made a serious 
attempt to negotiate an end to the insurgencies, frequently resorting to military force. During the 
1980s, greater political participation was granted to a few groups who had agreed to demilitarize 
(most notably the M-19 and the UP – a political faction of the FARC). However, these leftist 
parties were persecuted and excluded from participating in the political system, with the most 
extreme example being the systematic annihilation of the UP leadership in the 1980s and 1990s 
by right-wing death squads functioning with virtual impunity.390  
The political system was plunged into a deeper crisis with the rise of the international 
drug trade during the 1980s, for which Colombia became a major center.391 The growth of the 
drug trade – and the infamous Medellin and Cali cartels – augmented the severity and 
complexity of internal conflict, as the drug cartels successfully penetrated and corrupted every 
center of power in Colombian society including businesses, the police, the armed forces, the 
political elite, the guerilla organizations and the right-wing paramilitary groups. The Colombian 
political elite responded to these challenges with political reforms that encouraged the formation 
of new parties and devolved authority to elected local officials. The electoral institutions, 
mechanisms and rules established by the Constitution of 1991 and beyond were designed to 
enhance political democracy through, “ballot and electoral reform, approval of referenda and 
plebiscites as valid channels of lawmaking and constitutional amendment, restriction of 
presidential emergency powers, prohibition of presidential reelection…and the establishment of 
a Constitutional Court separate from the Supreme Court.”392 More importantly, the constitution 
bolstered political pluralism and participation, significantly augmenting the number of parties 
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that now compete in fair elections. These measures have ostensibly prompted some analysts to 
label the regime as a liberal democracy.  
While it is true that the Constitution of 1991 along with a subsequent array of 
democratizing reforms created a legal framework that has swept away most of the barriers to 
democratic governance experienced during the National Front agreement, a stable liberal 
democratic regime has yet to be constructed. Some scholars suggest that reforms such as political 
decentralization have further weakened and destabilized the central state, doing more harm than 
good to the Colombia’s political regime. Furthermore, although political parties and 
organizations have proliferated in recent years, what remains unclear is the degree to which these 
parties have been successful in generating substantive change in the political system.393 
Ultimately, many of these parties remain weak and unorganized; they tend to lack clear political 
agendas, and are usually consolidated around the personalities of a few individuals.394 As a 
result, the Colombian party system paradoxically remains both unstable and resistant to change.  
This reality has been reflected by the voting patterns of the Colombian electorate. From 
2002 through the 2016 referendum, voter turnouts in all governmental contests have remained 
below 50 percent of the registered voting-age population.395 Moreover, according to a 
measurement of voter turnout in Latin American Presidential Elections from 1997 – 2007 
conducted by the International Institute for Democratic Electoral Assistance, Colombia had one 
of the lowest voter participation rates in the region.396 These statistics indicate an extreme loss of 
confidence in the ability of the current political parties to govern in a manner that is perceived to 
be beneficial to the Colombian electorate. However, the support for democracy as well as 
democratic practices has been unwavering. According to a Latinobarometro survey in 2015, 
close to 80 percent of those polled agreed that voting, in addition to protesting, were effective 
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methods that would lead to national progress. Moreover, 55 percent of those polled preferred 
democracy to any other kind of government.397 However, there remains a minority, around 24 
percent, who responded ambivalently to the survey.  For them it did not matter whether the 
regime was democratic or non-democratic. A possible explanation for this ambivalence may be 
rooted in the relative similarity of the political parties regarding their ideologies and policies, as 
well as the inability of the government – regardless of which political party is in charge – to 
generate comprehensive and enduring social, economic and political reforms. As most large 
parties advance similar agendas and platforms, many Colombians do not feel they are being 
accurately represented, have become dissatisfied with political governance due to their prior 
experiences with the National Front agreement, perceive politics to be too complicated to 
understand, or do not pay attention to politics whatsoever.398 As a result, voting and other forms 
of civic participation have steadily declined, albeit there remains a commitment to the 
democratic mechanisms as forces for change.  
Although public opinion is not the sole determinant of the quality of a democratic regime, 
it is a crucial factor. According to Juan Linz, legitimacy depends largely on the public believing 
that existing institutions, despite their problems, are better than the alternatives.399 The case study 
of Colombia reinforces this assertion. Although dissatisfaction with the government and the 
political system are high, democracy seems to be the only game in town. However, the quality of 
democratic governance in Colombia will continue to be low so long as the party system remains 
unresponsive to voter and civil society interests, the parties in contention remain ideologically 
similar, and powerful intrastate actors such as paramilitary groups, drug trafficking organizations 
and guerilla forces are able to wield considerable influence over political actors. 
157 
 
In Venezuela, mounting discontent and disillusionment with the established system of 
representative democracy allowed Hugo Chavez to ascend to the presidency on a platform that 
promised to eliminate corruption and embark upon the construction of a more participatory 
democracy. The 1999 constitution established a number of institutional and political reforms that 
aimed to bolster popular participation in decision-making in order to close the substantial divide 
between the Venezuelan polity and the state. The constitution went further in that it mandated the 
participation of civil society in the selection of the judiciary and the appointment of the National 
Electoral Council, established as a separate branch of government, in addition to the three 
traditional branches. Most significant, the constitution reinforced the power and autonomy of the 
central government, the executive branch and the military. Presidential powers were enhanced as 
the presidential term was extended and immediate re-election was permitted. Moreover, the 
constitution strengthened the role of the central government in the economy and the military was 
given the right to vote; military promotions were doled out solely based upon presidential 
approval and the military was made to be subordinate only to the president.400  
Over the years and especially from 2007-2009, Chavez’s regime became more radical, 
resulting in the inequitable balance of the conditions of electoral competition, diminished 
freedoms of expression including the media and the press, the consolidation of power in the 
hands of the executive, the dependence of civil society upon a central leader, and the complete 
exclusion of the opposition in government.401 These shortcomings indicate the existence and 
development of authoritarian traits that have damaged Venezuela’s prospects of consolidating 
liberal democracy. Yet, based upon a 2007 Latinobarometro survey regarding confidence in 
democracy, Venezuelans considered their country to be a democracy. Moreover, 76 percent of 
Venezuelan citizens felt confident that democracy could create “conditions for prosperity”. The 
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survey found that Venezuelans were only slightly behind Uruguayans in their evaluation of 
democracy in their country in the region of Latin America.402    
 
The Role of the Military in Democratic Governance 
One of the main pillars of a democratic state is the full, and absolute control over the 
armed forces exercised by a democratically elected civilian government. Unwavering control 
over all the defense and security-related institutions indicates a high level of political maturity in 
the government, as well as the willingness of the military to be subordinate to civilian rule and 
indifferent to changes in polices.403 The subordination of the military to democratic civilian rule 
bolsters the legitimacy and sovereignty of a democratic regime. In Colombia, the armed forces, 
having presided over the National Front negotiations, gradually became more professional and 
distanced themselves from the two traditional parties. With a mandate from the Colombian 
government to take aggressive measures against insurgent guerrilla groups, by the mid-1970s, 
the military had become increasingly autonomous, and had developed a strongly anti-communist 
discourse. Therefore, many within the military have been staunchly opposed to the various peace 
initiatives with guerilla organizations proposed over the years, including the peace negotiations 
with the FARC in 2016.  
In 2008, dozens of senior army officers were fired after it was revealed that the 
systematic killing of civilians had been carried out to inflate guerrilla death tolls. As of mid-
2015, more than 900 soldiers had been convicted of similar crimes while thousands of security 
personnel remained under investigation. Nevertheless, most high-ranking officers escaped 
punishment. In 2012, a constitutional amendment that expanded the jurisdiction of the military 
justice system to address this problem was passed, repealed a year later, and then reintroduced in 
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2015 with many of the most controversial provisions omitted.404 Instances such as these 
exemplify the degree to which the military in Colombia continues to operate with relative 
autonomy. Limited civilian oversight of the armed forces has thus gradually undermined the 
legitimacy of the democratically elected civilian-led government; less regulation has 
undoubtedly led to more violence and increased tensions between the military and civilian 
leaders. These tensions are troublesome for they indicate that the military is not completely 
subordinate to civilian rule, as well as that many top military officers maintain an independent 
political agenda which must be taken into consideration for the sake of regime stability.  
Further undermining the legitimacy and efficacy of the state has been the continued 
presence of private paramilitary organizations. With the military being traditionally weak, in 
1968 the government ratified legislation that permitted and encouraged the formation of privately 
armed civilian self-defense groups under the supervision of the armed forces. Gradually, these 
paramilitary forces proliferated and began to operate with virtual impunity. Neither the armed 
forces nor the politicians in charge were able to keep them in line, nor actively attempted to do 
so. Some analysts have suggested that the relationship between the state and these paramilitary 
actors was ambiguous so that the state could avoid the accusations of human rights violations 
that accompanied the brutal campaigns waged by these paramilitaries against the guerrillas.405 
Over the years, the paramilitaries have viewed themselves as the only security force able 
to deal more effectively with the guerrilla organizations. From the 1990s until 2005, various 
paramilitary units coalesced under an umbrella organization called the United Self-Defense 
Forces of Colombia (AUC), but many continued to operate independently from this group. In 
2000, it was estimated that the AUC committed approximately 70 percent of Colombia’s 
political assassinations. The AUC financed itself by collecting rents from wealthy landowners, 
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narco-traffickers, and multinational corporations. It is estimated that at least 70 percent of these 
finances were derived from the drug trade.406 The AUC targeted not only the guerrillas, but also 
suspected civilian supporters of the guerrillas, including trade unionists, peasants, indigenous 
peoples, teachers and journalists. As a result, the AUC was considered to be the top perpetrator 
of human rights abuses in the country. Since 2005 several paramilitaries including the AUC have 
demobilized upon signing a ceasefire with the Uribe administration. Still, many units continue to 
operate with impunity in some regions. Responsibility for combatting these groups lies with the 
police. Because of the lack of support from the military or the state, members of the policy force 
are frequently accused of collusion with criminals, and are largely absent from many rural 
areas.407  
In Venezuela, ever since 1958, the military has been relatively subservient to civilian 
rule. Only in moments of intense political crisis, such as in the early 1990s, did the military 
attempt to intercede. As George Philip asserts, “military coups occurred when enough senior 
officers and civilian allies (the civilian aspect was important) decided that the current political 
situation was desirable and that change was necessary.”408 Even though the 1992 coups were 
orchestrated mainly by military officials, they were positively received by the public. It was this 
sentiment that helped bolster Hugo Chavez’s popularity as he headed into the 1998 elections. 
Since Chavez’s ascension to power, the power and size of the military has grown substantially, 
and has come under the complete jurisdiction of the executive. In 2010, General Henry Rangel’s 
announcement that the army would not accept an electoral defeat of the Bolivarian Revolution 
was meet with harsh criticism by the secretary general of the OAS. In response to this criticism, 
Chavez appointed Rangel to General-in-Chief.409 Moreover, during his tenure in office, Chavez 
provided the military with a modern arsenal and economic enticements, which have contributed 
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to the military’s unwavering support for the continuation of the Bolivarian Revolution under 
Nicolás Maduro.  
 
The Impacts of Clientelism, Corruption, and the Drug Trade on Democracy 
It has been underscored that “corruption in a democracy” is “corruption of democracy,” 
because “those who benefit from corrupt actions, decisions, or exchanges do so by excluding 
those who, under democratic norms, have a claim to inclusion.”410 Although this contention is 
sound, democracy and some corruption can coexist. Luigi Manzetti in his study of corruption in 
Latin American differentiates between democratic systems that have low corruption, with 
functioning checks and balances, internal constraints, and an exigent civil society, and those with 
high corruption where institutional checks against corruption are weak or not used, there is no 
self-restraint when profiting from corruption, and corruption is so widespread that it has to be 
accepted and tolerated at any societal level.411  
As explained earlier, a rentier state is one that obtains all or a substantial portion of its 
revenue from rent received from the sale of single natural resource to external actors.412 Since 
Venezuela had been one of the top producers of oil in the world, whenever the state needed more 
revenue, all it had to do was pressure the foreign-controlled oil industry (up until 1976) rather 
than its own population. Moreover, the distributive nature of the state, whereby resources would 
be transferred from the oil sector to other parts of the economy, ostensibly mitigated tensions that 
would have eventually required a reduction in wages and benefits for labor. Oil revenues allowed 
for the maintenance of political stability, as well as subsidized both business and popular sectors. 
Moreover, revenues protected the country from the inflation and balance-of-payments difficulties 
that plagued other party systems with similar economic projects. On the other hand, the massive 
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amount of rent accumulated via the oil industry deterred economic diversification and inhibited 
the independent economic development of Venezuela’s constituent states.413 Furthermore, petro-
states are prone to administrative inefficiency and corruption due to the relative absence of 
institutional checks and balances.414 This was especially apparent in the wake of the first and 
second oil booms in the 1970s and 1980s that flooded the state with petrodollars; much of this 
money, after being used to fund public sector services, was subsequently distributed to important 
societal actors to ensure the stability of the political regime.  
Also as noted earlier, from 1958 until the end of the oil bonanza in the mid-1980s, 
clientelism flourished and politics became a positive-sum game whereby both patron and client 
were able to arrive at mutually beneficial arrangements. 415 However, the ability of the 
clientelistic political machine to endure, as well as the state’s capacity to fund social programs 
and public projects, remained contingent upon the continued flow of oil revenues at a stable rate. 
When oil prices and revenues declined, as was the case in the mid-1980s and 1990s, the state’s 
distributive capacity suffered and the clientelistic ties became strained. Moreover, from 1970 – 
1994, Venezuela’s foreign debt rose from 9 percent to 53 percent of the GNP, while from 1982 
to 1989 poverty increased by 32 percent. In 1989, 22 percent of the population lacked the 
resources to meet basic needs,416 and in 1996, Venezuela was one of the few countries in the 
world where per capita income was lower than it had been in 1960.417 As oil rents decreased, the 
Venezuelan economy deteriorated, social conditions worsened, and the existing political system 
teetered on the verge of collapse.  
In addition to the existence of guerilla groups, paramilitary organizations and an 
increasingly autonomous military, the growth of the drug trade in Colombia in the 1980s and 
1990s and its enduring presence have further intensified the erosion of state autonomy. Since the 
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colonial period, the geographic location of the nation between two seas, in addition to its 
extensive network of tributary channels that have served as important transportation mediums, 
have provided the ideal environment for the growth and entrenchment of contraband. Flourishing 
in the absence of strong state institutions, the consumption of illegally sold goods and services 
became a socially accepted practice in Colombia, and in many cases, the only way to obtain 
certain goods. Between 1930 and 1990, high import tariffs and tight foreign exchange controls 
augmented the reliance upon black market items for much of the population. In addition to the 
reliance upon illegally imported goods, the smuggling of a wide variety of manufactured 
products, coffee, emeralds and even human beings became commonplace, facilitating the 
development of an export contraband culture. Together, these factors produced an environment 
in which the illegal drug trade could thrive.418 
The drug industry in Colombia has financed indirectly both the guerrilla organizations 
and the paramilitary groups, thus enhancing the capacity of both actors to actively resist state 
authority. Although the size and number of these groups have substantially declined in recent 
years, there still exists areas in Colombia that are highly insecure as well as areas considered to 
be drug-trafficking corridors. One lasting implication of drug-trafficking has been the presence 
of corruption within society – especially within the political arena. More prevalent during the 
1990s, narco-traffickers have been effective in infiltrating the political system and establishing 
clientelistic relations with numerous politicians operating on both local and national levels. They 
have done this by financing election campaigns, influencing local level election outcomes, and 
by bribing, threatening and terrorizing elected officials. The most notorious case of corruption, as 
already stated, was the support the Cali cartel extended to President Ernesto Samper in 1994.  
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The impact of corruption on the quality of Colombian democracy has been two-fold.  It 
has negated the ability of citizens to access and have a part in collective decisions and actions, 
and it has eroded the basic foundations of trust upon which democracy must rest. Due to public 
outrage over the levels of violence and corruption in Colombia, Alvaro Uribe, a former member 
of the Liberal Party won the presidency in 2002 on a platform that called for the reestablishment 
of state authority throughout the Colombian territory by reinforcing the military and working 
closely with the U.S. government. Under his administration, many paramilitary forces were 
demilitarized, while the guerrilla groups were increasingly pushed out of urban areas. With an 
approval rating of nearly 80 percent by the end of his term, President Uribe was elected to a 
second term in office after a constitutional amendment was passed that allowed the executive to 
serve for two consecutive terms. However, a 2008 scandal in which approximately 60 
congressional representatives were arrested or investigated for alleged links to paramilitary 
forces tarnished the administration’s reputation.419 Similarly, the 2014 legislative elections were 
plagued by accusations of fraud, vote buying, and connections with criminals.  
Although in 2011 the Colombian government promulgated anti-corruption legislation and 
established an anti-corruption office in the presidency - the nation still faces collusion between 
the public and private sectors, clientelism and policies dictated by organized crime, the lack of 
state control and weak service delivery in remote areas of the country, and the inefficiency of the 
criminal justice system.420 Furthermore, both the legislative efforts and the executive reforms 
aimed at combating corruption and improving transparency have yet to significantly reduce 
corruption. Instead, according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, the 
country went from being ranked 57th in the world in 2002 to 90th in 2016 with little to no change 
in ranking from 2012 to 2016.421  
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Civil Liberties and Associational Rights 
The freedoms of organization, assembly, expression as well as the right to alternative 
sources of information are essential to democracy. The degree to which these freedoms are 
respected and enforced is indicative of a regime’s dedication to ensuring civilian participation in 
government as well as crucial for the equitable representation of the public in the decision-
making process. Nevertheless, even in nations that possess markedly democratic constitutions, 
the ability of citizens to effectively exercise their freedoms without the fear of persecution, and 
with confidence that their interests will be heard, can be significantly curtailed by the presence of 
internal conflict, intra-state violence, corruption or even a highly institutionalized political 
system. As such, when these rights are upheld, the quality of democracy increases. Conversely, 
when they are infringed upon, the quality of democratic governance suffers.  
The drug trade in Colombia has been a major source of intense violence. Between 1982-
1991, Colombia’s homicide rate reached 86 per 100,000 inhabitants - one of the highest murder 
rates in the world. In the early 1990s, violence between the government and the major drug 
cartels intensified after the implementation of extradition policies as well as the federal 
confiscation of property from known drug-traffickers. By the mid-1990s, a combination of 
effective negotiation and extermination policies had led to the demise of the drug cartels. 
However, Colombia’s drug trade continues to thrive as several medium-sized trafficking 
organizations have taken over the decentralized industry. 
The 1991 Colombian constitution guarantees freedom of expression. Opposition views 
have been commonly expressed since then via media outlets unaffiliated with the government.422 
And yet, freedom of the press in Colombia has declined. It is estimated that between 1990-2010, 
some 77 journalist have been killed, many for reporting on drug-related activities.423 This 
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number is one of the highest in the region, signaling that one of the most fundamental 
requirements for constitutional democracy is still severely infringed upon.  
Ironically, the number of journalists killed between 1990-1999, when the cartels wielded 
the most influence in society, was lower than between 2000-2010, after the drug cartels had been 
dismembered. In 2015, a media watchdog organization recorded at least 144 threats and other 
abuses against the press, while three journalists – Luis Carlos Peralta, Edgar Quintero, and Flor 
Alba Nunez – were murdered after experiencing previous problems with local officials and 
criminals because of their reporting. The pressures placed upon the media have had significant 
implications on the quality and diversity of information available to citizens.424 Persistent 
violence has engendered a culture of censorship and self-censorship, which has negatively 
affected the quality of the electoral process.425 Moreover, most civil liberties, including 
associational and organizational rights, individual rights and personal autonomy, as well as 
freedom of expression and belief, are being undermined by the persistence of violence. The 
integrity of elections has also come under speculation, as the 2014 legislative elections were 
marred by rumors of corruption and collusion. Additionally, impunity for crime in general is 
rampant, with convictions achieved in only 10 percent of murders.426 As such, the failure on the 
part of the state to both ensure the protection of these fundamental rights, as well as to enforce 
the law if these rights are to be infringed upon, is exemplary of the low quality of democracy 
experienced within Colombia. 
 The 1999 Venezuelan constitution stipulates that the state is responsible for the protection 
and development of the individual. It also claims “respect for the dignity of the individual, [and] 
the democratic exercise of the will of the people…427 These rights have been significantly 
undercut by presidents Hugo Chavez and Nicolás Maduro. 
167 
 
 In 1999, the Bolivarian political project initiated by Chavez emphasized the regime’s 
commitment to the enforcement of civil liberties, the exercise of political rights, as well as social 
justice and social equality.428 However, after consolidating his support in the 2006 elections, 
Chavez reformed the constitution to enhance the powers of the executive as well as to augment 
the size and scope of the state apparatus so to ‘dictate the will of the people’ from above. As 
Roberta Rice points out, participatory democracy is not something that can be legislated from 
above – it must come from below. Moreover, in Venezuela, since decision-making authority is 
concentrated in the executive branch, the absence of well-defined mechanisms for citizen input 
implicitly contradicts the concept of participatory democracy. Finally, a lack of autonomy of 
civil society groups from the state has resulted in the inability of self-constituted organizations to 
express their interests without the fear of repression.429 The validity of this assertion was 
enforced most clearly by Chavez’s refusal to renew the broadcasting license of the Radio 
Caracas International Television network, one of his harshest political critics in 2007.  
Since then, freedom of the press has steadily deteriorated in Venezuela as the government 
has gradually acquired most major sources of alternative information. Moreover, currency 
controls that prevent publishers from acquiring newsprint, rules requiring private media to air 
state promotional advertisements for free, and the risk of administrative and legal actions against 
private outlets that anger the government further threaten media independence.430 In 2014 and 
more recently, antigovernment demonstrations have been met with violence, which have 
augmented existing tensions between those who remain loyal to the regime and those who 
oppose it. Journalists covering the demonstration in 2014 were subject to arrests, harassment, and 
violence, while more than 40 people were killed and approximately 900 were injured.431  
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Political Culture 
Many theorists who advocate a cultural approach to democratic consolidation assert that 
to develop and maintain a democratic regime, a culture of moderation, cooperation, bargaining 
and accommodation amongst the elites as well as at the grassroots level, are necessary. 
Furthermore, such theorists argue that together, those orientations facilitate the development of 
tolerance for opposing political beliefs and positions, pragmatism and flexibility in the political 
arena, trust in other political actors, an intrinsic willingness to compromise, and greater civil 
discourse. The degree to which those behavioral orientations are embedded in the culture of a 
particular society greatly affects the viability of stable democratic governance within a nation.432 
This argument becomes more complex when one considers the ways in which culture 
takes root and changes within a society. According to social constructivists, actions initiated by 
agents are culturally constituted. As posited by Larry Diamond, political culture can be 
summarily defined as “distinctive predispositions or ‘orientations to action’.” The orientations 
that influence the actions taken by social agents can be: 1) cognitive – involving knowledge of 
and beliefs about the political system; 2) affective – consisting of feelings about the political 
system and 3) evaluational – including commitments to political values and judgments about the 
performance of the political system relative to those values. As such, political actors rely upon 
existing knowledge, feelings and commitments to reaffirm and deepen culture within the 
objective dimensions of political life: the political system, the political process, and policy.433 In 
some instances, this reaffirmation can transform these dimensions thereby altering its culture; 
this transformation, in turn, has the potential to influence the future actions of other agents in the 
system.434 
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Culture is not static. While cultural change depends in part on existing structural and 
material conditions, those conditions vary from one societal group to another. As a result, 
distinctive types of beliefs and norms may prevail in different socioeconomic and institutional 
settings. Thus, political subcultures greatly nuance the relationships that form and the 
transactions that occur between different social factions. In Colombia, by the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, popular resentment toward the National Front regime had intensified, because of the 
exclusive nature of the arrangement. Such an arrangement contributed to the proliferation of 
guerrilla movements within the nation; to the decline in party identification as the ideological 
distinctions between the two traditional parties became negligible and socio-economic changes 
produced an urban population increasingly disinterested in party politics; to the internal 
factionalization, and clientelization of the state; and to an increase in governmental 
inefficiencies. 
Initially, it seemed as if the agreement between the two parties reflected the development 
of a political culture based upon the tenets of moderation, cooperation, bargaining and 
accommodation amongst the political elites.435 Although consensus amongst the elites had been 
reached, ultimately the exclusive nature of the regime with regards to other social groups, 
weakened the power of the two traditional parties. Moreover, the high degree of factionalization 
that occurred during this period is indicative of an elite culture steeped in sectarianism rather 
than one based upon moderation and accommodation. This form of governance, in fact, 
represented the continuation of the partisan political culture that was present during the 19th and 
early 20th centuries. As such, even under the National Front agreement the consolidation of a 
stable democratic regime in Colombia remained elusive.   
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Over the course of 70 years, Venezuela has experimented with democracy on three 
separate occasions. The lessons learned from the trienio period from 1945-1948 with regards to 
the destabilizing impact of political exclusion were, in turn, utilized to construct stable 
governance. From the promulgation of the Punto Fijo pact in 1958 until the Caracazo that 
followed the 1988 elections, the Venezuelan regime was accentuated by consensual and 
conciliatory politics founded upon a strong commitment to democracy above partisan 
interests.436 The spirit of the Punto Fijo pact was predicated upon elite moderation and 
accommodation, which allowed for the establishment of a regime built on democratic ideals, 
practices and institutions. Contributing to the stability of the regime was an impressive flow of 
financial resources generated by the export of oil that allowed for sustained economic growth 
over the course of three decades. Drastic material and social changes generated by the booming 
petroleum industry facilitated the reinforcement of a culture favorable to democracy. Moreover, 
this system was characterized by a particularly strong distributive and statist discourse that 
became widely socialized by Venezuelans, and an important component of their political 
culture.437 As a result, a significant portion of the wealth generated by oil exports was utilized by 
the state to provide jobs and social services, eradicate poverty, embark upon housing and 
construction projects, augment basic industries and import consumer goods. This configuration 
between the state and the Venezuelan citizenry gradually led to the solidification of a political 
culture and to the belief that democracy was the route to social justice.438 This sentiment towards 
democracy continues to be deeply engrained in Venezuela’s political culture.439 
Social, economic, and generational changes in Venezuela gave rise to two different sets 
of leaders – those who continued to maintain the rigid partyarchicial system and those who 
challenged it. Although elections were held regularly, and people voted, freely expressed their 
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views, and had access to alternative sources of information, the parties continued to monopolize 
nominations, to penetrate and politicize civil society organizations, to centralize authority in a 
small circle at the top, and to tightly control the legislative process.440 The rigidity of the political 
system led to the formation and consolidation of political subcultures along an elite-non-elite 
axis that intensified in the 1980s when the regime came under public scrutiny for widespread 
corruption. The revelation of endemic corruption eroded the regime’s legitimacy, as well as 
public trust in the existing governmental institutions.  
Although Chavez’s Bolivarian revolution enjoyed substantial backing in its efforts to 
enhance participatory democracy and eliminate corruption in Venezuela, by 2012 popular 
support for his regime had begun to decline. By August 2015, President Nicolás Maduro had 
barely managed to retain control of the government, with his popularity falling to 24.3 percent.441 
Latinobarometro concluded that in 2015 around 64 percent of Venezuelans were dissatisfied with 
their government’s performance, while about only half of those surveyed thought of their country 
as democratic. However, their commitment to democracy remained the highest in all Latin 
America.442 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
Conclusions 
 
Considering the various internal conflicts and violence between non-state actors that 
continues to plague Colombia, the fact that the political regime better fulfills some of the 
necessary conditions typically associated with democracy than the regime in Venezuela, allows 
me to formulate a few arguments about democracy. By the end of the 19th century and the 
beginning of the 20th century, although state apparatuses had managed to emerge in both 
Colombia and Venezuela, they possessed limited authority over the national territory, and their 
autonomy was routinely contested by regional antagonisms and civil wars.443 This is important to 
emphasize since a consolidated and legitimate state is one of the critical requirements for the 
establishment of a stable democratic regime. While both nations’ colonial experiences did much 
to establish national boundaries that solidified after the dissolution of Gran Colombia, 
institutions designed to facilitate the economic and political integration of autonomous regions 
into the national territory remained either non-existent or weak. This was primarily due to 
divisive topographical attributes, transportation and communication difficulties, and the 
development of distinct social and economic regions with correspondingly disparate regional 
identities.  
In Colombia, the highly contentious role of the Catholic Church in society, the equally 
polarizing influence of a strong two-party system, strong regional affiliations, a weak and 
ineffective military and the absence of a profitable export-commodity able to provide the state 
with a degree of economic dominance collectively curtailed the process of state legitimatization. 
In a markedly divided society, a powerful state was considered to be dangerous to the myriad 
competing interests within the nation. As such, from the 19th century onward, Colombia has been 
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imbued with a weak, and relatively ineffective state. In the absence of strong and efficacious 
state institutions, regional elites consolidated power primarily through the establishment of 
political parties. These parties engendered the intense polarization of Colombian society, as party 
loyalty came to constitute the basis of strong, competing civic nationalisms. By the turn of the 
20th century, regional economic elites had become more or less unified by the profits generated 
by the cacao boom. The subsequent emergence of powerful producer associations, or gremios, 
nuanced the historically sectarian nature of the Colombian political elite. These gremios lobbied 
against the greater involvement of the state in society, and actively opposed any attempt by the 
government to enhance its jurisdiction over economic and social matters. Moreover, 
modernization and industrialization led to the development of new social classes that desired 
greater representation in government. As a result, political parties expanded suffrage and 
attempted to inculcate these emergent classes into their ranks. Further politicization and 
polarization of the masses led to intense and often violent confrontations within society. After la 
violencia and the brief dictatorship of General Rojas, collusion between the emergent economic 
elite, and the long-established political parties facilitated a virtual oligopoly of power under the 
consociational elements of the National Front. Despite the inherent flaws of the National Front 
regime, from the 19th century until the end of the twentieth century, the Liberal and Conservative 
parties elected every president of Colombia – even after the consociational arrangement had 
ended.444  
Colombia possesses a long history of regularly held electoral contests through which the 
parties have alternated power. This tradition of regularly-held electoral contests signifies that 
Colombians view elections as being a critical component of the democratic process. The 
longevity of the electoral regime also suggests that political parties, despite their flaws, are 
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regarded by Colombia's citizens as being the most effective vehicles for the institutionalization 
of democratic governance. Thus, although the enduring duopoly between the traditional parties 
has by now run its course, the party system in Colombia, rather than collapsing has gradually 
become more pluralistic and competitive, albeit fragmented and weak. Furthermore, the demand 
that elections remain free and fair has been a focal point of the 1991 Constitution, and of 
subsequent electoral reforms. Though corruption and collusion continue to undermine the 
integrity of the process, they are generally brought to light and addressed. This assertion is 
exemplified by the revelation of a recent scandal that cast into question the legitimacy of the 
2014 legislative elections. In summary, the longevity of the political system, the extensive 
number of successive and successful elections, and the recent trend toward electoral 
accountability, help explain why Colombia today has been able consolidate democracy more 
effectively than Venezuela.445  
According to Robert Dahl, whose theories are discussed in my literature review, for a 
political system to be considered a democracy, it must be responsive to its citizens. Moreover, it 
must allow them an equal opportunity to: (1) formulate their preferences; (2) publicly manifest 
these preferences among their fellow partisans and before the government, both individually and 
collectively; and (3) be treated equally by the government. In short, to ensure the integrity of 
democracy, political parties as well as the state must be responsive to the interests of those 
governed, while also able to act responsibly for the collective benefit of society. For these basic 
conditions to be met, they should be accompanied by eight essential guarantees: (1) freedom of 
association, (2) freedom of expression, (3) the right to vote, (4) the ability to run for public office 
barring reasonable restrictions, (5) the right of politicians to campaign and compete for votes, (6) 
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multiple sources of information, (7) free and fair elections, and (8) institutions to develop policy 
based on voter preference.446 
Currently, Colombia meets all eight of Dahl’s conditions, albeit freedom of association, 
and expression remain significantly curtailed by internal violence. Over the past few decades, 
internal political violence has resulted in the death of over 220,000 people, and has engendered 
the internal displacement of more than 6.7 million Colombians.447 Due to the persistence of 
armed conflict in Colombia, spaces for political expression and organization remain limited, and 
in some areas non-existent. Freedom of expression is further curtailed in Colombia, as journalists 
are frequently treated with hostility. Since the mid-1990s dozens of journalists have been 
murdered, primarily for reporting on cases involving drug trafficking and corruption. In 2015, 
the Foundation for Free Press (FLIP), a respected Colombian NGO that monitors press freedoms, 
reported the death of two journalists, while 60 in total received threats between January and 
October of that year. Moreover, from 2011 to 2015, the government reported the murders of 121 
trade unionists. While abuses and threats towards certain groups have proliferated in recent 
years, the government has been invariably slow in regards to convictions and sentencings.448 As 
such, impunity for crime in Colombia remains rampant, while freedom of expression and 
association are routinely violated.  
Utilizing Dahl’s theoretic conditions of democracy, despite persisting internal violence 
and a widespread disregard for the protection of political expression and association, Colombia’s 
regime would rank highly, since public participation is constitutionally unrestricted and party 
competition is markedly pluralistic as well as inclusive. When considering Wolfgang Merkel’s 
contributions to democratic theory, this classification becomes considerably more nuanced. 
Merkel in his scholarship on democracy posits that liberal democracies consist of five partial 
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regimes which are: (1) electoral regimes that permit free, fair, and regular elections, (2) freedoms 
of speech and association, (3) protection of civil rights and liberties, (4) separation of powers 
between executive, legislative and judicial branches and (5) protection against nonelected groups 
that wish to overrule or overthrow the government.449 The first four of these regimes coincide 
with Dahl’s prerequisites, while the fifth condition becomes especially relevant to my 
considerations regarding the existing instability of the Colombian regime.  
 As mentioned earlier, for the past fifty years or so, the Colombian government has been 
engaged in civil armed conflict with various leftist guerilla organizations. Beginning in the 1980s 
and 1990s, right-wing paramilitaries initially introduced to neutralize these guerilla groups 
gained substantial autonomy from the state. Thereafter, these paramilitaries gradually 
relinquished themselves from state-control. The emergence of the drug trade and the rise of the 
various cartels further complicated situation. As the drug trade began to expand throughout the 
national territory, both the paramilitaries and the guerrilla groups came to be either directly or 
indirectly subsidized by the cartels. Within this increasingly complex overview of Colombian 
society, persistent violence caused by confrontations between the state and guerilla organizations 
threatened to destabilize the Colombian regime. Regime stability was further undermined by the 
bloodshed and endemic corruption associated with the drug cartels. Currently, with the cartels in 
disarray and a ceasefire in place between the largest guerilla organization and the government, 
the threats posed by these nonelected groups have significantly diminished. However, as long as 
violence perpetrated by intra-state actors continues, the regime can never fully be stable.  
 Despite the violence, Colombian civil society has flourished in recent years and 
opposition parties have been able to participate in the political system without fear of 
persecution. As such, the Colombian regime fulfills the first two conditions that Juan Linz and 
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Alfred Stepan consider to be essential for democratic consolidation, which are: (1) the 
development of a free and lively civil society, and (2) a relatively autonomous political 
society.450 In addition to these two prerequisites, Linz and Stepan assert that an established rule 
of law that protects individual freedoms and associational life, an effective state bureaucracy, 
and an institutionalized economic society are also significant requirements for democratic 
consolidation. In Colombia, while constitutional mechanisms designed to protect individual 
freedoms and rights exist, civilian rights are routinely infringed upon. While it is true that the 
state bureaucracy is relatively effective - in that it is coordinated throughout the national territory 
and provides for basic services - its functionality is inhibited by the presence of corruption which 
occurs at multiple levels of public administration. Since the judicial system also remains largely 
compromised by corruption and extortion, it lacks the capacity to hold those responsible for legal 
violations accountable for their actions.451 As a result, individual freedoms are marginally 
protected by the state, and the rule of law in Colombia suffers.  
Regarding Linz and Stepan’s final condition, greater integration into the world economy 
and profound changes in economic and social structures throughout the region have prompted 
various authors to consider moving beyond defining democracy as a political regime, as to 
include economic and social dimensions.452 Within the field of political science, it is commonly 
asserted that economic and social conditions are distinguishable from the intrinsic qualities or 
attributes of political democracy. As such, economic and social factors are particularly relevant 
when attempting to discern the quality of democratic governance within a nation. However, these 
factors alone are not considered to be prerequisite conditions for democratic consolidation. 
Nevertheless, socio-economic issues such as the persistence of poverty and income inequality 
have increasingly come to threaten the viability of democratic politics in Latin America.453 While 
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poverty has declined significantly since the late 1990s, income inequality in Colombia remains 
amongst the highest in the world.454 Since the 1980s, the persistence of income inequality as well 
as the increased concentration of wealth in the hands of a select few, has not only contributed to 
the longevity of the protracted civil conflict, but has also resulted in the steady declination of 
political participation and historically high abstention rates. Nevertheless, Colombia meets most, 
if not all of the conditions posited by the aforementioned theoreticians, and as such can be 
classified as a democracy. The stability of the current regime as well as the prospects for liberal 
democratic governance have, and will become increasingly tethered to the nation’s ability to: 
enforce the protection of citizen freedoms and rights – including demands for accountability and 
freedom of the press -, strengthen the capacity of the state as to maintain law and order, protect 
citizens and punish criminals, bolster participation through extensive reformation of the party 
system, as well as implement initiatives that seek to address the sources of income inequality.     
Similarly, Venezuela possesses several of the conditions that typically facilitate the 
formation of democracy. For example, the country retained a relatively stable and highly 
institutionalized party system, significant economic potential due to its vast petroleum reserves, 
and a particularly strong national identity that acted as a homogenizing force. However, due to 
rampant corruption, exclusionary policies, and long periods of economic downtown, the 
subsequent breakdown of the party system in the 1990s gave way to what can now only be 
described as an authoritarian regime. The authoritarian nature of the Venezuelan regime can be 
attributed to two primary factors: a highly centralized, largely ineffective, and clientelistic state – 
especially present during the Punto Fijo regime, as well as to the nation’s historical dependence 
upon oil rents to facilitate economic development and political stability. 
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In Venezuela, although political parties emerged in the 19th century, they did not become 
entirely relevant until the mid-20th century. Rather, the desire of regional caudillos to consolidate 
their power through the conquest of and control over Caracas laid the foundation for the 
establishment of a central authority in the late 19th century. Regionalist sentiments persisted as 
the longevity of each caudillo’s regime remained contingent upon their ability to both 
economically subsidize regional caudillos as well as militarily dominant them. As a result, stable 
governance became a function of control over a central authority. By the 1920s, the discovery of 
petroleum would serve to legitimize the power of state, and engender the creation of strong state 
institutions. Unlike in Colombia, where the state has been historically weak, in Venezuela, 
democracy has come to be associated with the preservation of a large, redistributive state 
apparatus.  
Venezuela’s oil wealth has done much to bolster the redistributive ethos of the state, 
which has in turn, also served to reinforce the link between social justice, paternalism, and 
democracy that is so inculcated into Venezuelan political culture. From the 1920s onwards, oil 
rents have filled the coffers of the Venezuelan government. First utilized to legitimize the power 
of the state in the context of pervasive regionalism, the caudillos of the early 20th century also 
relied upon oil rents to the fuel their personalist regimes. Economic stability due to the expansion 
of oil production and exportation facilitated the rapid industrialization and urbanization of the 
nation. Accompanying these processes were socio-economic developments that greatly 
contributed to the formation of a national identity, as well as a collective desire for increased 
representation in government. While the trienio represented Venezuela’s first experiment with 
democracy, the regime isolated important elite interests and as such, suffered. The Punto Fijo 
pact was more cohesive in that it included the most prominent societal actors within its 
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conciliatory framework. Under this agreement, it seemed as though elite cooperation had finally 
led to the establishment of an inclusive, representative and responsive democratic regime.  
 As a petro-state, the Venezuelan political system was the most stable when oil rents were 
accumulated at a steady pace. This steady accumulation, in turn, depended upon the relative 
constancy of the prices of oil on international markets. Regime stability was also contingent 
upon the dominant parties’ ability to sustain their clientelistic networks. Between 1958 and 1989, 
there were no elections for local governorships. These positions were distributed by executive 
decree, with the entire bureaucratic structure appointed from the center.455 This highly-
centralized structure not only contributed to the problem of endemic corruption, it exacerbated 
bureaucratic ineptitude and inefficiency. Moreover, the system excluded the poor majority from 
meaningful participation.456 During the economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s, while the party 
machines and the legal tenure of civil servants prevented any significant shrinkage of the state, 
the state could no longer prevent major declines in public sector pay.457 Maturing external loans, 
a decrease in international prices of oil and reformation of price and exchange controls further 
hindered the ability of the state to effectively support itself. Unable to subsidize social programs, 
and maintain the clientelistic networks established by the political elite, the regime imploded.  
As the number of Venezuelans living in poverty and extreme poverty increased, inflation 
skyrocketed and unemployment rose substantially. Public castigation of the political parties 
followed, leading to the eventual collapse of the party system. In contrast to the Colombian 
experience, as soon as the Venezuelan electorate assessed the performance of the traditional 
political parties in government and pronounced it as dismal, the parties were ousted from power. 
Although Chavez was democratically elected to the presidency in 1998, since then, the regime in 
Venezuela has become more authoritarian – ostensibly reverting to the dictatorial regimes 
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characteristic of Venezuela’s troubled past. Initially proposing to create a democracy rooted in 
the participation of the whole people, by the early 2000s, Chavez had begun to implement 
policies that further polarized Venezuelan society, as power increasingly became consolidated in 
the hands the executive.458 Currently, Maduro has coopted political power, quelled dissent, and 
has attempted to maintain substantial control over civil and political society. As a result, 
Venezuela has experience a radical departure from the participatory and democratic vision 
enshrined by the Bolivarian Revolution.459 
 In this way, Venezuela fails to meet most of Dahl’s criteria for democratic regimes. 
While it is true that all Venezuelans have the right to vote (barring reasonable restrictions) and 
that voting is not restricted in practice, the integrity of the electoral process has come under 
intense scrutiny. The legitimacy of the electoral process has been most recently challenged by 
Maduro in 2015, after he utilized his executive authority to suspend a recall movement directed 
at removing him from power. Additionally, the gradual consolidation of authority in the hands of 
the executive has been accompanied by the redrawing of political and administrative boundaries 
to curb the influence of governors, mayors and local officials.460 In 2008, the creation of the 
Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) served to further curtail the power of obstinate leaders 
within the MVR, as well as other potential political opponents.461 Essentially, a forced merger 
between all parties who supported the Bolivarian Revolution, the centralization of political 
power into a single entity granted Chavez greater authority in both political and electoral realms. 
As a result, although political leaders are constitutionally allowed to compete for votes, once 
elected, they are virtually powerless.  
In recent years, the Venezuelan regime has been accused of violating fundamental 
freedoms and civil liberties such as: the freedom of association, the freedom of expression and 
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the freedom of the press. Beginning in 2014, the government responded to non-violent and 
relatively peaceful anti-government protests with excessive force. A year later, Maduro deployed 
more than 80,000 members of security forces nationwide in “Operation Peoples’ Liberation” 
(OLP) to address rising security concerns. Widespread allegations of abuse, extrajudicial 
killings, mass arbitrary detentions, maltreatment of detainees, forced evictions, the destruction of 
homes and arbitrary deportations in low-income and immigrant communities followed.462 In 
2016, the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN) detained dozens of people based 
upon allegations of planning, fomenting, or participating in violent anti-government actions. 
However, many of these were peaceful protests.463 As public non-violent protestation continues 
to be met with state-sponsored violence, abuse and detainment, spaces for conflict resolution, 
compromise, and accommodation remain scarce. Without effective mechanisms to facilitate 
social reconciliation as well as to freely voice dissenting views, democracy in Venezuela cannot 
exist.  
Additionally, although freedom of expression and the press are guaranteed by Article 57 
of the Venezuelan constitution, they are not respected in practice. The continual violation of 
these freedoms has also contributed to the lack of democracy in Venezuela. Amended in 2010, 
the Law on Social Responsibility in Radio, Television, and Electronic Media, contains vaguely 
worded restrictions that have been used to severely limit content that could “incite or promote 
hatred”, “foment citizens’ anxiety or alter public order”, “disrespect authorities”, “encourage 
assassinations”, or “constitute war propaganda”.464 Over the course of 2015, Maduro relied upon 
this law approximately 147 times to interrupt regular programming on television and radio 
stations. This was done to deliver propaganda on behalf of pro-government candidates for 
parliamentary elections, announce new presidential decrees, and direct attacks against political 
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opponents. With this law, the government effectively possesses the ability to censor what the 
public is able view, as well as monopolizes the media to advance the interests of the regime. 
Although Article 51 of the constitution guarantees the right of citizens to access public 
information, journalists are also frequently denied access to official documents. Faced with 
verbal threats and harassment, arbitrary arrests, physical attacks, dismissal by employers, fines 
and lawsuits, many journalists frequently engage in self-censorship. Moreover, the Maduro 
administration heavily regulates the spread of information that may reflect negatively on its 
policies.465 The government itself officially controls 13 television networks, dozens of radio 
outlets, a news agency, eight newspapers, and a magazine.466 The independent media platforms 
that are left have also softened their positions regarding Maduro and his administration in 
response to extensive governmental pressure to do so. As a result, access to alternative sources of 
information is severely restricted in Venezuela, violating Dahl’s sixth prerequisite for the 
establishment of democracy.  
Finally, government policies in Venezuela depend upon the decisions of the executive as 
well as a small cadre of appointed officials, rather than upon the vote and other forms of 
preference expression. This was first made apparent in 2007, by Chavez’s request for a Ley 
Habilitante the day after his second inauguration. Upon its ratification by the National Assembly, 
this law enabled Chavez the authority to legislate by decree in 13 critical policy areas while 
Congress was sent into recess for 18 months.467 Ever since, Chavez’s and Maduro’s top-down 
governing and centralized decision-making style has given way to a “populist electoral 
autocracy” that concedes little to no political space to its opponents.468  
Venezuela also fails to fulfill Merkel’s five requirements for the establishment of liberal 
democracy, while the regime uses the fifth condition – protection against nonelected groups that 
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wish to overrule or overthrow the government – to justify its authoritarian policies. After taking 
office in 2007, Chavez contended that “oligarchic forces” had “infiltrated” their ideas into the 
1999 constitution. As such, he promised to reform these sections of the constitution, paving the 
way for a constitutional amendment that would allow for the unlimited reelection of the 
executive.469 Moreover, the regime has sought to identify external enemies such as the United 
States, as well as Colombia to rally support for the advancement of its populist agenda.470 The 
separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers in Venezuela has also come under 
intensive scrutiny, as the executive has retained substantial control over the judicial system ever 
since the Supreme Court was expanded from 20 to 32 members in 2004.471 Moreover, the 
National Assembly has been historically weak and dominated by forces supportive of President 
Chavez and the Bolivarian Revolution. Although the opposition garnered a majority in the 
elections of 2015, legislation aimed at curtailing or challenging the powers of the executive have 
largely floundered. 
The presence of a vibrant civil society and a relatively autonomous political society, two 
important elements that factor into Linz and Stepan’s conditions of democratic consolidation, 
remain constrained by a large domineering state which seeks to monopolize and control all forms 
of political expression. Moreover, while the rule of law is strictly enforced, rather than protecting 
individual freedoms and associational rights, the regime frequently encroaches upon them. 
Lastly, despite Chavez’s vociferous condemnations regarding the injustices committed against 
Venezuela by an inherently unequal and exploitative international economic system, the 
Bolivarian regime has done little to reduce the nation’s dependence upon oil exports and to 
diversify the economy. As a result, economic stability and by extension, political stability, 
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remain largely contingent upon international oil prices as well as upon the ability of the regime 
to attract foreign investment.  
According to the paradigm for democratic consolidation in Latin American advanced by 
Jeff Haynes in my literature review, an amicable international environment is of crucial 
importance for democratic consolidation in the region.472 Throughout the 1990s until mid-2001, 
global factors and international forces assisted and promoted democratic change with unusual 
commitment and effectiveness. Therefore, the international environment was markedly 
supportive of democratization in Latin America. After the September 11 terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon that occurred in 2001, the initiation of the “global war on 
terror” facilitated a wave of changes in regional priorities for U.S. foreign policy.473 As such, 
efforts to support democratization in Latin America fell by the wayside, as the United States 
along with other prominent international powers, rather focused upon confronting terrorism and 
amplifying their control over Central and South Asia as well as the Middle East.474  
In Colombia, however, by this time, the trans-national influence of the drug cartels had 
led to the implementation of Plan Colombia – a bilateral agreement brokered between the 
Colombian and U.S. governments with the objective of eradicating illicit crops, negotiating 
settlements with the guerilla movements, and providing aid for judicial institutions, human 
rights, and alternative development.475 After the September 11th attacks, the aid allocated to the 
Colombian government under Plan Colombia was utilized to not only battle the drug cartels, but 
also guerilla groups designated as terrorists or narco-terrorists.476 From 2002 until 2010, the 
Uribe administration was successful in significantly curtailing the power of these intra-state 
actors, which served to strengthen democratic governance in Colombia. Moreover, the aid 
supplied by the United States bolstered the ability of the regime to embark upon substantial 
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political and electoral reform. Currently, the United States remains the most influential foreign 
actor in Colombia. In 2015, it provided approximately US$280 million in aid mostly towards the 
strengthening of military and police forces.477  
Conversely, the rise of Hugo Chavez and his populist regime in Venezuela was received 
very critically by the United States and the international community. Working behind the scenes 
with the opposition in Venezuela to oust Chavez from office, the United States unintentionally 
contributed to the radicalization of the Bolivarian regime.478 Upon his reelection in 2006, Chavez 
further consolidated his power, and openly condemned the United States for infringing upon the 
sovereignty of the nation’s electoral and political processes. Since then, Maduro has continued 
this discourse, vilifying the United States and other trans-national organizations for attempting to 
intervene in Venezuelan affairs. In response to the deteriorating economic and political situation 
in Venezuela, in 2015, President Obama issued an executive order imposing targeted sanctions 
against several Venezuelan government officials.479 Furthermore, in September 2015, four other 
Latin American nations - Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay - blocked Venezuela from 
assuming the presidency of the regional trading bloc, Mercosur.480 In addition to these sanctions, 
the Organization of American States has…As is made apparent by the disparate experiences of 
both Colombia and Venezuela in an increasingly globalized world, democratic governance in 
Latin America faces an international environment that is hostile at times and neutral at best.481 
The comparative analysis of these two cases reveals the significance of historical 
legacies. The Colombian case emphasizes the link between the early consolidation of a political 
system and the proclivity for prolonged oligarchic rule – especially in the absence of a strong and 
legitimate state. Conversely, the Venezuelan experience highlights how the over-bearing nature 
of a dominant state can just as easily contribute to the establishment of democracy as it can to its 
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deconsolidation. Moreover, the consociational experiments of both the National Front and the 
Punto Fijo regime, accentuate the difficulties that arise when attempting to develop a system that 
accommodates separate factions of society while also mitigating political deadlock. Finally, 
while Colombia functions within an amicable international environment that has significantly 
contributed to regime stability as well as the government’s ability to combat violent intra-state 
actors, Venezuela has been forced to operate within a rather hostile environment. As a result, the 
regime in Venezuela has become more reactive and adverse to outside assistance, and has also 
sought to identify external actions, particularly those that are associated with the United States 
and a number of European actors, as threats to justify its authoritarian tendencies. In short, the 
international environment has had a decisive, and yet contradictory effects, on the quality of 
democracy experienced within both nations. 
Over the past decade or so, the literature assessing the state of democracy in Latin 
America has generally focused upon the current wave of political stability within the region. As 
Ignacio Walker asserts, “…contrary to what has historically happened in Latin America, 
episodes of political instability have not been accompanied by democratic breakdown and coups 
d’etat”.482 Although the region has successfully traveled from dictatorship to electoral 
democracy, the consolidation of authentic liberal democracy remains elusive. Through this 
comparative study of Colombia and Venezuela, I attempted to show how a variety of factors 
ranging from: colonialism, the absence of an authoritative state as well as the overwhelming 
presence of a patrimonial state, paradoxically exclusionary political arrangements, competing 
political sub-cultures, clientelism, and international factors have and continue to hinder 
democratic consolidation and governance in Latin America. To provide a more in depth analysis 
of the factors that have historically inhibited the processes of state consolidation and 
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democratization in Latin America, it would be crucial to focus upon a country that routinely 
achieves high marks on democracy indexes, such as Uruguay or Costa Rica. An analysis of these 
two nations would greatly nuance the arguments about democracy that I have posited in this 
study.  
Since the third wave of democratization, almost every nation in the region currently 
possesses a formal democratic regime – except for Cuba and as this study has shown, Venezuela. 
In an era characterized by market liberalization, increased international integration, and the 
massive trans-national movement of people, any future study of democracy in Latin America 
will need to consider the formidable challenges to democracy presented by globalization – 
namely the growth of income inequality and informality. These realities seek to threaten the 
viability of truly representative and responsive regimes not only in Latin America, but 
worldwide. The two case studies that I have considered here are pieces of a larger project crucial 
to the preservation and advancement of democracy. 
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